Dear all,
Thank you so much for your previous feedback on the handbook! We now have 36 tools and hope to move into production next week.
I am writing to ask you for your help once more. We are selecting quotes that may help people 'get' the issues. You may have some in mind (that you use in conferences or papers). We have what we need, but I am sure that some crowdsourcing will improve this section!
Some examples below (ideally should be shorter)
1:
One
review of 44 separate CCTV studies, published the same year as the
House of Lords report, showed that the more than £500 million ($780
million) spent on CCTV in Britain in the decade up to 2006 had produced
only modest benefits. The report’s most damning conclusion found that
where CCTV was at its most effective—preventing vehicle crime in car
parks—the same results could be achieved simply by improving lighting in
the parking area.
James Bridle, artista e investigador. Extraido de:”How Britain Exported Next Generation Surveillance”
2:
It’s
hard to explain to regular people how much technology barely works, how
much the infrastructure of our lives is held together by the IT
equivalent of baling wire.
Computers, and computing, are broken. (…)
Every
time you get a security update (seems almost daily on my Linux box),
whatever is getting updated has been broken, lying there vulnerable, for
who-knows-how-long. Sometimes days, sometimes years. Nobody really
advertises that part of updates. People say “You should apply this, it’s
a critical patch!” and leave off the “…because the developers fucked up
so badly your children’s identities are probably being sold to the
Estonian Mafia by smack addicted script kiddies right now.”
Quinn Norton, periodista especializada en cultura Hacker. Extraido de “Everything is Broken”.
3.
An
unfortunate side effect of the development of all these new
surveillance technologies is that the work of journalism has become
immeasurably harder than it ever has been in the past. Journalists have
to be particularly conscious about any sort of network signalling, any
sort of connection, any sort of licence plate reading device that they
pass on their way to a meeting point, any place they use their credit
card, any place they take their phone, any email contact they have with
the source because that very first contact, before encrypted
communications are established, is enough to give it all away.
No
matter how careful you are from that point on, no matter how
sophisticated your source, journalists have to be sure that they make no
mistakes at all in the very beginning to the very end of a source
relationship or they’re placing people actively at risk. Lawyers are in
the same position. And investigators. And doctors.
Edward Snowden. Entrevista de Alan Rusbridger, director de The Guardian
4.
Encrypting
all the things isn’t enough. Encrypting all the things will be hard,
but it isn’t actually enough. However, there are things that we can do
that will actually make a difference in addition to encrypting all the
things. If we start decentralizing all the things, that makes a real
difference. One of the reasons why NSA has been so successful is that,
“well, if we can’t break your security of if it’s going to be
too inconvenient to tap this on the wire, we just show up with a letter
and now you have to do what we say.” There is lots of other places
where this can happen too, we don’t know that much about who else is
trying to compel the companies to do that but I would guarantee that if
NSA is doing it, then lots of other people are doing it as well.
This means that we need to stop using an internet that is build out of
services: APIs are kind counter-revolutionary. It’s over, we need to
stop relying on central services, we just can’t do it anymore, it’s
impossible to build a free internet that is centralized.
Eleanor Saitta, experta en seguridad informática. Extraido de “Ethics and Power in the Long War”
Thank you again!
Gemma Galdon Clavell, PhD
Eticas Research & Consulting - Barcelona office - www.eticasconsulting.com
Universitat de Barcelona (UB) - Security, Technology & Society
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