Jim T. said:
>
>Adam, I'm having a difficult time understanding your concept of an entropic
>principle. Why are energy flows morally significant?
>

Ah, now this is the crux of my investigation. I am assuming energy flows
_are_ morally significant and am determined to discover how to formulate
such a position in a way that folks will be readily able to agree with.

It strikes me there is something ultimately sacred about Life (in human
form, non-human form, or otherwise) that distinguishes it from inanimate
matter. That something is the purposeful quest for low-entropy. Whether
you're a human, a barnacle or a tree, that quest is at the heart of your
life. With inanimate matter, there is merely random shuffling. The quest for
low-entropy then is unique to all life; it is a sacred quest that
nevertheless relies on the inanimate. I call it sacred because without it
there would be no existence, no consciousness, no time, etc. An entropy
based ethic then could tie together the animate with the inanimate, the
animal with the non-animal, the individual with the collective.

>How can all animals have intrinsic
>value? Do they all have it equally? And if they don't, how do you
>know/determine which animals have it more than others? How do you make
>environmental decisions about competing claims different animals place on
>us? And if all animals have it but don't have it equally, don't humans
>have the more intrinsic value than anyone else?

As hinted at above, all life, animal and non-animal, revolves around the
low-entropy quest. With an entropy orientation then, all life has an "equal"
interest in that quest, therefore, and "equal" intrinsic value. However I
must fault your whole perspective. Intrinsic value is not quantifiable
("value" is used for lack of a better word). So, no, humans don't have
"more" intrinsic value than, say, a bacteria. The idea that we do is the
cause of many of our problems.

I don't yet know how an entropy criterion will work with competing claims,
especially those that misguidedly pit environment or animal against human
interest.

>
>>>
>>>>I agree with Regan that an environmental ethic
>>>>is not possible before intrinsic value is accorded to animals in the same
>>>>way that it is accorded to humans.
>
>With due respect, *this* is not possible, given the contradictions implicit
>in your statement above. Humans are (generally) thought to possess
>intrinsic value *equally*--how can animals be accorded intrinsic value in
>"the same way that it is accorded to humans" (equally, that is)? Regan's
>work in this area is not very convincing. I believe you mentioned either
>_All That Dwell Therein_ or the _Thee Generation_-- it would help if you
>gave us some specific passages to consider here for discussion.
>

I don't see how anything I'm contending has implicit contradictions. Please
elaborate on your view here. Intrinsic value _can_ be accorded "equally" if
you must use a quantitative perspective. I'm not broaching the subject here
of competing claims; I'm inclined to say they define themselves and
therefore can redefine themselves into non-existence.

The Regan book I'm thinking of is

Regan, Tom. 1982. All That Dwell Therein: Animal Rights and Environmental
Ethics. Berkeley: University of California Press.

>> Since as I see it this
>>separateness is created by, humankind's unique ability to make moral
>>judgements Steve's argument therefore falls well within the bounds of
>>ethical debate.

On what specific grounds does one say moral judgement is unique to humans? I
would say this is categorically untrue, and am willing to elaborate here.
Philosophy as a discipline, as a facet of academia, okay, you got me; but as
a part of the judgement that transpires for any living thing? I think not.
Obviously, I'm not talking about barnacles here; but then who can site facts
on such a subject (do barnacles know morality?)? Conjecture is conjecture no
matter how sure of yourself you are. You still hear people mistakenly
asserting that humans are the only ones with self-consciousness; it is not
true, but asserting it is one of the ways we blindly make ourselves feel
like the best.

>the empirical *fact*
>of human dominion (I pick that term advisedly) is not up for debate--the
>fact is, we have "dominion" whether we want it or not. The real ethical
>question is how we excercise this dominion.
>

This is sheer equivocation on the word "dominion."

>I would very much like to see/read more of the details of your entropy
>orientation, but, and again with all due respect, I am not sure how you
>think the entropy metaphor will enable you to communicate with the
>"average" person. Perhaps your subsequent postings will make that clearer
>for me and for others. But it is something we stress with our students
>here: that you have to speak to people where they are-- and in fact that is
>one of the central arguments of "eco-pragmatists" (e.g. Andrew Light, Eric
>Katz, Bryan Norton, etc.). Light and Katz have been on a crusade the last
>few years to develop as many different environmental ethics arguments as
>there are possible audiences for those arguments.
>

I would like very much to get more to you as it develops. My web site should
be up soon, at which point you will be wecome to read the little I have and
to make comments online.

The communication thing I am very sensitive to and try to be aware of at all
times. Ideaphoria is one thing, a thing for which I'm inclined;
communication is entirely another, an area I'm similarly "devoted" to. An
idea is a waste of time if it is not timeless; I concur with the
anti-deconstructionist view that there are facets of great works which are
discernible as their wide appeal and the ease of their comprehension.

>And, as an aside, in this country, at least, well over half the population
>subscribes to some sort of overtly religious worldview. If one is really
>interested in changing the world, then wouldn't it be best to start with
>environmental philosophies written in the language people actually speak?
>i.e. to begin in a conventionally religious idiom? [etc., etc.]

This is a central not a side issue. As far as I know, the religious
percentage is quite a bit higher across the globe. I can't tell you how much
I appreciate and am concerned with this sentiment. It is exactly that notion
that propels me, that what people hold sacred is what will get them to move.
It is exactly for this reason that I am not saying simply that energy flows
are important, but that they are sacred. I couldn't agree more that
philosophy and environmentalism need to be written in words that folks can
understand, and that therefore religious perspectives and issues are
essential to the tasks that face those proactive among us. In the end, I'm
hoping to figure out how to cast a viable entropy criterion for moral
considerability in a religious light.

On that note, please see the excellent book

Maguire, Daniel and Larry Rasmussen. 1998. Ethics for a Small Planet: New
Horizons on Population, Consumption, and Ecology. Albany: State University
of New York Press.

It's part of SUNY's Series in Religious Studies.

Adam


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