Much interesting stuff here - I grow concerned that intentionality is
looked at in its soft form of "desire/need" - not that I am no
interested in this soft form of intentionality (i spend a lot of time
thinking about the complicities between need, want and desire) - rather,
I am concerned, as a phenomenologist, with the hard aspects of
intentionality - that is, all instances of perception of any kind are
instances of intentionality. This expands the domain of knowledge - it
also resiticts the gamut of the claim that my knowledge is every known
by anyone - that I know is open to others knowing - how I know is open
to others - the process of my knowing, as its own external evidence is
open to the knowing of others - the indrect consequences of my knowing
are open to others in so much as I might structure them
(concretize/formalize/mediate) - these areas can be explored in much
greater detail than is commonly done - other areas, such as my cognition
of my cognition are not open to others and yet this is the part it would
seem that others wish to claim access to.
keith russell
newcastle OZ
Klaus Krippendorff wrote:
> i agree with much of what you say, tim,
>
> regarding design, terry's notion:
>
> we design things when there is a need or a desire for
> some part or aspect of our world to be different, and
> we cannot immediately specify how it should or could
> be changed.
>
> and your (tim's) modification:
>
> we design things when there is a need or a desire for
> some part or aspect of our world to be different in a
> non-routine situation.
>
> you end up converging on a notion of knowledge as being conscious
> (non-routine) and intentional (need or desire). by focusing on these
> individual subjectivities, you exclude design teams. you also exclude
> the possibility of designers having internalized or routinized their
> knowledge. i am asking myself how we could distinguish between
> subjective states and inter-subjectively verifiable accomplishments?
>
> i am reminded of ross ashby's definition of information as the degree
> to which its beholder's choices have outcomes that succeed better than
> chance. his presumption is that some things always happen.
> information (knowing) ought to make a difference (1) between what
> would happen anyway and what would happen by designers' intervention,
> and (2) howwell people are off after the invention. so what about
>
> we design in the expectation of improving some part or aspect of
> our worlds
> and we do this knowingly to the extent we succeed against what
> would happen
> without our intervention.
>
> you are right to say that knowledge is an abstraction that must must
> ultimately be recognizable in people's knowing, in particularly
> successful practices. a master may well have learned to do this
> routinely. i would be hesitant to require unascertainable
> consciousness as part of the definition of design.
>
> klaus
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