Dear Klaus,
I don't know the alcoholic stuff but I think I following the reasoning. I recall a quotation that goes "don't bring the drunk man to the sober" (can't remeber who said that).
I'm not against the logic that says the drun k man is in that state of consciousness and the sober man is in some other. But this also implies that I am always in different states of consciousness, when I am sober and when I am drunk - how well I recall any such states and how many states I am open to accepting as "states" is a matter of reflection - even if in the instant. That is, we each vary as to how acute and detailed our reflections are.
I'm not interested in creating a morality from such differences - I really don't care much - except that it impinges on me - that most of the world is mostly ignorant of its state of consciouness (as a reflection) most of the time. Unlike Socrates, I don't set out to disabuse people of their ignorance. But like Socrates, I do believe that when ignorance goes so does the error - that is, a man would not do bad knowingly.
There is a poetics of getting drunk just as there is a poetics of relieving oneself of ignorance. Those who would impose a morality where a poetic might be found are really in denial of their own ignorance.
The common confession of "reformed" people illustrates that they have been bashed into conformity - there are some accounts, rare accounts, that illustrate a poetics - the Monica Welinski "confessions" before a TV audience have several such moments of articulated poetics - she has found her own way to disabuse herself of her ignorance.
So yes, I agree with you Klaus about the logical grounds where such poetics might begin, but I also hold to a poetics of self-knowledge that needs some kind of retrospective determination of self-deception, false-consciousness or plain old ignorance.
all the best
keith
>>> klaus krippendorff <[log in to unmask]> 09/15/03 15:54 PM >>>
ken, michael, keith,
i am interested in reading the 1998 article that you mentioned
but please, let's not confuse the issues.
i have not read fingarette's self-deception book. i imagine it derives from
his earlier work on alcoholism for which he is badly criticized in the
literature. the internet on alcoholism is full of that -- which doesn't
really mean much but it is something one should examine too.
in much of the alcoholism literature, especially in aa, the concept of
"being in denial" has much currency. i know that and guess fingarette is
moving in this tradition, having written much on alcoholism before he did on
self-deception.
one crucial issue pertaining to the principle of non-(self)-contradiction is
the difference between whether an alcoholic, under the influence of alcohol,
is in full control of his or her faculty or not. if s/he is not, then him
or her saying that s/he isn't drunk when others agree s/he is is not a
self-contradiction for the alcoholic. it merely indicates to outside
observers the alcoholic's inability to assess his or her own state when
under the influence of alcohol. if s/he is in control and the principle of
non-(self)-contradiction applies, outsiders can accuse the alcoholic as
lying and then put social pressure on the alcoholic to acknowledge as much.
aa uses social "interventions" of this nature very effectively. but this
does not speak against the principle at all.
let me see what his 1998 article says
klaus
klaus krippendorff
gregory bateson term professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
the annenberg school for communication
university of pennsylvania
3620 walnut street
philadelphia, pa 19104.6220
phone: 215.898.7051 (O); 215.545.9356 (H)
fax: 215.898.2024 (O); 215.545.9357 (H)
usa
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhDs in Design
[mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf Of Ken Friedman
Sent: Sunday, September 14, 2003 8:51 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Self-deception -- book and article by Herbert Fingarette
Dear Colleagues,
Thanks to Michael Biggs for introducing me to Herbert Fingarette. I
went looking for the book, and I ordered a copy.
The 1969 edition seems to be out of print, but University of
California Press brought out a new edition in 2000 with additional
contents by the author. I was interested to note that Fingarette
draws on some of the sources mentioned here, including Kierkegaard,
Freud, and Sartre.
-snip-
Self-Deception.
by Herbert Fingarette
This new edition of Herbert Fingarette's classic study in
philosophical psychology now includes a provocative recent essay on
the topic by the author. A seminal work, the book has deeply
influenced the fields of philosophy, ethics, psychology, and
cognitive science, and it remains an important focal point for the
large body of literature on self-decpetion that has appeared since
its publication. How can one deceive oneself if the very idea of
deception implies that the deceiver knows the truth? The resolution
of this paradox leads Fingarette to fundamental insights into the
mind at work. He questions our basic ideas of self and the
unconscious, personal responsibility and our ethical categories of
guilt and innocence. Fingarette applies these ideas to the
philosophies of Sartre and Kierkegaard, as well as to Freud's
psychoanalytic theories and to contemporary research into
neurosurgery.
Fingarette, Herbert. 2000. Self-Deception. Berkeley: University of
California Press. ISBN: 0520220528
New Edition. [First published 1969 in London]. [vi]+189+[5]pp. Trade
paperback. With a new chapter originally published 1998 as
"Self-Deception Needs No Explaining" in _The Philosophical Quarterly_
(Vol. 48 #192).
-snip-
After ordering the book, I located a copy of Fingarette's 1998
article. I have it in .pdf format. If you would like a copy as an
email attachment, drop me an off-list note with the word Fingarette
in the Subject: header.
Best regards,
--
Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Department of Leadership and Organization
Norwegian School of Management
Visiting Professor
Advanced Research Institute
School of Art and Design
Staffordshire University
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