Klaus, Kari-Hans, Chuck et al

It is the case that I was trying to be more specific than previous
correspondents and so I adopted a very firm line. I would be interested to
read examples from Klaus of what is excluded (and there may indeed be some,
or we may disagree about whether they are metaphors, etc).

Regarding my "literally false" and Klaus's disagreement with my reasons...
There is a difference between the question whether something is a metaphor,
and the question whether it is an appropriate metaphor. My reason applied
to the first question and not to the second. It seems to be a universal
definition of metaphor that the primary cue to it being recognised as a
metaphor is its literal falsehood or inapplicability, followed by a more
creative interpretation of how this literal falsehood might nonetheless
tell us something about the subject.

What I said about Aristotle was his aversion to "argument from analogy".
This is quite different to arguing that metaphors are useful because they
change our perspective on a subject. I agree entirely with the latter. We
would shoot ourselves in the foot if we sent all our metaphors up in smoke!

When Chuck prefers the construction "design is like weaving" to my "design
is weaving" I think he sacrifices an important part of the metaphor's
power. Its very assertiveness forces us to reappraise our view of design.
Also, because it is more-or-less cryptic, the author cannot control the
interpretation (as Chuck asks) and that enhances the plurality of meaning
and hence rhetorical impact.

Thank you for your interesting responses
best wishes
Michael

At 19:17 22/07/2003 -0400, klaus krippendorff wrote:
>the discussion becomes confusing because it draws on old metaphysical ideas
>
>mike writes:
>Firstly "design is like weaving" is not a metaphor.
>
>true because the statement compares design with weaving. it suggests a
>similarity between two phenomena, which in a more careful analysis would
>reduce to an analogy of the form A is to B as C is to D -- as michael
>points out below.
>
>i am disagreeing with the reason that michael is giving:
>
>The reason is that [in the linguistic context differentiated by Klaus]
>metaphor states something that is literally false.
>
>in literal language we speak of truths but in metaphorical language we
>speak of appropriateness, as chuck and michael correctly assert. in
>judging whether a metaphor is appropriate or not, truths simply do not
>play a role.
>
>It therefore need to
>make an assertion rather than a comparison, e.g. "designing is weaving".
>The power of the metaphor comes from the plurality of allusions that this
>[literally false] assertion makes. To this extent I agree with Chuck that
>"It is only when transferred understandings are recognized to be
>appropriate in the new context that one has really successfully applied a
>metaphor;" although, of course, one cannot determine whether this condition
>has been met.
>
>aristotle's attitude against metaphor stems from confusing truths with
>appropriateness. he said that because metaphor addresses one thing in
>terms of another, the other cannot be what one is talking about and hence
>falsity it introduced.
>
>however, when one acknowledges that metaphor changes one's perception of
>something usually difficult to see or describe, like design, then metaphor
>becomes something altogether different from a true statement. it says
>something of how to look at something. "design is weaving multiple
>perspectives into cloth" says something that might require far more words
>or may not become as clear when expressed literally.
>
>metaphors are indispensable in most innovations and inventions where
>something new is being conceptualized without precedent except from the
>source domain of the metaphor used.
>
>metaphors may be misleading, like "the human brain is a soft
>computer." but the use of this metaphor has fuelled much of computer and
>cognitive science, especially artificial intelligence. this metaphor is
>inscribed in much research and development, makes funds available until it
>hits a dead end and a new metaphor is created and pursued. (what the
>brain really is is out of our reach)
>
>klaus
>
>Analogy, on the other hand, makes a comparison of a specific form: A is to
>B as C is to D. "A woman needs a man like a fish needs a bicycle" has the
>form of an analogy. We infer the relative need of a woman for a man from
>our supposed greater appreciation of the relative need of a fish for a
>bicycle. This is called "argument from analogy", an activity much frowned
>upon by logicians and Aristotelians because it is unspecific about which
>aspect of female need is unfulfilled by men in ways that fishy needs are
>unfulfilled by bicycles. For example, we might understand that both
>bicycles and men are unsatisfactory modes of transportation for either
>whereas they might seem equally satisfactory as objects of derision.
>
>Have a good Summer
>Michael
>
>At 15:35 22/07/2003 -0400, Charles Brunette wrote:
> >Lubomir wrote
> >
> >"Any attempt to look for other relationships might
> >discredit
> >the use of use the metaphor and might provide reasons
> >for rejecting the
> >argument."
> >
> >I agree. I believe that the use of metaphor in design
> >is just such an attempt to explore the relevance and
> >credibility of ideas (or to convey an understanding of
> >them).
> >
> >A metaphor indicates a "frame of reference" where
> >understandings in one domain may afford understandings
> >potentially applicable in another. Ken's example
> >"design is like weaving" identifies useful
> >information,
> >structures,forms,behaviors,technologies,expectations,
> >associated cultures, etc. only some of which will be
> >appropriate in a given situation. It is only when
> >transferred understandings are recognized to be
> >appropriate in the new context that one has really
> >successfully applied a metaphor. The criteria for
> >metaphorical fit may vary from being extremely fuzzy
> >(as in the design of poetry perhaps) to being highly
> >technical and explicit (the action of a weaving
> >machine) it is the process of applying metaphor that
> >needs operational explication and support at any level
> >(even if the process is never overtly manifested and
> >thus may appear to be implicit.) I think your use of
> >the term heuristics needs definition when applied to
> >metaphorical thinking.
> >
> >Regards
> >Chuck
> >
> >Dr. Charles Burnette
> >234 South Third Street
> >Philadelphia, PA 19106
> >Tel: +215 629 1387
> >e-mail: [log in to unmask]
>
>************************************************************
>Dr Michael A R Biggs
>Reader in Visual Communication
>
>Faculty of Art and Design, University of Hertfordshire
>College Lane, Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
>United Kingdom
>
>Telephone +44 (0)1707 285341
>Fax +44 (0)1707 285350
>E-mail [log in to unmask]
>Internet
><http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html>http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html
>
>Coordinator of the Centre for Research into Practice
><http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm>http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm
>
>************************************************************

************************************************************
Dr Michael A R Biggs
Reader in Visual Communication

Faculty of Art and Design, University of Hertfordshire
College Lane, Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
United Kingdom

Telephone +44 (0)1707 285341
Fax +44 (0)1707 285350
E-mail [log in to unmask]
Internet http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/creac/html/intrombiggs.html

Coordinator of the Centre for Research into Practice
http://www.herts.ac.uk/artdes/research/cr2p/index.htm

************************************************************