Hi all,

I apologize for this late reply to the response that Stephen Mulhall's
gave to my review article of his book. Like Dan Shaw, I think that
Mulhall's thesis that film can *do* philosophy is an important and
provocative one -- and am gratified both for the chance I had to discuss
it and for Mulhall's thoughtful response.

I did want to clarify one point of my review article, that may not have
come across as I intended. Mulhall worries -- on the basis of my
remarks on Bazin -- that I expect him to endorse some specific
metaphysical doctrine as a precondition for his saying that films lay
claim to tell us about reality. That wasn't my intention. I don't
suppose that for a film to present a kind of reality it must involve
commitment to a specifically Bazinian or other sense of "reality."
 Rather, I brought up Bazin in my article, along with and in contrast to
Eisenstein, only to point to two senses in which we might consider that
films themselves raise questions. Obviously, we can raise questions
about films, or we can see that films provide tentative answers to
questions we may raise independently of the film. But to consider what
it might mean to say that films raise their own questions, I thought it
worthwhile to refer to the classic debate about the nature of film that
centers on the figures of Eisenstein and Bazin (without committing
myself to the view that film is either primarily or essentially
formalistic or realistic).

Let's say, first, drawing loosely upon the formalist tradition, that a
special possibility of film is to juxtapose images in ways that call for
the viewer's contribution of synthesis. Then we could say that a way for
a film itself to raise questions would be for the juxtaposition of
images to present some kind of problem, so that the viewer was forced to
consider that problem in his or her effort to make sense of the film as
a whole or of a series of films. As I take it, Mulhall considers the
Alien series of films to raise questions in this way: the series
presents a problem insofar as each film seems to be a reworking and
transformation of similar material, and to make sense of the hanging
together of the series, the viewer is confronted by a series of
questions, like, say, why does Ripley have intercourse in the third
movie when the other two have presented her as resolute in the defense
of her body against any kind of penetration? This question is not
external to the series, but internal in the sense that unless we ask it
and see how the films answer it we cannot really make sense of the
series as presenting a more or less coherent and developing universe and
logic.

If, by contrast, we draw upon the realist tradition, we might say that a
special/unique possibility of film is the presentation/creation of a
kind of reality as it unfolds. I don't take this to be exclusive of the
first possibility, and on my loose reading of the realist tradition for
these purposes I don't take this approach to be committed to any kind of
special ontology. According to this approach, we might say that the
film itself, insofar as it aims to present a world as hanging together,
poses the question by its very existence as a film: does it hang
together? is this a candidate for what we might call a "possible world"
or a "possible reality"? There are lots of questions that go along with
that, but the point to notice is that any answer to this question will
also go some way towards clarifying or challenging or calling the viewer
to think about the kinds of basic assumptions about reality that tend to
come up for question in philosophy.

In that sense, the film itself is provoking, internally, the kind of
work that characterizes philosophy; and, if, furthermore, we can also
say that the films are themselves able to provide resources and hints as
well as evidence for answering the questions they raise, then we could
make sense in at least these two ways of Mulhall's claim that film can
reach the condition of *doing* philosophy.

Nate Andersen

Mulhall wrote that that Alien world:

> is a recognizably human world. It contains alien=
> species and extrapolations of human technological achievements, but it is=
> not a fantasy of human reality, if by that we mean a fictional world that=
> represses or rewrites the fundamental elements of our finitude. If Ripley's=
> readings of her life can seem variously empowering, self-punishing and=
> childlike to and for her, they cannot avoid showing us how our own=
> accommodations with such understandings of human existence can manifest our=
> own empowerment, masochism and immaturity. Does this sense of film as a=
> projected moving image of human reality require a Bazinian, realistic=
> theory about cinema, or a metaphysical ontology (as Andersen seems on=
> occasion to imply)? My sense is rather that my use of the ordinary word=
> 'real' in these contexts needs as much and as little justification as my=
> use of any other ordinary word in this text, or indeed in any text. I am=
> accountable for every word I use, as is any speaker; but I am not bound to=
> give such an accounting in any specific discourse of film theory or philoso=
>phy.
>

--
Nathan Andersen, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Director, International Cinema at Eckerd College
Collegium of Letters
Eckerd College
4200 54th Ave. S. Phone: (727) 864-7551
St. Petersburg, FL 33712 Fax: (727) 864-8354
U.S.A. E-mail: [log in to unmask]