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FILM-PHILOSOPHY  2001

FILM-PHILOSOPHY 2001

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Subject:

Re: Pentagon Far More Confused and Uncertain Than Americans Realize

From:

Robert Koehler <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Film-Philosophy Salon <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Wed, 17 Oct 2001 01:55:45 -0700

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (287 lines)

Mr. Carlile--
I think we in this discussion area have been more than accomodating of your
bilious Leninist nonsense for some time. Now that you have vented, operating
like so many tiresome Octoberists I have run into over the years, would you
kindly please leave us alone, so we can discuss film and philosophy as the
discussion was intended. I believe the subtle hint from the editor of this
group has delivered its point, but if it hadn't, a more blunt verbal
instrument is needed. If you aren't going to discuss film philosophy at this
point--after we have long gone past the post-Sept. 11 debate which
sidetracked the main theme--please go somewhere else to pester folks with
your antique, musty and inhuman politics.
Now...what was I saying about ``L'Avventura''....??
Robert Koehler
----- Original Message -----
From: "Karl Carlile" <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Monday, October 15, 2001 1:22 PM
Subject: Fw: Pentagon Far More Confused and Uncertain Than Americans Realize


> PENTAGON SPLIT OVER WAR PLAN
>        Generals at odds with politicians on strategy
>
>         By Julian Borger and Richard Norton-Taylor
>
>  [The Guardian - UK - Monday October 15, 2001]:
>  The Bush administration is growing increasingly alarmed by the
>  direction of the military campaign in Afghanistan after a week of
>  almost continuous bombing has failed to dislodge either Osama bin
>  Laden or the Taliban leadership.
>
>  In the absence of new intelligence on the whereabouts of the
>  Saudi-born extremist accused of masterminding the September 11
>  terrorist attacks, US generals are under pressure from civilian defence
>  officials to send greater numbers of special forces into Afghanistan to
>  try to accomplish what the bombing failed to do - flush out a target.
>
>  But the Pentagon's top brass are reluctant to deploy their best troops
>  in the absence of good intelligence about Bin Laden's whereabouts,
>  and before further bombing has softened expected resistance on the
>  ground.
>
>  The defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is reported to be
>  increasingly frustrated by the caution of the generals and their
>  inability to come up with a creative battle plan. One of his aides was
>  quoted in today's edition of Newsweek as comparing the attitude of
>  today's Pentagon to the conventional thinking familiar in the Gulf war
>  - a thinking now considered to be out of date and inappropriate for
>  the delicate nature of the war against terrorism. "The media are
>  preparing to cover a second Gulf war," the aide said, "and the military
>  are preparing to fight one."
>
>  It was always assumed that the second phase of the military
>  campaign in Afghanistan would involve the deployment of significant
>  numbers of special forces, but as the moment drew closer yesterday
>  differences were becoming more visible over how many should be
>  used and in what manner. Mr Rumsfeld had taken office planning a
>  radical shake-up of the military hierarchy, but did not have time to do
>  so before the US came under attack on September 11. After the
>  suicide attacks on New York and Washington were traced to Bin
>  Laden and his camps in Afghanistan, Mr Rumsfeld gave his top
>  generals the task of drawing up a radical and innovative battle plan.
>
>  His aides predicted that apart from a few opening air strikes to
>  destroy the Taliban's air defences, the war would be a largely covert
>  conflict. Instead the first week of the campaign has involved wave
>  after wave of Gulf war-style strikes, and a rising toll of claimed
civilian
>  casualties.
>
>  The traditionalist generals believe that there are more military targets
>  in Afghanistan which can be hit from the air, and have backed the
>  renewed use of heavy bombers this week, after a weekend in which
>  most strikes were carried out by smaller, tactical strikers launched
>  from carriers in the Arabian sea.
>
>  One potential target is the Taliban's 55th Brigade, made up principally
>  of Arab fighters who are thought to constitute the regime's Praetorian
>  guard.
>
>  The first week of bombing has not "smoked out" Bin Laden or the
>  Taliban leadership from their strongholds, as President Bush had
>  hoped, and the Pentagon's military planners are said to be still
>  operating in an intelligence vacuum. Some feel the job of finding
>  these elusive targets belongs to the diplomats and the spies. "I hope
>  the military isn't given this to solve," General Anthony Zinni, the
>  former head of the Pentagon's central command, is reported to have
>  grumbled to other officers.
>
>  British defence officials were yesterday giving the clear impression
>  that military planners are deeply frustrated by the lack of intelligence
>  about the impact of the air campaign and what next they should do to
>  attack such elusive targets.
>
>  They say they are continuing to look at all the options for the
>  deployment of ground troops, including "small units" - a reference to
>  special forces - or "larger numbers" - the prospect of airborne troops
>  gaining a bridgehead inside Afghanistan as a base for raids against
>  Taliban forces.
>
>  But sources describe the plans as "paper talk" and say no decision
>  has been made.
>
>  Top officers in the Pentagon are leaning away from setting up a base
>  inside Afghanistan on the grounds that it would be vulnerable.
>  Instead the most likely option is that helicopter-borne special forces
>  units will launch their missions from the deck of the Kitty Hawk
>  aircraft carrier in the Arabian sea.
>
>  Military planners are concerned about the approaching winter and the
>  pressures on the Pakistani leader, General Pervez Musharraf, as well
>  as the immediate tactical problem of knowing where to strike against
>  the forces of an unconventional enemy.
>
>  While most of the Taliban's air defences have been destroyed, their
>  light forces and the small open-backed lorries they use to move about
>  the country were reported yesterday to be mostly intact.
>
>  The Afghan militia's deputy prime minister, Haji Abdul Kabir,
>  yesterday offered to hand Bin Laden over to a neutral country if the
>  US provided evidence of his guilt. But the offer, a reiteration of
>  previous Taliban proposals, was immediately rejected by President
>  Bush.
>
>  A White House spokeswoman said: "The president has been very
>  clear: there will be no negotiations."
>
>
>
>
>            WEEK OF BOMBING LEAVES U.S. FURTHER FROM PEACE,
>                                 BUT NO NEARER TO VICTORY
>              by Julian Borger in Washington and Luke Harding in Islamabad
>
> [The Guardian - UK - Monday October 15, 2001]:  At one end of the US war
machine are
> people like Donald Rumsfeld, the ultimate defense intellectual who views
the war on
> terrorism as an intriguing puzzle requiring new ways of thinking. At the
other are
> the long-serving men in uniform such as General Tommy Franks, the former
artillery
> officer leading the campaign.
>
> Gen Franks is the commander-in-chief of the central command, whose
headquarters are
> in Tampa Florida, from where he is orchestrating the air strikes on
Afghanistan. He
> is a blunt, outspoken veteran of the Vietnam and Gulf wars and, by all
accounts, he
> has taken to heart the lessons of both: be very sure of what you are doing
before you
> put soldiers on the ground, and rely as much as possible on the awesome
destructive
> capability of US air power.
>
> The two men embody the different approaches circulating in the corridors
of the
> Pentagon over how to pursue the war on terrorism. Winter is coming to the
Afghan
> highlands and decisions have to be made quickly, but a week's bombing
under Gen
> Franks's command has so far failed to push Osama bin Laden or the Taliban
leader,
> Mullah Mohammed Omar, into the open where they could be picked out by an
air strike,
> or grabbed by special forces.
>
> That would have been considered a bonus in the initial phase of the
campaign, but in
> the absence of such a stroke of luck, differences over how the plan should
proceed
> have come to the surface.
>
> Mr Rumsfeld and his civilian advisers believe the US military does not
have the
> flexibility to combat an enemy like Bin Laden. They point to a
computerized war game
> in 1997 in which the army took on a terrorist organization similar to
al-Qaida, and
> lost. The generals, the analysts concluded, spent too much time looking
for things to
> bomb, and not enough time looking for innovative methods of eliminating
the enemy.
>
> Mr Rumsfeld is reported to be so frustrated with the pursuit of the war by
Gen
> Franks's command, with its emphasis on waves of Gulf-style bombing
sorties, that he
> is pressing to have operational control shifted from Tampa to Washington.
Mr Rumsfeld
> and his circle want to pursue a new military doctrine built around small
groups of
> special forces soldiers who will dart in and out of Afghanistan looking
for
> intelligence and targets.
>
> Uniformed top brass are more comfortable with the technique of the Powell
doctrine -
> named after secretary of state, Colin Powell - which dictates the
overwhelming use of
> air power until the deployment of ground troops is either unnecessary or
met with
> minimal resistance.
>
> This week US and British special forces units are expected to be deployed
in
> Afghanistan, but they are being sent on highly dangerous fishing
expeditions,
> concealing themselves along the sides of dirt roads and mountain paths on
the chance
> that Bin Laden or Mullah Omar, or their top lieutenants, might pass by.
>
> Senior Pentagon officers have pointed out the dangers in such missions.
The terrain
> is littered with millions of landmines, and "butterfly" anti-personnel
mines, dropped
> by Soviet helicopter pilots over hostile territory in the 80s.
>
> Before sending in larger numbers of troops, the traditionalist generals
want to
> continue the air campaign. It has been kept up for seven days, with only a
pause on
> Friday, the Muslim day of prayer.
>
> But such niceties are not helping the state department efforts to keep the
> international coalition together.
>
> At the weekend the Pentagon admitted that an F-18 navy strike aircraft had
> accidentally dropped a 900kg (2,000lb) bomb on a suburb of Kabul, killing
four
> civilians and wounding eight. Latitude and longitude were mixed up when
the
> coordinates were entered into its guidance system.
>
> The Taliban are claiming that civilian victims have been more numerous. In
any case
> the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is blurred. Many of
the "troop
> concentrations" targeted are conscripts who may have been market vendors
only a few
> days earlier and who were rounded up by Taliban press gangs.
>
> These troops have been hit by cluster bombs and on one occasion by a huge
> bunker-buster bomb which would have burrowed into the ground beneath them
and then
> swallowed them as the explosion opened up a gaping crater.
>
> As reports of the casualties percolate into the Middle East and Pakistan,
support for
> the US is fast eroding. A poll of Pakistanis found that 83% supported the
Taliban in
> its confrontation with the US. According to Newsweek, which conducted the
poll,
> support for the Afghan militia jumped by 40% when the bombing began last
week.
>
> The Taliban are beginning to exploit the TV images of US mistakes by
inviting
> reporters to view the damage. This "collateral damage" is inevitable in a
bombing
> campaign. The only way to avoid it is to put troops on the ground, but
that is
> fraught with human, military and political problems. The US population
remains
> virtually unanimous in support of the campaign, but that may change with
the return
> of body bags.
>
> The Pentagon's military leaders have painful memories of the last two
comparable
> special forces missions, which both ended in fiascos - the 1980 "Desert
One"
> operation to rescue US hostages in Iran, and the 1993 raid on Mogadishu,
Somalia, by
> Rangers and Delta Force commandos, which failed at the cost of 18 dead, 73
wounded,
> and two helicopters shot down.
>
> Some in the Pentagon believe Bin Laden may not be in the caves of the
Hindu Kush
> after all, but could be hiding in the warren of slums outside Kandahar.
There, he
> would probably be protected by fervently committed guerrillas. Going in
after him
> would be an operation reminiscent of the Somalia disaster.

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