Hi again everyone,

>Jim T. said:
>>
>>Adam, I'm having a difficult time understanding your concept of an entropic
>>principle. Why are energy flows morally significant?
>>
>
>Ah, now this is the crux of my investigation. I am assuming energy flows
>_are_ morally significant and am determined to discover how to formulate
>such a position in a way that folks will be readily able to agree with.
>
>It strikes me there is something ultimately sacred about Life (in human
>form, non-human form, or otherwise) that distinguishes it from inanimate
>matter. That something is the purposeful quest for low-entropy. Whether
>you're a human, a barnacle or a tree, that quest is at the heart of your
>life. With inanimate matter, there is merely random shuffling. The quest for
>low-entropy then is unique to all life; it is a sacred quest that
>nevertheless relies on the inanimate. I call it sacred because without it
>there would be no existence, no consciousness, no time, etc. An entropy
>based ethic then could tie together the animate with the inanimate, the
>animal with the non-animal, the individual with the collective.

Hmmm. . . why not just say that it is life itself that is sacred? Why is
it necessary to undertake the diversionary tactic into "low entropy"-speak
at all?

Perhaps you simply need to provide us with your definition of entropy. But
as many commentators have noted, entropy is overall a rather negative
metaphor for ethics: it connotes disorder and life running down. . .
Zencey for example writes that "entropy is obviously pessimistic. Its use
as a metaphor is a convenient shorthand for articulating a sense that
things are running downhill, falling apart, getting worse. . . . [T]he
entropy process itself is omnipresent. It lies behind all the change in
the physical world. Death, decay, rust, rot--these are obvious
manifestations." And I am not sure I understand your statement that (the
quest for) low-entropy "is unique to all life." Why unique to life?
Certainly entropy is a physical process first and foremost, no?


>
>>How can all animals have intrinsic
>>value? Do they all have it equally? And if they don't, how do you
>>know/determine which animals have it more than others? How do you make
>>environmental decisions about competing claims different animals place on
>>us? And if all animals have it but don't have it equally, don't humans
>>have the more intrinsic value than anyone else?
>
>As hinted at above, all life, animal and non-animal, revolves around the
>low-entropy quest. With an entropy orientation then, all life has an "equal"
>interest in that quest, therefore, and "equal" intrinsic value. However I
>must fault your whole perspective. Intrinsic value is not quantifiable
>("value" is used for lack of a better word). So, no, humans don't have
>"more" intrinsic value than, say, a bacteria.

Frankly, this makes no sense to me. To take the most trivial case: how can
we justify using an anti-bacterial soap to wash our hands?

>>Jim:
>>With due respect, *this* is not possible, given the contradictions implicit
>>in your statement above. Humans are (generally) thought to possess
>>intrinsic value *equally*--how can animals be accorded intrinsic value in
>>"the same way that it is accorded to humans" (equally, that is)? Regan's
>>work in this area is not very convincing. I believe you mentioned either
>>_All That Dwell Therein_ or the _Thee Generation_-- it would help if you
>>gave us some specific passages to consider here for discussion.
>>
>Adam:
>I don't see how anything I'm contending has implicit contradictions. Please
>elaborate on your view here.

Well, the hand washing example for one: how can you square the intrinsic
value of the bacterium with my intrinsic value, and my additional selfish
desire not to die from things like dysentery or cholera?

Intrinsic value _can_ be accorded "equally" if
>you must use a quantitative perspective. I'm not broaching the subject here
>of competing claims; I'm inclined to say they define themselves and
>therefore can redefine themselves into non-existence.

[snip]
>On what specific grounds does one say moral judgement is unique to humans? I
>would say this is categorically untrue, and am willing to elaborate here.

Fine, I'd love to hear it. Obviously you are not talking about barnacles
(exercising moral judgment, that is) here--but what nonhuman animal(s) ARE
you talking about here? Just one example would be fine for starters.

>Philosophy as a discipline, as a facet of academia, okay, you got me; but as
>a part of the judgement that transpires for any living thing? I think not.
>Obviously, I'm not talking about barnacles here; but then who can site facts
>on such a subject (do barnacles know morality?)? Conjecture is conjecture no
>matter how sure of yourself you are. You still hear people mistakenly
>asserting that humans are the only ones with self-consciousness; it is not
>true, but asserting it is one of the ways we blindly make ourselves feel
>like the best.
>
>>the empirical *fact*
>>of human dominion (I pick that term advisedly) is not up for debate--the
>>fact is, we have "dominion" whether we want it or not. The real ethical
>>question is how we excercise this dominion.
>>
>
>This is sheer equivocation on the word "dominion."

Why? Why is this "equivocation"? Contrary to your conjectures about the
moral capacities of all animals (except barnacles of course), humans seem
to be the only ones out there who morally weigh the consequences of their
actions. I don't think beavers file environmental impact statements. I
don't think birds of prey set up charitable non-profit organizations to
further their philanthropic impulses once their appetites for raw meat are
satiated. I'm pretty sure that even the Great Apes don't have a Great Ape
equivalent to Dear Abby when one Great Ape wants to break up with another
Great Ape, but can't figure out the tactful and least hurtful Great Ape way
of doing it. . . .

I pick "dominion" advisedly partly because it is a term that tends to raise
a red flag in many enviromentalists' minds, but also because it is a term
that clearly and accurately describes humans' *moral* role in nature. We
have a choice about our actions (a moral choice, that is)--whereas nonhuman
animals do not have a moral choice.


>>And, as an aside, in this country, at least, well over half the population
>>subscribes to some sort of overtly religious worldview. If one is really
>>interested in changing the world, then wouldn't it be best to start with
>>environmental philosophies written in the language people actually speak?
>>i.e. to begin in a conventionally religious idiom? [etc., etc.]
>
>This is a central not a side issue. As far as I know, the religious
>percentage is quite a bit higher across the globe. I can't tell you how much
>I appreciate and am concerned with this sentiment. It is exactly that notion
>that propels me, that what people hold sacred is what will get them to move.
>It is exactly for this reason that I am not saying simply that energy flows
>are important, but that they are sacred.

Hmmm. . . well, okay--but saying that something is so, doesn't make it so.
Why are energy flows sacred?

Jim T.




I couldn't agree more that
>philosophy and environmentalism need to be written in words that folks can
>understand, and that therefore religious perspectives and issues are
>essential to the tasks that face those proactive among us. In the end, I'm
>hoping to figure out how to cast a viable entropy criterion for moral
>considerability in a religious light.
>
>On that note, please see the excellent book
>
>Maguire, Daniel and Larry Rasmussen. 1998. Ethics for a Small Planet: New
>Horizons on Population, Consumption, and Ecology. Albany: State University
>of New York Press.
>
>It's part of SUNY's Series in Religious Studies.
>
>Adam



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