A postscript of issues raised by rejections of "postmodern" theories as
incomprehensible. (Those familiar with Lyotard's work on games will feel at
home with these remarks.)
This rejection poses an interesting ethical question. Namely, in what sense
can we disagree with theories we admit we do not understand? Saying a
theory is "incoherent" is a common (Anglo-American) way of attacking it.
But is it just?
Yes, I'm really asking this as an ethical question. Is it fair or justified
to say an utterance which you admit you do not understand is not itself
justified?
Some theories we should not dispute because we do not know them well enough.
Not understanding and not liking ideas are not sufficient criteria for
denying their accuracy or usefulness.
In other words, here we are substituting aesthetic criteria for epistemic
ones. Of course, our epistemic criteria may include aesthetic ones--that a
theory is not well-formed or parsimonious. But this criteria may generally
be subordinate.
I do not understand all of Einstein's theories. Let's suppose I didn't like
them. Einstein himself didn't like certain consequences people inferred
from this theories--that God "plays dice with the universe," e.g. But that
does not put me in a position to deny that the theories are correct or have
some possible uses. It *did* cause Einstein to reject those consequences,
but others have since suggested the consequences be accepted.
I would not dare tell a physicist I did not believe in quarks because I
thought the arguments for their existence were gibberish. Nor would I tell
a biologist I did not believe in evolution or genes because I thought their
writing was poor.
If I said anything, I would have to say that I did not understand the
theories well enough to agree or to disagree. They may be gibberish *to
me*, but that, alas, is my failing, and not a failing on the part of the
theory in question.
Of course, if you just want to trash some texts, I would say stick to films.
I don't mind saying that David Fincher's movies are disgusting, shallow and
hateful. But I am treating these as aesthetic texts and I am offering an
aesthetic judgment.
On the other side, I do not feel relieved in this case from offering an
analysis. Some ugly and hateful texts (by aesthetic and moral criteria) are
meaningful nevertheless and significant exactly because of their ugliness
and hatefulness. I find certain political rhetoric disgusting on both
levels, yet this is part of reason I fel compelled to combat it.
But perhaps something funny is happening when we react to theories as if
they
were works of art. Yes, some theories court this by trying to write in
such a way as to be interesting *qua* text rather than transparent. This
bothers some on epistemic grounds--that the theory is just 'fooling around
with words.'
But what is the justification for entirely rejecting the epistemic value of
a theory, its ability to produce knowledge, based solely on an aesthetic
objection? Probably the aesthetic objection only functions in tandem with
epistemic and moral ones--this theory's wrong and I don't agree with the
ends towards which it is directed, and it's ugly to boot.
In short, I find the aesthetic objection mis-stated in its importance.
Sincerely,
Edward R. O'Neill
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