Perhaps your final point that "being and nothingness are not amenable to
intellectual perception" is appropriate in the sense that it is not
sufficient (nothing is) to adequately deal the problem but my point is that
it is unavoidable even for Easterns. For instance, one of my recently
deceased mentors in martial arts and meditation who could control his body
to an amazing extent, (heart rate, respiration, pain) spent his entire life
trying in his words to "understand thru experience". His views coincide with
my experiences. Irrespective of the depths on reaches in meditation, even if
one reaches the ultimate state of union with the one, the "wild" urges
interrupt and come to the foreground imposing their will or power. Then the
resulting state is or returns to a, as you correctly state, a different kind
of consciousness. And I agree with you that different kinds of
consciousness are associated with different philosophical perspectives. But
how did this come to be if not thru some underlying intellect or
understanding. The alternative is to resign to blind forces. Bergson's
intuition always seemed to me a defensive mode, somewhat like understanding
without the intellect. I argue that return to intellect is eternal. In
meditation, when the mind is cleared, I experience predominantly in a visual
mode, like a dream with language quite secondary. We can speculate that
somehow the neural pathways are altered in unknown ways. Even someone as
advanced as my mentor admitted that ultimately you ask "who is this I" or
"what is this consciousness" for melting into oneness does not resolve our
need to understand.
From a psych perspective, I disagree with N (my greatest influence) who
considered the eastern way to be somewhat cowardly, a running away from the
hardships of life. To me the eastern attempt to control the body and mind is
driven by the need to understand.
Thus I submit that there is no "fundamental distinction between
mentation/language and what is" because they are so intertwined. H I feel
had it partially right insofar as language is one mode of experience that
arises from the underlying N'n struggle. How it comes about is unknowable.
But you will never, I suggest avoid the "thing" in its various
manifestation. In any event although I find the results of intellectual
differentiations, the mind games, quite problematic I can't imagine how to
avoid the interpretations, even in meditation. Isn't this what we are
doing?. I agree with N, there is only interpretation from different
perspectives.
Later today after sparring and calming my aggressive drives by feeding them,
I will attempt to clear my mind, meditate on this again and see what pops
up.
Regards, Richard
----- Original Message -----
From: "James Lomax" <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Sunday, April 27, 2003 8:58 AM
Subject: being and mentation
> On Sat, 26 Apr 2003 18:58:24 -0400, richard <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
> >
> >James' provocative submissions deserve evaluation. I disagree along with
> >Nietzsche that Eastern thought has a "more sophisticated and coherent
> >tradition" and that the problem of being addressed by "endless convoluted
> >speculation" is somehow circumvented by simply and magically determining
> >that 'something either is or isn't".
>
> OK that was slightly more rhetorical, than accurate. My point is/remains,
> however, that there is a fundamental distinction between
mentation/language
> and what 'is', and Western philosophical methods often seem to forget
this.
> Elegant constructions of thought are given some kind of truth value,
> missing the more fundamental point. And then what happens (in academia
> mostly) is those patterns of speculative thought become the accepted and
> normative form of intellectual discourse. Indian and Chinese philosophy
> usually avoids this because it is phenomenologicaly based - ultimately,
> from meditation. The difference is like riding a stationary exercise bike
> and actually getting on the road and going somewhere.
>
> <<We do not begin and end with ourselves
> >because
> >even if there were a self, it would be an interpretation. >>
>
> 'Consciousness' is perhaps a better way of describing this. There's no
> reason to assert that this is all a question of interpretation only. All
> that does is subsribe to the view that Intellect is the ultimate and only
> means of perception or reality, equivalent to 'consciousness'. Which it
> isn't.
>
> There are different kinds of consciousness and - the critical point -
> different kinds of philosophical outlook apply according to what kind of
> consciousness you begin with. Most Western phil. is fiercely
'intellectual'
> ie attempting to cram everything into rational explication. Which is
> impossible. There are a few exceptions - Bergson distinguished between
> intellect and intuition, using the latter term to describe a more non-
> habitual awareness which is not the norm, but a kind of breaking away from
> automatism.
>
>
> >The notion of the equivalence of "logical construction" and the K'n
> >thing-in-itself sounds like a misreading and makes no sense. How does one
> >tie these two concepts together in any consistent acceptable way. And no
> one
> >has submitted the impossible notion that language "is the thing itself"
> >.
>
>
> Hmm. Maybe Heidegger never said this, which may be your reservation here.
> But my point is, however much you wrestle with H, Sartre, Bergson or
anyone
> else, it is ultimately a mind game ie mentation, which is not, in my
> opinion, the necessary or appropriate way to investigate 'being'. When H
> died, I doubt very much if all his years of study made the slightest
> difference to that basic phenemological fact. I would have liked to have
> said to him "Now then H, what was all that about being and nothingness?
All
> those books are't really making any difference, are they?"
>
> - Why would I say this? Because it proves the point that 'being and
> nothingness' are not amenable to intellectual perception.
>
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