Hi Ken

You said some science (must/needs to be) is inhuman & then trans-human
using the example of mathematics and I am having difficulty with the
meaning of this.

Are you suggesting (when describing inhuman science) that mathematics etc.
are features of the world? From your example are you saying that the
information in the world has an informational correspondence (exists in the
same formation) as the human-social knowledge-thing we know as
maths-science etc?

Are you suggesting when you say trans-human that science through the
mathematics example is a 'held in common' feature of mind or mankind? Or
that it presents immutable 'truths' that all must accept?

I know that you realise where I am going with this but please let us follow
this track because I believe Terry's question is so vital for my postgrads
also.

Bunge, M. (1983) stated that (epistemological) methodologies should not be
confused with methodics …they are not only about what we do in knowledge
'finding' they are also about how one should best proceed in/through our
(version of) 'searching' intent… so that knowledge is 'reliable'; 'valid' etc

Thus there are values and hence humanity at all levels… are there not?

What follows from a measurement which is seen to be apart from humanity &
thus from error?...(surely this is a human value that denies human value as
a source of its own validity).

Another question that i am compelled to ask is why does the question of
false consciousness only apply to self-referential studies...are some
researchers immune from false consciousness because their methodology does
not require them to refer to self (is that possible) ... are some research
methods also a kind of cultural-normative vaccine against error?

An excellent text available in my area is Linda T. Smith's (1999)
Decolonising Methodologies it presents a Maori context Indiegenous approach
to the idea of research.

Thanks to Jan and Klauss…I will read the text over the weekend

Apologies for my pointy questions

Norm



Epistemology & methodology / Mario Bunge1983.
 Publisher Dordrecht, London

At 11:25 AM 17/09/03 -0700, Ken Friedman wrote:
>Dear Norm,
>
>Thanks for your recent notes. I have been following the thread with
>great interest. For the last five days, I have been trying to write
>up a reasonably short note summarizing the central questions.
>
>Here, I would like to respond briefly to your fine post.
>
>In existential terms, false consciousness has little to do with
>reliability in a scientific sense. For Kierkegaard, the imperative
>aspect of working through false consciousness has to do with
>self-understanding and existential commitment.
>
>One of Kierkegaard's books addresses the dialectical relationship
>between reliability in the scientific sense and existential issues.
>This is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript of 1846.
>
>Kierkegaard reflects deeply on the different natures of truth. In
>religious and feeling issues, he examines historical and rational
>speculative approaches to find them inadequate. He does not reject
>the correspondence theory of truth of the possibility of
>contradiction. Rather, he sets it aside as inappropriate to the task
>of religious and existential life.
>
>He then goes on to discuss how we know what we know in subjective and
>existential terms. Here, he clarifies a form of ethical and religious
>thought linked to Socratic inquiry as distinct from the abstract
>scientific thinking of modern rationalism. This is why the book is
>labeled unscientific. The designation is intended to make clear what
>it is that we work with when we work in a philosophical or
>psychological frame.
>
>This relates to the first of your two postulates, "No methodology
>is, or can ever be free from the multiplex of human errors."
>
>Johan Olaisen and I have wrestled with this issue in terms of its
>appropriate application to research. Some years ago, Johan coined a
>term "clarified subjectivity," that addresses exactly the kinds of
>issues that are appropriate to the human sciences. If we cannot be
>free of error or free of subjectivity, we must ask how we can best
>use our abilities to understand the issues we consider. This is where
>Johan began with his early work on clarified subjectivity. We have
>taught doctoral seminars in information science based on this
>approach, and I have been adapting some of this to design research.
>(We presented a paper on clarified subjectivity at La Clusaz. It is
>in the proceedings.)
>
>Your second postulate deserves reflection in two dimensions.
>
>You write, "the elimination of the human condition from research is
>dangerous because it produces an inhuman science." This is true. More
>important, some forms of science are and SHOULD BE inhuman.
>
>Mathematics is inhuman. So is physics. So are vast areas of biology,
>chemistry and many of the logical and natural sciences. Most of these
>sciences have human subfields linked to or located within them.
>Mathematics education and some branches of applied mathematics would
>be examples of this, along with the history and philosophy of
>mathematics. Mathematics itself is inhuman.
>
>In contrast, the human and behavioral sciences cannot be inhuman.
>They address and involve human understanding, human behavior, human
>perceptions, and human feelings. At the same time, some of these
>fields may have inhuman subfields linked to or located within them.
>Econometrics and statistical modeling theory would be examples of
>this, as would the purely abstract study of many research methods.
>
>It is up to us as thinkers and doers to distinguish between episteme
>and phronesis and to make use of that distinction. To know something
>that is inhuman in an abstract and objective sense does not commit us
>to inhuman actions based on our knowledge.
>
>The failures of understanding that arise from this lead away from,
>rather than closer to realizing our human qualities. For example, it
>has been a post-modern fashion to blame the terrible deeds of the
>twentieth century on the Enlightenment as though the existence of
>technological possibilities requires us to use those possibilities.
>The argument becomes thin when we fail to recognize that the
>Enlightenment also led to the concept of universal human rights, and
>the theory of democratic participation and enfranchisement for all
>human beings. Enlightenment science offered the scientific
>foundations for a technology that can commit mass murder.
>Enlightenment philosophy states that we are free not to employ this
>technology. The challenge of human and inhuman science is that the
>same inquiry and principles that create beneficial technologies are
>often linked with adverse technologies.
>
>Some of the things we know may be inhuman. This raises no problems at all.
>
>In contrast, we should not be inhuman in our thinking and our use of
>what we know. The attempt to become inhuman or the attempt to act as
>if we are inhuman leads to great problems.
>
>All possibilities are open in some sense. We are ethically obliged to
>employ phronesis - wisdom, good judgment, and prudence - in deciding
>which possibilities to pursue.
>
>The technical and scientific information, knowledge, and skill
>required for wise choices are often the same information, knowledge,
>and skill involved in evil choices. A scalpel can be used for surgery
>or murder. A hammer can build a house or crack a skull. We do not
>prohibit these tools based on the possibility of improper use. We
>restrict the ways in which they may be used.
>
>Returning to Kierkegaard, this is where the issues of consciousness
>and false consciousness become significant.
>
>Kierkegaard's project involved knowing ourselves, understanding what
>is worth doing, making an existential commitment to what is best in
>life. This is the Socratic quest. While this involved religious
>dimensions in Kierkegaard, the existential framework outside
>religious commitment involves a self-awareness that probes the layers
>and levels of consciousness.
>
>It is here that relation of the states and conditions of
>consciousness becomes important and valuable.
>
>In terms of Kierkegaard's approach, inquiry into consciousness and
>the effort to win through over false consciousness is important for
>the reasons given in Norm's two postulates. The examination of
>consciousness and a reflective existential commitment to virtue and
>wise action is only possible when we acknowledge fallibility and seek
>to act in humane (and appropriately human) ways.
>
>In my view, the issues that Terry raises pose no conflict with Norm's
>view. Stating that we face the problem of unreliability in reflective
>research is another way of stating what Norm states in stating that
>no method is or can ever be free from the multiplex of human errors.
>Speaking for myself here - and not for Terry - I'd say this is
>exactly why it is vital to reflect on and work through the many
>layers of consciousness in any research that requires using the self
>as an instrumental part of research inquiry.
>
>One can never transcend the self, at least not while we remain
>embodied. This, in effect, is a principle of the sophisticated
>psychology developed centuries ago by Buddhists philosophers and
>theologians. To be embodied and woven into the web of human
>experience is also to be partially trapped by the chains of illusion
>(maya) and fate (karma).
>
>What is new in the late twentieth century is the understanding of how
>embodiment contributes to thought, to wise cognition, to better
>philosophy and to better science. This is the central point in a
>major stream of research undertaken by such figures as Antonio
>Damasio, author of Descartes' Error, or George Lakoff and mark
>Johnson, authors of Philosophy in the Flesh.
>
>As I will propose in a later note, awareness of consciousness and
>inquiry into false consciousness helps us precisely in addressing the
>issues Norm brings up. Understanding how to do that wisely involves
>some of the problems and questions that have been posed by Klaus
>Krippendorff. I will try to address these when I finish a note that
>is taking me some time.
>
>Thanks, Norm, for this fine contribution. Your two postulates have
>helped me to crystallize thoughts and make progress.
>
>Warm wishes,
>
>Ken
>
>
>
>Norm wrote:
>
>-snip-
>
>You said ... anything to do with sense of self, ego, feelings, self
>perception of cognition, confidence and certainty is unreliable ...
>
>I have doubt about these issues because it seems to me that there is
>an enormous amount of myth building and self-deception at the core of
>this dilemma. This is evident to me through the manner that some
>social domains prompt people engaged within certain research
>paradigms to come to perceive and then believe that they and their
>work are immune from these essentially human attributes ... and then
>propose that their immunity from humanity fallibility is an asset.
>
>I want to make two comments on this now
>
>1. No methodology is or can ever be free from the multiplex of human errors
>
>2. The elimination of the human condition from research is dangerous
>because it produces an inhuman science
>
>I will return to this a bit later but I hope my comments draw some responses
>
>-snip-
>
>--
>
>Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
>Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
>Department of Leadership and Organization
>Norwegian School of Management
>
>Visiting Professor
>Advanced Research Institute
>School of Art and Design
>Staffordshire University
>
[log in to unmask]
Norman Sheehan
Lecturer
Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Studies Unit
University of Queensland
Brisbane Old 4072 Australia