Dear Ken and others,

Thank you for your excellent posts on theory. I would like to comment and
add a couple of extra themes. I apologise now for potential
inconsistencies, poor grammar and spelling. I’m writing under pressure (see
below) with no time for revision or editing.

For us in the design research field, I feel there is an important
difference that is yet to be recognised between ‘technical definitions’ and
other forms of definition. Unambiguous tightly bounded technical
definitions of terms and concepts are a key feature of strong theory making
traditions in well-established disciplines (for a fuller discussion, see
Klein, 1996).

It is technical definitions that are central to theory making – theories
are stated in these tightly defined technical terms.  Further, these
technical definitions are taken ‘as given’ for most of the time by most
theory practitioners in a field – they are not usually open to moment by
moment redefinition ore reinterpretation (or at least not so in fields
recognized for competence in theory development.

In many cases, technical definitions of terms bear little resemblance to
the definitions of the same terms in common use (for example the technical
meaning of  ‘hypertension’ refers to elevated blood pressure, whereas the
term hypertension in general means a high level of tension (as in a tight
rope on a child’s swing)). In other cases, meanings may refer to a specific
instance. For example, the technical definition of the term ‘atom’ in
physics is of an entity that lies between molecule and more elementary
particles. The more general definition has atom as the smallest particle –
clearly not true in physics. There are an enormous number of technical
definitions of terms that differ substantially from common definitions
across most disciplines (some more examples that spring to mind
are ‘pressure’, ‘power’, ‘stress’, force’, ‘work’, ‘momentum’).

An important issue is the way that the characteristics of these technical
definitions are chosen on epistemological grounds. Epistemological issues
take precedence. Alignment with etymological history of use is helpful but
not the main priority. In the realm of technical definitions, the central
criteria are ‘What should we use ‘X’ to mean, and how can we best tightly
circumscribe that meaning?’ rather than ‘What does X mean?’

Dictionaries are frequently weak on technical definitions – especially when
they focus on the use of terms as used because they focus on everyday
language. For example, I note that the definitions of ‘theory’ you
reprinted from Mirriam-Webster's dictionary (many thanks!) are unusually
weak because of its choice of persons quoted. Most of the use of ‘theory’
quoted was of a non-technical nature. There are several specific areas of
study whose focus of research is theory qua theory and as far as I could
see, none of the persons quoted were renowned for this expertise. Even
Giddens does not fall into this class because his main activity is the use
and modification of theory, rather than research into theory qua theory.
Contrast, for example, definitions of terms in a general dictionary such as
Merriam or OED, and definitions in technical dictionaries of  (say)
Philosophy, Sociology, or Engineering.

From a theory building perspective, the important thing is to carefully
craft technical definitions that result in terms that describe
epistemologically useful, conceptually independent and orthogonal
entities.  These technically defined entities are the tightly defined
concepts that can be used unambiguously by researchers across a field of
study to build and extend unambiguous theories that usefully represent
concrete and abstract situations.

In short, what I’m suggesting is that we in the design research field need
are technical definitions of key terms such as design, theory, creativity
etc. More strongly, I’m suggesting that the successful route to these
technical definitions is via their epistemological utility. I’m also
suggesting that it will be unsuccessful if we attempt to make these
definitions mainly on the basis of common, non-technical, use of terms and
through dictionaries that do not describe definitions in terms of
epistemological relationships to other concepts or which focus solely on
the etymological history of uninformed or common use of terms.

A sidetrack I’d like to sketch (I’m writing a more detailed post on this)
draws attention to five significant aspects of theory: representation,
tight technical definition, the use of formal operations, unambiguity, and
utility. Theories, concepts and definitions are representations. (Most
representations, however, are not theories, concepts or definitions). Tight
technical definition is important to identifying exactly what they are
representations of, whether these representations are accurate, and what
the limitations of the representations are. Building and extending theory
involves applying formal operations to theory elements. These formal
operations include: simple prepositional logic (equivalent, subset of, and,
or, implies etc), mathematical manipulation of formulae, and the
application of tools of critical thinking. Minimising ambiguity is the key
feature in all of these for creating value and utility from theory making.
The importance of reducing ambiguity is often neglected yet is the driving
force behind the establishment of the enormous literatures on interpretive
research. The extensive literatures on phenomenology, critical theory,
hermeneutics, grounded theory, alternative paradigms, post-positivism,
symbolic interactionism etc can be seen as different ways of minimising
ambiguity in theory. Each of them focuses on a different aspect of how we
as humans introduce ambiguity (perception, ideological bias, hegemonic
influence, language interpretations etc).

From a perspective of addressing ambiguity, the differences between
interpretive and empiricist research are relatively insignificant.

As far as I can see, the most significant split in theory is that between
causal and correlatory approaches. This is especially problematic when
correlatory models of relationships between ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ are
carelessly or accidentally regarded as causal representations.  This
problem can be found in much the same form in systems disciplines and in
those disciplines that focus on stimuli and responses or causal factors and
consequences. The depth and consequence of this problem are great because
it is so extensive. The problem stems from epistemological category
confusion due in part to limitations in data gathering techniques. There
are many disciplines in which theory is made about why people act in
certain ways in particular circumstances (e.g. history, economics,
psychology, management, marketing, and design research). The causal
explanation, of agency and behaviour, lie in understanding the physicality
of how people function. Non-physical theories (e.g. thinking, emotion,
motivation, group behaviour, attitudes, personality attributes) are
epistemologically in a different frame that cannot provide direct causal
representation. These other approaches, however, have the advantage that
correlatory data is relatively readily accessible. The difference in
convenience, however, might mask but does not avoid the difficulty that,
due to their epistemological and ontological status, they cannot provide
casual explanation.

This causal-correlation problem of theory making about human functioning
has led to many confusions being introduced into the literatures of theory
making.  Stepping back a bit, and going to Popper’s main work on theory
making,  ‘Unended Quest’ (Popper, 1976), he suggests that theory, external
observations and subjective perceptions lie in three
incommensurate ‘worlds’. Put simply, Popper argues that it is not possible
to prove theory as true or false by observations or subjective perceptions.
Instead, he argues that theory is only validated in terms of other tightly
defined theories. This is now widely accepted in the appropriate fields of
philosophy (the same also applies in relation to the other
incommensurabilities, i.e. its not possible to prove subjective perception
by external observation or theory, and its not possible to prove objective
observation by subjective perception or theory). In many theory literatures
is found extensive evidence that it has been assumed that correlatory
evidence creates theory.  This is a significant issue because it confuses
distinctions between, concept, correlation, theory, model, prototype,
problem definition, representation, internal imagogenic perception,
feeling, emotion and a host of other concepts.

The causal- correlatory split in theory making differentiates types of
theory and ways of building theory. A causal representation of a situation
is a result of deep understanding of how a situation functions in terms of
its physicality. This may involve concepts that are simply place markers
(e.g. the use of the concept of ‘glucose tolerance factor’ to represent
something that is yet unknown in theory representations of the physiology
of hypoglycemia). Its primary focus is, however, to create theory that as
representations has strong mapping onto the physical causal processes.

Correlation-based representation contrasts with causally based theory in
many ways . The development of  correlation-based representations is via
the identification of statistically significant correlations
between ‘causal factors’ and ‘outcomes’ to fix the constants in a
mathematical formula (e) that emulates the data. There are an infinite
number of formulae that can be used for this task and there is no
requirement that the formula (e) chosen map in any way onto the causal
mechanisms. In fact, they are often chosen for administrative convenience.
If the phenomena is relatively smooth and unchanging in its behaviour then
correlatory formula offer the basis for interpolating between data, and for
projecting a small way beyond data. In situations that are marked by strong
changes (such as many design situations) correlatory representation of data
offers little utility beyond simplifying the presentation of the data. It
is questionable as to whether this justifies them being viewed as ‘theory’.

Entirely a different problem, and needing more time and space than I have
is the situation in which simplified system models are based on correlatory
data. These models are commonplace in the literatures of management,
systems, education and learning. Characteristic of these models is a lack
of epistemological consistency (now increasingly recognized as a serious
weakness of systems approaches to modelling); a foundation in correlatory
rather than casual understanding of phenomena; and a mode of representation
that sacrifices correspondence with underlying theory for simplified
conceptualisation. That is, there has been a shift from a theory
representation to a reformulation as tool for teaching or managing. In
terms of theory development, this raises concerns if the underlying theory
becomes accidentally (or carelessly) reformulated such that the teaching
tool is regarded as the theory (the unfortunate status of the teaching
models of Kolb, Schon and other researchers working in management and
education).

Finally, is the question of literature about theory qua theory. In
libraries using the Dewey decimal classification system, such texts can be
found in the following sections: 101, 111, 112, 121, 142, 165, 401, 501,
601, 701, 801, 901. For some reason the social sciences and religious
studies (200 and 300) don’t have much to do with studying theory as theory
and the philosophy of theory (some might say it shows!).

Finally, finally, the twenty-eight topics you identified match well against
the 9 level meta-theoretical taxonomy of design theory I developed in the
mid 1990s (Love, 2000b, 2000a). The taxonomy should point to other areas of
weakness in design theory. The most obvious one that isn’t yet emerged in
the list is the relationship between design theory and designers’ thinking
and feeling.

Finally, finally, finally: Popper’s three incommensurate worlds model can
be applied to theory. In that case, it distinguishes between:
· Theory as objectively seen (formulae, written theories etc)
· Theory as subjectively perceived (e.g. internal imagogenic models
of objective representations of theory, or theory internalized so it shapes
imagogenic perception and agency through affective influences)
· Theory as theory (the ontological and epistemological status and
identities of abstract characteristics of theories)


Best wishes,

Terry

______________________

Dr. Terence Love
PO Box 226
Quinns Rocks
Western Australia 6030
Tel/Fax +61 (0)8 9305 7629
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______________________

Klein, E. (1996). Conversations with the Sphinx: Paradoxes in Physics (D.
Le Vay, Trans.). London: Souvenir Press.
Love, T. (2000a). A Meta-theoretical basis for Design Theory. In D. Durling
& K. Friedman (Eds.), Doctoral Education in Design: Foundations for the
Future (pp. 45-54). Stoke-on-Trent, UK: Staffordshire University Press.
Love, T. (2000b). Philosophy of Design: a Meta-theoretical Structure for
Design Theory. Design Studies, 21(3), 293-313.
Popper, K. R. (1976). Unended Quest: an intellectual autobiography. La
Salle, Ill: Open Court.


Text copyright (c) 2003 by Terry Love. All rights reserved.
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