Dear all
I think we might be getting side-tracked here.
I actually agree with much of what has been said about the virtues of metaphor.
At one point I felt that there was a confusion about what constituted an
analogy and a metaphor, at which point I offered a differentiation based on
their form (22/07/03). My contribution will continue to be on that topic:
at which point I think I disagree with Klaus when he says: (1) "one could
also say that the act of naming something (like a ship, a baby, or a
product) is literally false". On the other hand I agree with what he then
says (2) "because there are no truth conditions associated with naming
something, this does not make naming literally false". But I am a bit
puzzled because I do not see how (1) follows from (22/07/03). I said
(22/07/03) "metaphor states something that is literally false". Klaus's
example of a speech act "I name this ship" does not state something that is
literally false. Therefore, by my definition, "I name this ship" is not a
metaphor, for the reason that Klaus also thinks it is not a metaphor. [Or
have I missed something here, Klaus?]
I confirm my general approval of the virtues of metaphors before I make my
next comment (a speech act)
.
Tim says that the truth of "design is weaving" is irrelevant. I disagree.
As I said (23/07/03) it is the literal untruth that cues us to interpret
this as a metaphor. Therefore the truth value IS relevant, BUT only as the
spur to a particular type of interpretation. What seems to have been
misunderstood in the correspondence is that I am claiming this stage of the
interpretation of the metaphor is only the beginning, not the end. Once one
has identified something as a metaphor, then one can gain all of the
virtues of plural interpretation that we all agree are valuable. One of the
interesting questions about metaphor is "how do we know it is a metaphor".
This is important because we are then cued to [in a manner of speaking] to
consider the author's intentions (cf. Chuck 22/07/03), rather than to
interpret what is said "at face value" [literally?].
Michael
At 12:31 23/07/2003 -0400, klaus krippendorff wrote:
>michael, kari-hans, chuck
>
>michael wrote:
>
>It seems to be a universal
>definition of metaphor that the primary cue to it being recognized as a
>metaphor is its literal falsehood or inapplicability, followed by a more
>creative interpretation of how this literal falsehood might nonetheless
>tell us something about the subject.
>
>this definition entails the bias of a representational view of language
>well enshrined in our western modernist version of science. it relegates
>metaphor, just as you say, to something literally false, suitable to poets
>and the stuff of creative literature but to be avoided in more serious
>endeavors, in science for example, for the confusions this trope can cause.
>
>using an analogy to speech act theory, by this very reasoning one could
>also say that the act of naming something (like a ship, a baby, or a
>product) is literally false. from my perspective, because there are no
>truth conditions associated with naming something, this does not make
>naming literally false. truth is simply irrelevant. because of this,
>austin thought of other conditions, for lack of a better word called
>felicity conditions, that must be met for speech acts to be considered
>appropriate. for example, the namer must be accepted as having the
>authority to name, be sincere about it, the name must be accepted and used
>by others, etc.
>
>metaphors have little to do with truths but much with changing our
>perception of something -- without comparison, which is what analogy
>does. i would even go so far that it does not merely change someone's
>perspective (which presupposes a thing to exist that could be viewed from
>different angles). it is the perveived thing that becomes something else,
>let me add, unnoticeably.
>
>What I said about Aristotle was his aversion to "argument from analogy".
>This is quite different to arguing that metaphors are useful because they
>change our perspective on a subject. I agree entirely with the latter. We
>would shoot ourselves in the foot if we sent all our metaphors up in smoke!
>
>When Chuck prefers the construction "design is like weaving" to my "design
>is weaving" I think he sacrifices an important part of the metaphor's
>power. Its very assertiveness forces us to reappraise our view of design.
>Also, because it is more-or-less cryptic, the author cannot control the
>interpretation (as Chuck asks) and that enhances the plurality of meaning
>and hence rhetorical impact.
>
>again, we objectify the world when we say that metaphors change "our view
>of" something. look what is happening right now. using the metaphor of
>terrorism to describe the events we are experiencing gives the government
>the license to wage war, imprison people, introducing a network of
>suspicion and creating a technology of surveillance that changes the
>fabric of our lives. if we don't like what we see we need to start using
>different metaphors. unlike analogies, metaphors that work are immensely
>powerful.
>
>for the same reasons, i am also not happy with the suggestion that
>metaphors have multiple meanings or are ambiguous. sure a designer can't
>control these meanings, but if the source of the metaphor is widely
>shared, its entailments may well be strikingly predictable, have very
>pointed consequences, as exemplified in the metaphor of terrorism.
>
>klaus
>
>At 19:17 22/07/2003 -0400, klaus krippendorff wrote:
> >the discussion becomes confusing because it draws on old metaphysical ideas
> >
> >mike writes:
> >Firstly "design is like weaving" is not a metaphor.
> >
> >true because the statement compares design with weaving. it suggests a
> >similarity between two phenomena, which in a more careful analysis would
> >reduce to an analogy of the form A is to B as C is to D -- as michael
> >points out below.
> >
> >i am disagreeing with the reason that michael is giving:
> >
> >The reason is that [in the linguistic context differentiated by Klaus]
> >metaphor states something that is literally false.
> >
> >in literal language we speak of truths but in metaphorical language we
> >speak of appropriateness, as chuck and michael correctly assert. in
> >judging whether a metaphor is appropriate or not, truths simply do not
> >play a role.
> >
> >It therefore need to
> >make an assertion rather than a comparison, e.g. "designing is weaving".
> >The power of the metaphor comes from the plurality of allusions that this
> >[literally false] assertion makes. To this extent I agree with Chuck that
> >"It is only when transferred understandings are recognized to be
> >appropriate in the new context that one has really successfully applied a
> >metaphor;" although, of course, one cannot determine whether this condition
> >has been met.
> >
> >aristotle's attitude against metaphor stems from confusing truths with
> >appropriateness. he said that because metaphor addresses one thing in
> >terms of another, the other cannot be what one is talking about and hence
> >falsity it introduced.
> >
> >however, when one acknowledges that metaphor changes one's perception of
> >something usually difficult to see or describe, like design, then metaphor
> >becomes something altogether different from a true statement. it says
> >something of how to look at something. "design is weaving multiple
> >perspectives into cloth" says something that might require far more words
> >or may not become as clear when expressed literally.
> >
> >metaphors are indispensable in most innovations and inventions where
> >something new is being conceptualized without precedent except from the
> >source domain of the metaphor used.
> >
> >metaphors may be misleading, like "the human brain is a soft
> >computer." but the use of this metaphor has fuelled much of computer and
> >cognitive science, especially artificial intelligence. this metaphor is
> >inscribed in much research and development, makes funds available until it
> >hits a dead end and a new metaphor is created and pursued. (what the
> >brain really is is out of our reach)
> >
> >klaus
> >
> >Analogy, on the other hand, makes a comparison of a specific form: A is to
> >B as C is to D. "A woman needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle" has the
> >form of an analogy. We infer the relative need of a woman for a man from
> >our supposed greater appreciation of the relative need of a fish for a
> >bicycle. This is called "argument from analogy", an activity much frowned
> >upon by logicians and Aristotelians because it is unspecific about which
> >aspect of female need is unfulfilled by men in ways that fishy needs are
> >unfulfilled by bicycles. For example, we might understand that both
> >bicycles and men are unsatisfactory modes of transportation for either
> >whereas they might seem equally satisfactory as objects of derision.
> >
> >Have a good Summer
> >Michael
> >
> >At 15:35 22/07/2003 -0400, Charles Brunette wrote:
> > >Lubomir wrote
> > >
> > >"Any attempt to look for other relationships might
> > >discredit
> > >the use of use the metaphor and might provide reasons
> > >for rejecting the
> > >argument."
> > >
> > >I agree. I believe that the use of metaphor in design
> > >is just such an attempt to explore the relevance and
> > >credibility of ideas (or to convey an understanding of
> > >them).
> > >
> > >A metaphor indicates a "frame of reference" where
> > >understandings in one domain may afford understandings
> > >potentially applicable in another. Ken's example
> > >"design is like weaving" identifies useful
> > >information,
> > >structures,forms,behaviors,technologies,expectations,
> > >associated cultures, etc. only some of which will be
> > >appropriate in a given situation. It is only when
> > >transferred understandings are recognized to be
> > >appropriate in the new context that one has really
> > >successfully applied a metaphor. The criteria for
> > >metaphorical fit may vary from being extremely fuzzy
> > >(as in the design of poetry perhaps) to being highly
> > >technical and explicit (the action of a weaving
> > >machine) it is the process of applying metaphor that
> > >needs operational explication and support at any level
> > >(even if the process is never overtly manifested and
> > >thus may appear to be implicit.) I think your use of
> > >the term heuristics needs definition when applied to
> > >metaphorical thinking.
> > >
> > >Regards
> > >Chuck
> > >
> > >Dr. Charles Burnette
> > >234 South Third Street
> > >Philadelphia, PA 19106
> > >Tel: +215 629 1387
> > >e-mail: [log in to unmask]
> >
> >************************************************************
> >Dr Michael A R Biggs
> >Reader in Visual Communication
> >
> >Faculty of Art and Design, University of Hertfordshire
> >College Lane, Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
> >United Kingdom
> >
> >Telephone +44 (0)1707 285341
> >Fax +44 (0)1707 285350
> >E-mail [log in to unmask]
> >Internet
> ><<http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html>http
> ://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html>http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html
> >
> >Coordinator of the Centre for Research into Practice
> ><<http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm>http://www.herts.
> ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm>http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm
> >
> >************************************************************
>
>************************************************************
>Dr Michael A R Biggs
>Reader in Visual Communication
>
>Faculty of Art and Design, University of Hertfordshire
>College Lane, Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
>United Kingdom
>
>Telephone +44 (0)1707 285341
>Fax +44 (0)1707 285350
>E-mail [log in to unmask]
>Internet
><http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html>http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html
>
>Coordinator of the Centre for Research into Practice
><http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm>http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm
>
>************************************************************
************************************************************
Dr Michael A R Biggs
Reader in Visual Communication
Faculty of Art and Design, University of Hertfordshire
College Lane, Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
United Kingdom
Telephone +44 (0)1707 285341
Fax +44 (0)1707 285350
E-mail [log in to unmask]
Internet http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html
Coordinator of the Centre for Research into Practice
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm
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