All:

This is a somewhat lengthy response to the ongoing exchange re: Metaphor and
Analogy, but I trust it will not motivate anyone on the list to utter Churchillian
comments along the lines of "This document, by its very length, prevents itself from
being read."  The Metaphor and Analogy exchange has been very interesting to this
point, and I felt compelled to put my oar in -- and quite simply, I haven't had time this
evening to make this response any shorter.  At any rate, I hope that list members will
demonstrate reasonable kindness and understanding, and that some things of
interest, use and relevance might be found herein.

Comments

I'll begin with the last (most recent) comment first.  Charles asks, "[f]rom a practical
point of view, how does a designer become satisfied with a relationship they
perceive?"  I'd like to suggest that the question of "satisfaction" in this context may be
directly related to the integration of logic, discovery, meaning and conceptual
enhancement.  But where does such a constellation reside?  Let's see if we can get
to some type of plausible answer by the end of this note.

Klaus states "there are places for metaphors, metonymies, and analogies ... it is
useful to understand their different workings, not confuse them".  Absolutely;
confusion is not helpful.  I would suggest that it is not only useful to clearly
understand, but essential as well.  Knowing more about the extent and nature of the
'places' Klaus mentions is, I think, one of the most important tasks we share -- and
this may be a connection to where logic, discovery, meaning and conceptual
enhancement reside.  It is the ongoing exploration of such 'places' that motivates my
own research on innovation, as well as this extended response.

Michael observes that "[w]e would shoot ourselves in the foot if we sent all our
metaphors up in smoke!"  I would add that if we created that much smoke (it would
be an almost incomprehensible volume given the countless metaphors we use, most
of which are highly flammable!), we'd be hobbling about with our self-inflicted
injuries and buried at least up to our necks in a rather large pile of noses, dutifully
sliced from spited faces.  But I'm not sure we could see any of that anyway, given all
the smoke.

Charles asks about "how metaphorical projection might be modeled in
computational systems and how such systems might support the 'surface
representations' in such metaphorically guided (intentionally directed, designerly
(sic)) dialog as Klaus describes."  This is extremely interesting and potentially very
helpful, and suggests that the elements and processes of (what Charles calls)
'metaphorical projection' have the potential of being clearly identified, quantified and
eventually run in simulation.  This further suggests the necessity for a working
'designerly' ontology.  I think that, in the end, this most likely will be achieved.
However, to get to this type of family of products (an excellent and very challenging
set of design projects, perhaps?), we need to build a very good conceptual model of
what it is we think we are dealing with.  See Appendix "A" for some interesting
information about IEEE's 'Standard Upper Ontology Working Group' which may have
relevance to these ideas.

Tim asserts that "[g]ood metaphors change the way we feel about things, which
changes the way we understand things.  They do not change the way see things:
good analogies can do that.  And they too, can change we understand things," and
later adds "[m]etaphors don't work because they are correctly identified (by their
literal untruthfulness) and then properly interpreted.  They simply generate feelings
in the receivers.  They are speech acts--spoken actions that have impact.  What, if
any, truth value might be assigned to them has no impact."  There is no denying we
are awash in a sea of speech acts that have impacts, and that how and why our
feelings affect our thinking (and visa-versa) may in large part not yet be well-
understood, but I think these assertions and the questions that are concealed within
them might be properly revealed, and made somewhat clearer and perhaps more
useful if, to the extent we are capable, we carefully examine the interrelationships
among feeling, thinking, understanding, and the tools we employ to understand and
do these things.

I agree with Michael that truth value is relevant to the comprehension of metaphor,
especially in accord with the conditions he describes as a "spur" to a particular type
of interpretation that he suggests takes place at the "beginning stage" of metaphoric
interpretation.  This is an exceptionally important observation because it illuminates
the notion that in thinking about metaphor-related elements and tools of comparison
and comprehension, we are also thinking about processes that are interrelated,
undergo change, take place over time and are at once a combination of the explicit
and implicit.  With this, we can again be brought back to the notion of seeking a
system of computable elements and processes subject to explication, representation
and then operational simulation.  Perhaps this is an inevitable direction of
conceptual development regarding systems that are amenable to our efforts at
modeling such things as design.

The Heart of the Matter

I think that all perception, cognition, and feeling is analogic in nature, and that these
things are all of a piece; that is, what and how we perceive, think, feel, experience
and derive meaning are deeply interconnected and related, and depend on the
many functions and types of comparison, both explicit and implicit, in which we
regularly and consistently engage.  I think that on the most abstract level, we do
these things (perceive, think, feel, experience, derive meaning) by virtue of an
idiosyncratic knowledge structure which we each build and modify throughout our
lives, yet hold relatively constant in form and process, if not extent and nature; that is,
we build knowledge in the form of some relatively stable, yet changeable and
changing assemblage of comparable and interrelated elements that have relatively
consistent and modifiable relationships with each other.

I suspect many of these relationships are deeply recursive and thereby allow us to
simultaneously engage both in knowledge (re)structuring and useful exploration of
the 'place' that Klaus mentions, where "metaphors, metonymies, and analogies"
(and, I would argue, all other comparatives) reside and operate (and, I think that
'place' is rather large, although I am not entirely sure how we might measure such a
thing).  In thinking this way, it seems I may be in the same boat as Charles; that is,
such elements, structures and processes may in the end be understandable (at least
in part) as explicit computation and, when fully articulated, can be made to simulate
what it is we think we have modeled out of our explorations.  In suggesting this,
rather than slicing off thinking from feeling in our exploration of metaphor in relation
to design, I am suggesting that they be most usefully thought of as deeply
interwoven.

Such an assembly (or what we might usefully call a "knowledge architecture") of
relatively stable and reliable yet modifiable elements, determined in major part by
the relatively consistent relationships among that structure's elements as well as our
processes of perception, thinking, feeling and experiencing, is founded, I think,
entirely on relationships among multifaceted processes of comparison -- the
identification and selection of the elements or portions of those elements which have
features or characteristics that can be and are both juxtaposed and compared.  Note
that I am not at this point differentiating between conscious and non-conscious
identification and selection; I think proceeding in this way allows us to acknowledge
what Kari-Hans underscores as "the importance of the knowing-how-it-feels or tacit
understandings and uses of metaphor and analogy ...".

I further think that it's important to reflect on the idea that the elements, or some of the
features of the elements we employ to engage in explicit or implicit comparison, can
be seen and understood as variously incomplete.  I think this is so not only by virtue
of our limited capacities, but also by virtue of their actual incompleteness; either way,
I think it is safe to assert that we do not know all there is to know about all (or even
any) of the elements we employ to structure our knowledge or to make comparisons
(indeed, we might go so far as to suggest it may be the case that not only do we not
know all there is to know, but that we are not even capable of knowing all there is to
know about our knowledge; some may argue this is [perhaps simply or obviously]
the human condition).  Although it may be that some would think of this as a
problem, I think no problem exists here; we are simply presented with a consistent
yet malleable state of affairs that describes and encompasses our growing,
changing knowledge architectures, and that assuming incomplete knowledge does
not mitigate against explication or further exploration of what it is we can know.
Finalizing this last point, I would strongly argue that awareness of what I have
posited as incompleteness of structural and process elements of our knowledge
architectures is essential to our ongoing processes of discovery, understanding and
application (this is connected to perceived dissonance).  I think this applies in all
fields of inquiry and endeavour, especially that of design.

Comparisons

So, how do we go about exploring, thinking about, comparing and making use of
things that we know, and at the same time exploring, thinking about, comparing and
making use of those things that we don't, thereby building and modifying our
knowledge architectures?  Let us stop for a moment to consider some generally-
accepted definitions having to do with comparison.  The definitions and examples
which are appended to the bottom of this note are related to language use, and
serve to illustrate how we hold and relate certain kinds of concepts and ideas having
to do with perceiving, thinking, feeling, and understanding, as well as relating those
concepts and ideas to each other.  The list (see Appendix "B") is not complete but it
is useful.

Now, if we generally agree that we all tend to regularly use such comparative
devices, both intentionally and unintentionally, in various combinations, and to
various degrees within our languages, we may be afforded a useful window into
some of our most important conceptual processes and, especially, the tools we
employ to learn; that is, by thinking about such devices, constituent parts, functions
and relationships, we may be able to understand more about how we build and
modify our knowledge, and thereby usefully employ the products of that knowledge.
From this we may also be better able to improve our understanding of insight,
creativity, humour, and design; this may, in turn, allow us to better understand and
explore Klaus' "space".

Insight, Creativity, Humour, and Design

So, let us think for a moment about where insight, creativity, humour, and design fit
into employing such comparative devices to build knowledge, create new products
and enhance our potential for understanding.  In basic terms, I suggest that the
underpinnings of insight, creativity, humour, and design are characterized by the
manipulation of new elements in relation to an already-extant set or sets of
elements, some unique modification of those elements in any number of new
combinations, and / or the alterations of relationships among those elements in our
knowledge structures from which we can then derive fresh meaning and, perhaps,
new utility.

Insight.  I suggest that when we have an insight, we first achieve and realize fresh
meaning from an understanding of such above-mentioned changes in elements and
in their relationships.  We can think about some good examples of such insight:
Kekule and his initial idea having to do with the structure of benzene; Russell and
his initial idea having to do with denotation; Einstein and his initial idea having to do
with the photoelectric effect; Feynman and his initial idea having to do with QED;
Gell-man and his initial idea having to do with elementary particles he would call
Quarks; Newton and his initial ideas having to do with gravity; Archimedes and his
initial idea having to do with the screw; Robin Williams and his initial idea about
what would be shaped into a trademark joke; the list goes on.  Here I am
emphasizing the point made by Michael about a "spur" to a particular type of
interpretation that he suggests takes place at the "beginning stage" of metaphoric
interpretation.  I would add to this the idea of convergence and then recombination
of relevant antecedent elements (or some of their constituent parts) that perhaps
coalesce as the "spur"; as Michael suggests, this is merely the beginning.

Creativity.  I further suggest that when we are creative, we engage in new thinking
and consequent new activities based on our insights that result in changes in the
elements and their relationships (configurations) comprising our knowledge
architecture as it exists in a social network.   I am here completely agreeing with
Kari-Hans about the practical consequences that can be derived from insights that
are directly related to the field of design (as I understand it at this time); that is, any of
us can have the best insights any person has ever had or will have, but if we do
nothing with such insights to move them into the realm of creativity and application,
they remain completely useless (perhaps not to the individual who had such an
insight -- he or she might find ways to use it in other personally-focused ways);
however, such insights remain unavailable and therefore inapplicable when
excluded from any social network context.

Humour.  I would like to spend a moment briefly exploring humour in this extended
response.  Humour is a unique marker for perceived significance of discovery of
dissonance-based meaning, generated by following rules of analogic reasoning,
and leading to a species of structural configuration that is then incorporated into our
overall knowledge architecture.  We all love a good joke and very few people do not
enjoy and appreciate genuine wit especially of the dry variety, and it certainly seems
we can't live without authentic laughter.  Arguments made about the "enriching
nature" of humour, I think, are directly related to understanding how humour
functions as a specific example of the general case of successful analogical
reasoning -- intentionally through design (and sometimes by accident when we least
expect it), this takes place with the exclusion or omission of one or more elements
comprising a network of unique comparisons which the receiver then (re)constructs,
discovering what is missing.  He or she then enjoys the discovery of a "solution" to
the "problem" presented by virtue of the relative incompleteness of the initial joke
structure and conditions.  As far as I know, very few people find much pleasure in
having a joke explained to them, especially in great detail, and such a process can
forever ruin the enjoyment of a perfectly good joke; in general, employing processes
of comparison and the discovery of what has been left out is what makes a good
joke work well.

Here I think we can see that the process of comprehension, or structural knowledge
completion through (re)construction leading to discovery, is central to what Tim has
mentioned, for this is the locus of deep significance of the "feeling" aspect of
metaphor, or, as Feynman observes, "the pleasure of finding things out".  From this, I
would like to make at least one further step explicit and suggest that, at the root of it
all, "getting" a good joke and "getting" a good scientific discovery are very deeply
similar.  That is (and please bear with me as I intentionally repeat in part what I have
written in the previous paragraph, with appropriate substitutions):  "[a]rguments
made about the 'enriching nature' of (scientific discovery), I think, are directly related
to understanding how (scientific discovery) functions as a specific example of the
general case of successful analogical reasoning -- usually, either intentionally
through design (and sometimes by accident when we least expect it), by (having)
one or more elements in a network of unique comparison left out, which the
(scientist, through exploration or experimentation) constructs and discovers as a
'solution' to the 'problem' presented by virtue of the incompleteness of the initial
(scientific) conditions"; again, processes of comparison and discovery of what has
been left out of (or cannot be initially determined in) analogic structure, by whatever
means, is what makes a good scientific discovery work well.

At this point, however, humour and scientific insight and discovery seem to diverge,
at least somewhat (although I acknowledge this may be a chimera):  as far as I know,
as I've stated earlier, very few people enjoy having a joke explained to them and
thereby having it ruined forever, but it appears to be the case that most scientists
derive considerable pleasure from having a scientific discovery explained clearly
and well, and usually in writing.  This is not to suggest, of course, that scientists have
no sense of humour, and this apparent split may have something to do with who is
the storyteller, who is the receiver, who it is who actually engages in the act(s) of
discovery, and the contexts of knowledge and understanding within which all of this
takes place.

Design (or, The proposal is now cast in concrete -- the only question is, will it fly?).
The 'proposal' example in the preceding parentheses provides a reasonably-good
illustration of a mixed metaphor, where some standard and predictable rules of
analogical reasoning are neatly twisted (some might say "botched") at least into the
shape of a pretzel, where a specific set or subset of rules for successful analogical
reasoning may be followed and then recombined and juxtaposed (perhaps) in error,
resulting in the pleasure of surprise and new discovery.  This is why mixed
metaphors, especially of the spontaneous variety, are so often perceived as being
funny -- they have an unanticipated outcome that results from following plausible but
unexpectedly "bent" rules.

So, where does this example, plus the lengthy exposition of which it is a part, take us
in terms of thinking about design?  If we think about understanding a good joke and
scientific discovery as specific examples of the application of predictable rule sets for
successful analogic reasoning (where, in addition, not following the basic rule sets
in their entirely have the potential to create entirely new conditions where
unexpected outcomes, such as novel insight and creativity, can occur), we might
also usefully think about design in this way.  That is, if a joke is understood by virtue
of the unexpected discovery of some further or new degree of completeness (e.g.,
context-driven logical structure), and similarly, if scientific insight is understood by
virtue of a discovery (expected or not) of some further degree of completeness (e.g.,
context-driven logical structure), both taking place by virtue of analogic reasoning
the results of which can then be incorporated into an overarching knowledge
architecture, is there any reason to think that design doesn't operate or function
according to parallel, or, at least, comparable rules, operators and elements?  If this
can be reasonably contemplated, what new things do we need to explore and know
about to better understand what these rules, operators and elements might be?

Conclusion

What I've written here may suggest ways for us to proceed in directions to which
Charles originally alluded -- that is, to further explore "metaphorical projection [that]
might be modeled in computational systems and how such systems might support
the 'surface representations' in such metaphorically guided (intentionally directed,
designerly (sic)) dialog ..."  I suspect that doing so in the list's measured, deliberative
and collaborative manner may illuminate potential routes to the 'places' where logic,
discovery, meaning and conceptual enhancement reside.  It's entirely plausible that
computer-aided, "metaphorically-quided, intentionally-directed 'designerly' dialog"
will be developed to support the exploration and enhancement of design.  See, for
some thought-provoking reading:  "How to Build a Brain" <http://www.kurzweilai.net/
meme/frame.html?main=memelist.html?m=3%23589>.  There is, of course, a great
deal of other material also available to aid in this exploration.

Many thanks and best wishes to all who have managed to plow through some of my
work-in-progress thoughts to this point; and, thanks for the opportunity to place them
here.

Cheers / Bob Este / Ph.D Candidate [interdisciplinary] / U of Calgary
____


Appendix "A"

IEEE's Standard Upper Ontology Working Group
<http://suo.ieee.org/>

(excerpt follows) (The target of the working group is) [t]he standard which will specify
an upper ontology that will enable computers to utilize it for applications such as
data interoperability, information search and retrieval, automated inferencing, and
natural language processing. An ontology is similar to a dictionary or glossary, but
with greater detail and structure that enables computers to process its content. An
ontology consists of a set of concepts, axioms, and relationships that describe a
domain of interest. An upper ontology is limited to concepts that are meta, generic,
abstract and philosophical, and therefore are general enough to address (at a high
level) a broad range of domain areas.
____


Appendix "B"

Comparative Literary Devices (incomplete list; various sources)

Item, followed by Formula / Description, plus example(s)

Metaphor -- "a" is a "b" -- an implied comparison of two things.  Examples:  John is a
wolf.  Design is weaving.  This burger is a tastebud explosion.  His wine-making is
crap.  They took the bait.  This is very sharp cheese.  Here are the doors of
perception.

Simile -- "a" is like a "b" -- a comparison using "like" or "as."  Examples:  Mary's idea
is like a breath of fresh air.  This is as clear as mud.  This result is like the one we got
yesterday.  This refinished tabletop is as smooth as a baby's bottom.  Accelerating
this cannon-ball to just the right velocity would make it a satellite of the Earth, just
like the moon.  His story is as dry as dust and as interesting as sock soup.  This ice
cream tastes like wet newspaper.

Analogy -- "a:b as c:d" -- a paired, two-way comparison often comprised of metaphor
and a species of metonymy.  Examples:  Applying their ideas here is like trying to
mix oil and water.  Oar is to boat as flagellum is to bacteria.  Water is to wave as
ether is to light corpuscle.  Nixon is to Republican Party as turd is to swimming pool.
Limp is to walk as lisp is to talk.

Hyperbole -- extreme exaggeration -- Examples:  I've told you a trillion times to shut
the screen door!  It was so cold that night, we were frozen solid!  This one product
will satisfy your every need.  That new national park is as big as all outdoors!

Synechdoche -- whole used for part, or part used for whole -- Examples:  All hands
on deck.  When the last tail-light disappears down the road, we'll have completed
our task.

Meronymy -- partial ordering of concept types by part-whole relation; the expression
of a part-whole relation between objects or classes of objects that are denoted by
words.  Examples:  A finger is part of a hand, which is part of an arm, which is part of
a body.  (Some aspects of) the classic "spider-inside her, fly-die-why, Horse-of
course" nursery rhyme; etc.

Metonymy -- substituting the name of a thing with an attribute of that thing, or
substituting one thing for another based on their association or proximity --
Examples:  referring to the death of the last surviving member of a family, the final
step of a project or contract, the tipping point of system, etc., by saying "We have
closure" or "It's a wrap"; referring to the monarchy, representatives of the monarchy
or even possessions of the monarchy as "the crown", "crown land", etc.; a judge
giving instruction to a lawyer in the courtroom to move physically closer for a private
consultation by saying "You may approach the bench"; uttering a motivating
statement to achieve a focused team effort, as in, "Let's roll."

____