I agree with Giles when he writes "To try to define or demarcate science is
based on the mistaken assumption that there is one thing that is science. As a
beginning I think it would be more appropriate to speak of 'the sciences'." My
own twist on this would be to recall that 'science' has always been a general
and imprecise label for plethora of loosely and not-so-loosely related things.
So in other words, we have inherited a fuzzy symbol which legend has it refers
to some fuzzy things we call . If we then forget this, as Nietzsche would say,
then we reify what was never meant to be a discrete 'stuff'. I think those who
have commented that the definitions provided cut to the quick some things
commonly thought to be sciences are quite right to point this out. Pushing the
definitions leads to excluding things we don't want to exclude. The only
answer I can see is to leave the fuzzy label as it is and to try not to be
dissatisfied with the fact that we can't speak precisely about 'it'.
I think Descartes would have had little difficulty in telling us what
'science' deals with. He would say 'science' deals with the physical side of
existence, leaving only the 'spiritual' and 'mental' outside its scope. So in
this view, 'science' might be playing with everything but human information
(like religion or political theory, music, lit, etc.)
"whether pre c20th is actually interesting." is one of those complex questions
( such as: "do you still beat your wife?") which doesn't have an objective
answer. Peter Hingley put it best "people will ultimately study what attracts
them!" What kinds of criteria affect what attracts researchers is another
matter.
John van Wyhe
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