ken,

you are puzzled about being called an objectivist by several people and
claim this isn't so.

to me, an objectivist argues that there are facts outside ones ability to
observe them, that the task of language is to describe these objectively,
that is, by excluding the role of the observer/describer from the statement
of facts, as if they described objects regardless of how and by whom.  this
view of entails a construction of mind as an ideally unfailable organ,
common to all reasonable people, that abstracts from sensory experiences and
describes them accurately, truthfully, consistently, etc. by one and only
one logic.  (and if that abstraction is inaccurate, then the human mind is
flawed).  the communicational practice associated with these notions is
mono-logue.

you demonstrate this stance for me when you ask questions like:  what is IT?
what IS THE appropriate DISTINCTION?  is IT TRUE that?  questions like these
accept answers that are objectively true, i.e., according to validity
criteria that are assumed applicable generally, uni-versally, and without
reference to observers/describers/designers in conversation with each other.
validity criteria stem from a theory, as chuck suggests, that detaches the
observer from the observed and fails to account for the use of language by
real people in conversations such as in this discussion group (including how
the questions by one person direct the attention of another, me, for
example).

an embodied use of language would encourage you to acknowledge that you are
putting out claims whose truth depends on their acceptance by others, that
objects are not there but constructed in conversations and actions, that
language is not primarily descriptive but does something to their users
(wittgenstein), that the world is in the process of being made and remade as
we speak, that there is nothing there without our experiencing it (including
metaphorical extensions of these experiences), that ethics is involved
whenever we are concerned with people other than ourselves.  the
communicational practice associated with these notions is dia-logue,
accepting multiple logics, multiple voices in conversation.

i like to locate design in the latter domain -- but this is my preference
for it opens unprecedented possibilities for humans

you cherish consistency, which assumes one logic ruling supreme.  if you do
not want to be called an objectivist, then you might try another way of
languaging and the world may change for you

cheers

klaus

,

klaus krippendorff
gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
the annenberg school for communication
university of pennsylvania
3620 walnut street
philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
usa


-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhDs in Design
[mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf Of Ken Friedman
Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2003 10:12 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: False Consciousness, Contradictions, and Self-deception. --
response to Chuck Burnette


Dear Chuck,

Your interesting note to me has two parts. The first part addresses
the thread on false consciousness as a thread, rather addressing its
content. The second part offers your thoughts on the content of the
thread. Let me answer the first part first.

You ask, "Why so much investment in the abstract notion of false
consciousness?"

The answer is clarity.

I am not invested in the abstract notion of false consciousness.
Rather, I am interested in clarifying issues concerning three
converging topics. False consciousness is one. Contradiction and
self-deception are the other two.

Early in the larger series of threads on design learning, Terry Love
asked an interesting question. Some list members pursued Terry's
question, some others denied its validity or importance, and one or
two denied that there exists such a phenomenon at all. The other two
issues came in later.

These themes have surfaced recurrently over the past month. At some
point, I became interested enough to analyze the full thread
carefully in an effort to articulate the implicit and explicit
questions.

These past few months, I have been rereading Soren Kierkegaard,
Ernest Becker, and Norbert Elias. I am also examining Karl Jaspers,
whose work I have never read properly. When the threads came up, it
triggered some interesting resonances. When the issues triggered such
an interesting series of denials and refutations, I became more
interested still.

Terry's initial question involves an issue that is common and
difficult in dealing with doctoral research and other forms of
research involving reflection and the use of self as research
instrument.

List members clearly hold a great variety of views on any of the
specific questions I have articulated. Nevertheless, it seems to me
that most of us agree that the issue of reflection and awareness of
self in research is an important issue.

The importance of this issue is the reason I have been taking so much
time to tease out and articulate the questions in the past two posts,
and the questions yet to come on contradiction and self-deception.

We seem content to touch lightly on the themes of some list threads,
moving past without digging deeply. In this case, the issues recurred
and converged often enough over a month of discourse that I wanted to
look deeply and to articulate the questions.

None of the questions I ask implies a position or answer. I want to
clarify the questions to see where they might lead.

On the issues, you write:

"Understanding what is going on in the mind of another must depend on
having a 'theory' of how their mind is working. This requires
imputing their intention, level of awareness, knowledge and values as
well as probable ideas and actions. Writers such as Daniel Dennett
and Steven Pinker have noted how such an 'intuitive psychology' is
essential to the capacity to understand and empathize with others -
without it we could not interpret their utterances or behavior.
(Children learn to interpret others by forming a 'theory' of what the
other is thinking, often mimicking thought and behavior to learn what
is involved.)

"It seems to me that detecting false thinking and helping to correct
it is what Terry is really talking about. I think the task of the
mentor is to carefully uncover the student's intentions, the
information they are basing their thoughts on, their concepts and
approach regarding it, and their application of values, and
knowledge. Then the task becomes one of advising them by referencing
similar content in your own mind.

"Self deception can be identified by analyzing whether an intention
is consistent with the other dimensions discerned while
contradictions appear when content is inconsistent. In other words,
we should look at consciousness in terms of the thinking it supports."

By and large, I agree with you. I must think more deeply on what you
write, but it feels right to me.

Where I disagree slightly is in restricting false consciousness to
false thinking. Kierkegaard's investigation of the categories of
despair "viewed under the aspect of consciousness" suggests some of
the kinds of issues that ought properly to be considered in an
inquiry of this kind.

I do not suggest that this is the only topic or even the most
important topic to be considered on a list such as this. I do argue
that this is an interesting and important topic, and I believe it
will yield interesting results for those who are willing to dig into
the topic deeply enough. The issue is not an abstract notion, but a
category of pedagogical, philosophical, and psychological inquiry
located in the larger context of design learning. One of the key
aspects of this topic is that it directly involves issues of advising
and mentoring doctoral candidates. As such, it is one of the rare
topics specifically on the theme of doctoral education rather than
the other issues in design research and research training that are
important here.

Hope that explains why I am interested.

Your note to Michael Biggs arrived just as I was about to post this.
At the risk of a premature response to Klaus Krippendorff - and to
your note - I want to clarify my position explicitly on a few issues.

Klaus has labeled my position "objectivist." You have gone further by
stating, "False consciousness, it appears, is being put forward as an
objectivist construct with a Cartesian contradiction." This does not
represent my view. If someone has argued for false consciousness in
an objectivist, Cartesian sense, it would be helpful to point clearly
to the argument rather than to suggest that everyone who has
addressed this issue so far has taken an objectivist or Cartesian
viewpoint.

Keith Russell's notes referred to Sartre, and Michael's to
Wittgenstein. My earlier notes referred to Kierkegaard, Becker, and
Freud, as well as to Argyris and Schon. Kierkegaard's perspective is
quite the contrary of a Cartesian perspective. Kierkegaard
distinguishes his view as existential and - in one book - distinctly
unscientific and subjective. While I am not arguing Kierkegaard's
position, I am saying that his views are one central range of issues
that I would argue deserve consideration. So does the work of Argyris
and Schon on reflective practice. I discussed their work in my posts
of August 28 and September 2. The appropriate balance of subjective
and objective positions is also at the heart of clarified
subjectivity.

An evolving thread that permits us to build fruitfully on each
other's ideas must attend to the ideas, rather than to the way that
one person or another labels them. If anyone has argued from an
objectivist stand implying a Cartesian contradiction, it would help
to have it restated and cited clearly. What I observe are more
nuanced positions and overlapping views.

For my part, I am asking questions in the hope of developing useful
distinctions. To do so, I am attempting to summarize and articulate
the multiple issues in an interesting thread on subtle topics. It
seems to me that there is much useful reflection in many of the notes
posted here. The fact that these issues have come up repeatedly
suggested to me these issues deserve reflection.

Best regards,

Ken

--

Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Department of Leadership and Organization
Norwegian School of Management

Visiting Professor
Advanced Research Institute
Faculty of Art, Media, and Design
Staffordshire University