Hi everyone,

Adam wrote:
>
>I do not equate animal rights with animals not being killed by humans. On
>the contrary. However, wildlife management (as you know, Leopold was a
>wildlife manager) stems largely from hubris and ignorance to our own
>(humans') self-servingness.

All right, I'll nibble. Do you mean this latter statement about wildlife
management in a *historical* sense (about the wildlife profession in other
words), or in a broader sense: i.e. the claim that ALL human management of
wildlife stems from hubris and arrogance?


> In fact what I would
>like to say that both animal rights and enviro ethics should be concerned
>with much more than just harm or happiness. I do not see an emphasis on
>energy flows as essentialy environmental and therefore non-compatible with
>animal rights. I am convinced that if we pursue this line we will see that
>there is some criteria for moral considerability (say, an entropic one)
>which incorporates both animal rights and enviro ethics together. I do not
>believe they should be separate issues.

Adam, I'm having a difficult time understanding your concept of an entropic
principle. Why are energy flows morally significant?

[snip]
> In short,
>I think this is because environmental ethics is laughable for most people
>until animals are first acknowledged to have intrinsic value by way of their
>being alive, in the process of living (which entails both pleasure and
>pain).
[and snip]
>animals' needing it. Where we differ is that I don't think a widespread land
>ethic will attain without _first_ facing the intrinsic value of all animals.


A number of folks have wrestled with this issue of intrinsic value since,
well, since the time of Pythagoras. How can all animals have intrinsic
value? Do they all have it equally? And if they don't, how do you
know/determine which animals have it more than others? How do you make
environmental decisions about competing claims different animals place on
us? And if all animals have it but don't have it equally, don't humans
have the more intrinsic value than anyone else?

>
>>
>>>I agree with Regan that an environmental ethic
>>>is not possible before intrinsic value is accorded to animals in the same
>>>way that it is accorded to humans.

With due respect, *this* is not possible, given the contradictions implicit
in your statement above. Humans are (generally) thought to possess
intrinsic value *equally*--how can animals be accorded intrinsic value in
"the same way that it is accorded to humans" (equally, that is)? Regan's
work in this area is not very convincing. I believe you mentioned either
_All That Dwell Therein_ or the _Thee Generation_-- it would help if you
gave us some specific passages to consider here for discussion.

>
>I think the way that we assume ourselves the most valuable animal is
>dangerous. I agree that the problem is humans thinking we are "above" the
>earth.

I think there is a big difference between considering humans to be more
valuable that other natural entities, and thinking ourselves "above" the
rest of . . . well, "creation," for lack of a better term. Too often in
deep ecologists' (and other environmentalists') minds these two beliefs are
conflated. Considering ourselves more valuable than other
animals/plants/whatever does not necessarily imply the position of human
arrogance that deep ecologists seem to think it implies. This is what Paul
Kirby was driving at when he wrote:

>There is no hypocrisy in making a comparison between exploitative and
>custodial relationships as I understand Steve to making such a comparison .
>Both speak of a relationship based on separateness from the natural
>environment which we are obliged to manage. Since as I see it this
>separateness is created by, humankind's unique ability to make moral
>judgements Steve's argument therefore falls well within the bounds of
>ethical debate.

Separateness doesn't imply the sense of human arrogance represented by the
automatically hierarchical relation of "above" which you seem to attribute
to human thinking. But separateness does imply that we are "different"
from the rest of the animal kingdom in being able to think out the
consequences of our actions, and reason about them from among a range of
future possibilities. No news there. Like Paul says, the empirical *fact*
of human dominion (I pick that term advisedly) is not up for debate--the
fact is, we have "dominion" whether we want it or not. The real ethical
question is how we excercise this dominion.

For as Paul wrote:
>If we are not separate from the natural environment but part of it what
>part of the natural world do we take as the model for our ethical
>behaviour ? I am willing to accept that as recently evolved primates we are
>the inheritors of some unhelpful behavioural instincts. It is the paradox
>of the "part of nature" argument that these behaviours, such as the
>enjoyment of hunting, are close to our "natural" self. We have a choice
>therefore; to be part of nature (and be in part beastly) or be apart from
>and accept dominion over nature. The ethical debate concerns of course how
>we excercise this dominion.
>

[further snippage]


>>CP: you propose a primacy of ecological function (as represented by energy
>>flowing through a system - death, predation and decay being one of the
>>mechanism incidentally). This seems at odds with your views on animal
>>primacy, but perhaps I misunderstand you.
>>
>
>Again, I don't think my entropy orientation is at odds with _the future of_
>animal rights. I hope to work on the details of why this is so. I do not
>mean to replace the sentience/intelligence criterion with a purely humane
>animal-oriented one; I mean more to imply that a properly ordered criterion
>has got to help us see why it is not just we humans who have intrinsic
>value--animals and ecosystems do too.
>
>Again, the thrust of my arguments is geared toward the "average" person--how
>does she or he feel? How can she or he be made to question her or hers
>worldviews?

I would very much like to see/read more of the details of your entropy
orientation, but, and again with all due respect, I am not sure how you
think the entropy metaphor will enable you to communicate with the
"average" person. Perhaps your subsequent postings will make that clearer
for me and for others. But it is something we stress with our students
here: that you have to speak to people where they are-- and in fact that is
one of the central arguments of "eco-pragmatists" (e.g. Andrew Light, Eric
Katz, Bryan Norton, etc.). Light and Katz have been on a crusade the last
few years to develop as many different environmental ethics arguments as
there are possible audiences for those arguments.

And, as an aside, in this country, at least, well over half the population
subscribes to some sort of overtly religious worldview. If one is really
interested in changing the world, then wouldn't it be best to start with
environmental philosophies written in the language people actually speak?
i.e. to begin in a conventionally religious idiom? After all, Gallup polls
conducted in the late 1980s suggest that (at that time), close to 90
percent of the American people claimed still to believe in God--I don't
have more recent figures, nor do I know how that shakes out in other
countries. But religion is still a viable force in society, and talk of
energy flows and entropic relations is bound to get you only so far. . . .

Jim Tantillo





I think part of the reason that environmentalism falters is not
>(as deep ecologists might argue) because of the application of humane
>ideals; rather it is because of the _incomplete_ application of those
>ideals. Again, I do not mean to say anything really about ad hoc animal
>rights activity. I am talking about conceptions of the sacred.
>
>Adam
>
>P.S.: I appreciate your taking the time to respond to my statements.



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