There are, of course, many refutations of bioutilitarianism (Singer's
view). It is, however, very difficult to refute bioutilitarianism without
refuting utilitarianism - the unpalatable results Singer presents so
starkly are implications of utilitarianism (switching from hedonistic to
nonheonistic utilitarianism doesn't save utilitarianism). While many
philosophers (including myself) are happy to abandon utilitarianism in
favor of a nonconsequentialist (usually, a formalist or a virtue theory)
view, doing so is likely to be equally unpalatable to Singer's opponents.
That is because social welfare systems are, I would contend,
intransigently consequentialist. It's because it invites views like the
ones attibuted to Singer that I reject welfarism.
I prefer to see how
much social transformation can be generated by appeal to a "thick" notion
of equality. Significantly, "luck egalitarianism" reduces back to
welfarism (see
Liz Anderson's essay in the Winter 99 issue of Ethics), and other
versions of egalitarianism do not seem to generate special benefits or
services for people with disabilities (although some of what we are used
to thinking of as "services" - interpreters for people who are deaf, for
instance, alternative formats for printed material, and so on - turn out
to be required not as services but as compensations for discrimination).
This is fine from my perspective, but those who fear Singer because they
think his position invites euthanesia to save the expense of special
benefits owed to people with disabilities should reflect on the
advisability of endorsing, as he does, a consequentialist view.
On Sun, 25 Apr 1999, M.G.Peckitt wrote:
> To all
>
> As I have said in the past I am a philosophy student and
> Singer is standard text for Ethics. I of course do not
> agree with his point on disability and abortion. However
> has anyone, anyone at all written a philosophical paper
> against his view? (not to imply that philosophical
> reasoning is the only and best way toi deal with it) If
> not, I may think about doing so. If you look at his
> reasoning, summarised expertly below, even a first yr
> student can see possible flaws:-
>
> 2. We should act so as to increase the total sum of happiness. This means
> permitting voluntary euthanasia so that persons with disabilities don't have
> to continue with their (less than full-quality) lives.
>
> 3. Acting so as to increase the total sum of happiness also means that it can
> be a positive thing to kill disabled infants. In the case of an unwanted
> non-disabled infant, someone else will probably want the baby. But if you
> kill a disabled infant, then whoever would have ended up caring for that baby
> could have another one -- and both the parents and the nondisabled
> "replacement" would have better quality of life.
>
> To rely on what is called "The Happiness Principle" or
> Utilitarian grounds can be rocky grounds. For example
> whose happiness? How many people have disabilities in this
> world and how many do not. And of those two groups how
> many think the world would be happy killing disabled people
> at birth. Looked at that way the majority may be in favour
> of those who would be in favour of not killing disabled
> people at birth. Thus greater happines might not be
> achieved through following Singers philosophy and thus his
> argument is refutated.
>
> Now has anyone tried doing this properly, unlike my quick
> 1st year philosophy argument. Thank you for you patience.
>
> Michael
>
> ----------------------
> M.G.Peckitt
> [log in to unmask]
>
>
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