Mr. Keyuan:
Here I attach a map of NLL. By the way, I would like to know who you are. If
you have any more questions about this Korean Border matter, please do not
hesitate to ask me. Professor Kim from Pusan. Korea.
Zou Keyuan wrote:
> Dear Mr Kim,
>
> Do you have a map to show the Northern Limit Line? Regards, Zou Keyuan
>
> > ----------
> > From: Young-Koo Kim[SMTP:[log in to unmask]]
> > Reply To: Young-Koo Kim
> > Sent: Friday, September 10, 1999 2:54 AM
> > To: [log in to unmask]
> > Subject: Comment on Korean Border
> >
> >
> > In addition to Mr. Brendan Whyte's Korean border and Korean border-2,
> > and to comment on Korean Border-5, here are some supplementary
> > informations and comment.
> >
> >
> > 1. What is the Korean sea border, named "Northern Limits Line" which was
> > branded as "ill-legal and invalid" in the North Korean unilateral
> > declaration ?
> >
> > This is the cease-fire line, unilaterally designated by the U.N. Command
> > in the western sea area of korean peninsula at the end of the Korean
> > War.
> > Actually, throughout the whole proceedings of the Korean War, there had
> > not been any substantial Communists' naval forces confronting against
> > the UN naval forces. "The line of contact" in the sea war theatre
> > therefore, had been the marginal lines of the northern part of the
> > Korean Military Defense Zone, the naval blockade area declared and
> > maintained by Commander-in-Chief UN Command, General Mark
> > Clark.(Latitude 39¡Æ35' in the east, 41¡Æ51' in the west,
> > respectively.) "All opposing naval forces shall respect the waters
> > contiguous to the De-militarized Zone and to the land area of Korea
> > under the military control of the opposing side." [Article 2. Section
> > 15, The 1952 Korean Armistice Agreement.] Consequently, the sea area
> > could have only been demarcated according to the land demarcation line,
> > virtually ignoring any UN forces' superiority in air and sea. This was
> > the exact results what the Communists' negotiating tactics expected and
> > had won eventually.
> > To implement this accord, the UN Command had to have its forces retreat
> > from all islands and waters which it had occupied and controlled, from
> > the Estuary of Apllock River in the west; Latitude 41¡Æ51', and that of
> > Tuman River in the east; Latitude 39¡Æ35', way down to the 38th parallel
> > and then had to adjust the cease-fire line in the sea area to the land
> > demarcation line. To do this, the Commander-in-Chief, UN Command had
> > designated the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the west coast, and the
> > Northern Boundary Line (NBL) in the east coast.
> > Generally speaking, in an armistice agreement, the cease-fire line -no
> > matter whether it be on land or on the sea- is one of the most
> > indispensable elements as much as the intention of suspending the
> > hostilities. The indispensable elements in the contents of an armistice
> > agreement could be summarized as; ¨ç the suspension of hostilities, ¨è
> > effective date and time, ¨é duration, ¨ê demarcation line (the
> > cease-fire line) and neutral zone, ¨ë prohibited acts, ¨ì prisoners of
> > war, ¨í return of civilians and commercial intercourse, ¨î consultative
> > machinery and ¨ï miscellaneous politico-military matters. [The Law of
> > Land Warfare, U.S. Army, Basic Field Manual (Washington, July 1956),
> > Para. 487-488.; Howard S. Levie, "The Nature and Scope of the Armistice
> > Agreement," 50 AJIL (1956) 888-900.]
> > However, all those indispensable elements are not necessarily prescribed
> > in an armistice agreement in some manifested manner. In other words,
> > there is no fixed rule or custom which prescribes what provisions should
> > or should not be included in an armistice agreement. [ Clunet,
> > "Suspension d'armes armistice, Preliminares de paix," 46 Journal du
> > droit international prive 173 (1919); Howard S. Levie, Loc. cit.,;
> > Fauchille, Traite de droit international public, (8th ed. Bonfils.
> > Paris.1921), Vol.¥±, p.326. ]
> > And no matter whether the parties specifically provide therefor or not,
> > a general armistice does result in a complete cessation of active
> > hostilities. That is, it results in a cease-fire and there results a
> > cease-fire line established. Without a cease-fire line be established,
> > by definition, there would be no armistice. And once a cease-fire line
> > has been established, it should be respected by the both parties of the
> > armistice agreement. [1907 Hague Convention ¥³. Respecting the Law and
> > Customs of War on Land, Annex Regulations Article 40.]
> > As far as the unique Korean War situations are concerned, the NLL in the
> > west, or NBL in the east, have been crystallized as the fait accompli
> > cease-fire line in the sea area, with the implementation of the
> > armistice agreement. So any attempt to trespassing these lines, by one
> > of the parties would give the other party the right of denouncing it and
> > even in case of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.
> > [Article¥°. Section 7, Article2. Section 13, 15. The 1952 Korean
> > Armistice Agreement.] As far as the NBL in the east of Korean peninsula
> > is concerned, even the North Korea has never disputed its validity as a
> > fait accompli cease-fire line.
> >
> >
> > 2. What does make the North Korea "abruptly" dispute the validity of the
> > NLL, the 46 years old fait accompli cease-fire line ?
> >
> > This sea border issue resurfaced when the two Koreas exchanged gunfire
> > last June after North Korean fishing boats and torpedo boats trespassed
> > this NLL and intruded into southern area for a few consecutive days.
> > South Korean naval boats have tried to persuade them to retreat,
> > desperately. The North Korean boats opened fire against south Korean
> > ships and triggered the armed engagement on June 15. About 30 North
> > Korean sailors were believed to have died, with one North torpedo boats
> > sunk and several others severly damaged.
> > Technically speaking, however, this is not an "abrupt" dispute.
> > Since October 1973, when the North Korean invaded this line, making so
> > called, "the Western Sea Incidents", South and North Korea have often
> > experienced nerve-racking disputes on jurisdiction in the sea area
> > around the five western coastal islands (Paengyong-do, Taechong-do,
> > Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do and U-do).
> > Thanks to the fact that the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement does not
> > have any clear provisions articulating the sea demarcation line, North
> > Korea attempted to break this status quo line by sending patrol boats
> > intentionally trespassing this line, about 43 times consecutively during
> > two months periods, October and November, 1973.
> > The North Korean's assertion at the 346th Military Armistice Commission
> > Meeting which was held on December 1. 1973 to discuss the "Western Sea
> > Incidents", could be interpreted and summarized as that the sea
> > demarcation line in the Yellow Sea area between the two parties of the
> > Korean Armistice Agreement should not be the Northern Limit Line which
> > was designated by the Commander in Chief, UN Command, and had been
> > crystallized as a status quo boundary line but the hypothetical
> > extension line extended parallel to the Latitude from the end of the
> > provincial boundary line between Whanghaedo and Kyong- kido.
> > Such far-fetched assertion from North Korea in the 346th MAC Meeting, as
> > demanding the prior authorization for entering the vicinity of the five
> > western islands, might have seemed to be an unexpected blow, even though
> > it has never been acquiesced by the UNC side, thereafter. But this
> > notorious North Korean assertion was revived again in 1992, at the
> > Military Subcommittee to implement the Non-aggression provisions in the
> > South-North Basic Relations Agreement, discussing the Associated
> > Protocol, pertaining to the Article 11.
> > In this particular Article 11, it is prescribed as that "the South-North
> > demarcation line and areas for non-aggression shall be identical with
> > the Military Demarcation Line specified in the Military Armistice
> > Agreement of July 27, 1953 and the areas that have been under the
> > jurisdiction of each side until the present time". Article 11 of the
> > 1992 South and North Basic Relations Agreement has special meanings for
> > the sea communications between South and North Korea. The relationship
> > between the South and North is defined in the 1992 Basic Agreement as a
> > special interim relationship stemming from the process towards
> > unification. During this special interim period in the process towards
> > ultimate unification, the South and North Korea are supposed to respect
> > each other's political substantiality. They are also supposed to respect
> > each other's fait accompli jurisdiction area.
> > To implement Article 11 of The South and North Basic Relations Agreement
> > and to delimit the sea demarcation line of the non-aggression area
> > between South and North Korea, the most relevant demarcation line in the
> > Yellow Sea area which clarifies "the areas that have been under the
> > jurisdiction of each side until the present time" should be
> > approximately identical with the Northern Limit Line (NLL). But the
> > Military Subcommittee which was convened to discuss the separate issue
> > pertaining to non-aggression, had difficulties in fixing sea demarcation
> > line due to North Korean's abrupt but worn-out assertion about this
> > "provincial boundary line". [Proceeding Minute, The 5th Session, The
> > South and North Military Committee (June 19, 1992). Ministry of National
> > Unification.]
> > The North Korea's third attempt to defy the NLL in the recent unilateral
> > declaration, was basically on the same worn-out strategical theory. But
> > this time, their "provincial boundary line" assertion has been
> > drastically changed and deliberately modified comparing with the first
> > and second one.
> > Now they asserted that the sea demarcation line should be the extension
> > line from the end of the provincial boundary line between Whanghaedo and
> > Kyong- kido extended, "not parallel to the Latitude," but as a line
> > protruding deep into the gulf of Kyongki which constitutes the
> > forefront of Seoul, the capital city of the South Korea, connecting some
> > arbitrary equidistant points between the corresponding islands
> > controlled by the either parties respectively.
> >
> >
> > 3. What shall be the first hand legal appraisal upon the North Korean's
> > new sea demarcation line assertion?
> >
> > With the same old provisions of 1953 Korea Armistice Agreement, the
> > North Korean interpretations have obviously been changed from their
> > original "provincial boundary line" assertion. Needless to say about the
> > inconsistency of the North Korean's own legal stance in connection with
> > the sea demarcation line, their newly redesigned theory seems to be
> > based on the assumption that the legal relations between the two Koreas
> > could be taken as a relationship between ordinary opposite or adjacent
> > states. But South and North Korea both have recognized that their
> > relations not being a relationship between "states", but constitute a
> > special interim relationship stemming from the process towards
> > unification in the Preamble of the 1992 Basic Relations Agreement. So
> > any sea boundary between the two Koreas could never be delineated
> > applying a simple equi-distance criterion.
> > Since the North Korean's assertion is based on the interpretation of the
> > Korean Armistice Agreement, the analysis to arrive a fair judgement for
> > this dispute should also be started by interpreting the relevant
> > provision, Article 2, Section 13 paragraph (b), which reads:
> >
> > Within ten days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective,
> > withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the
> > rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If
> > such military forces are not withdraw within the stated time limit, and
> > there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other
> > side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary
> > for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands",
> > as used above, refers to those islands which , though occupied by one
> > side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were
> > controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that
> > all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary
> > line between Whanghae-do and Kyongki-do. shall be under the military
> > control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the
> > Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, except the islands groups
> > of PAENGYONG-DO (37¡Æ58'N, 124¡Æ40'E), TAECHON-DO (37¡Æ50'N, 124¡Æ42'E),
> > SOCHONG-DO (37¡Æ46'N, 124¡Æ46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37¡Æ38'N, 125¡Æ40'E), and
> > U-DO (37¡Æ36'N, 125¡Æ58'E), which shall remain under the military
> > control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.
> >
> > A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
> > ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty. [Article 31.
> > 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.] Any special meaning
> > which is established by a proviso clause is to be confined to that
> > particular part of provision. This is a general rule of treaty
> > interpretation. Any special meanings which would possibly be
> > established by the proviso should be interpreted as modifying supplement
> > based on and developed from the above-mentioned primary text.
> > ¡Ú In Article 2, Section 13. Para.(b), ¡ºthe primary text¡» is:
> >
> > both opposing sides shall withdraw all of their military forces from the
> > rear and the coastal islands and waters within 10 days after the entry
> > into force of the armistice agreement. .
> >
> > The term "coastal islands and waters" here means those islands and
> > waters which were occupied and controlled by the other side on 24 June
> > 1950.
> > Consequently, the Communist side should withdraw its military forces
> > from all the islands and waters which are located below the 38th
> > parallel, while UNC side should withdraw its military forces from those
> > islands and waters which are located above 38th parallel within 10 days
> > after the entry into force of the armistice agreement as long as such
> > obligations are not exempted by any modifying proviso, based upon the
> > principle of Uti posidetis.
> > The very important point of this provision is that the 38th parallel is
> > still the main reference line in demilitarization. This formula in
> > deciding the cease-fire line, faithfully based on the principle of
> > status quo ante bellum is precisely coincident with the original
> > Communists' stance.
> > ¡Ú In Article 2, Section 13. Para.(b), ¡ºthe proviso¡»is : all the
> > clauses following "provided however".
> > Adopting the principle of Uti possidetis by this proviso, only some
> > parts of the Communist's obligations to withdraw up northwards the
> > respective forces above the reference line of the 38th parallel, are to
> > be modified and exempted to the hypothetical "line of contact" which
> > shall be eventually formed by taking into account the five islands
> > groups under the actual control of the UN Command. The five western
> > islands, namely, Paengyong-do, Taechong-do, Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do and
> > U-do were occupied and controlled by South Korean army, the 17th
> > Regiment of the 1st Division, at about the conclusion of the armistice
> > talks.
> > This was the main compromising accord which had been arrived between the
> > two competing negotiation parties in regards to the cease-fire line
> > issue at the armistice talks. Among other things, this Article 2.
> > Section 13, Para. (b) itself is the stark evidence of such accord. [See
> > also, Foreign Relations of the U.S., Volume 7, p.1413.; William H.
> > Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjum; The Story of the Korean Military Armistice
> > Negotiations (New York: Praeger,1958),pp.73-81.]
> > The descriptions of the latter part of the proviso in Section 13, Para.
> > (b) are nothing but a cautionary and descriptive clause to define the
> > limits exempting the communist's original obligation of retreats.
> > "All the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary
> > line between Whanghae-do and Kyongki-do. " which are under the 38
> > Parallel, should be under the military control of the UN Command by the
> > principle of status quo ante bellum. But the communist's original
> > obligation of retreats has been exempted by the principle of Uti
> > posidetis and they shall remain under the control of the Communists. The
> > limits exempting the communist's original obligation of retreats should
> > be the hypothetical "line of contact" which shall be eventually formed
> > by taking into account the five islands groups under the actual control
> > of the UN Command. This is a matter of course reasoning particularly in
> > the basic logic of an armistice agreement.
> > When it says that "all the islands on the west coast of Korea lying
> > south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the
> > military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command," in
> > the Korean Armistice Agreement Article 2. Section 13, Para. (b), the
> > above-mentioned boundary line could mean the provincial boundary line
> > between Whanghae-do and Kyongki-do. But this could not justify the
> > North Korean assertion as that the sea demarcation line prescribed in
> > this particular provision is the hypothetical extension line extended
> > parallel to the Latitude from the end of the provincial boundary line
> > between Whanghae-do and Kyongki-do. Because even with this awkward
> > clause, the marginal line of exempting the communist's original
> > obligation of retreats shall be the hypothetical "line of contact" which
> > shall be eventually formed by taking into account the five islands
> > groups under the actual control of the UN Command.
> > Indeed, this clause is so awkward that some misinterpretations could be
> > induced. The drafter of the Korean Armistice Agreement seemed to be so
> > much concerned with this worse possibility that in the attached
> > Reference Map-3 of the Korean Armistice Agreement, he put the clarifying
> > "Notes" that the purpose of the line A-B (provincial boundary line) is
> > solely to indicate the control of coastal islands on the west coast of
> > Korea and the line has no other significance and non shall be attached
> > thereto. [ REFERENCE MAP-3. ¡ºControl of Coastal Islands on the West
> > Coast of Korea¡». Notes: (1)].
> > Now, even with all such awkward descriptions, the Article 2, Section 13
> > Para.(b) could be interpreted properly as logically explained above, if
> > it were not from any wicked intention. Such "misinterpretation" of this
> > provision like the North Korean's original assertion could never be
> > sustainable. In recent redesigned claims which is still far-fetched and
> > unreasonable, the North Korea has abandoned this "misinterpretation".
> > In conclusion, to implement Article 11 of The South and North Basic
> > Relations Agreement and to delimit the sea demarcation line of the
> > non-aggression area between South and North Korea, the most relevant
> > demarcation line in the Yellow Sea area which clarifies "the areas that
> > have been under the jurisdiction of each side until the present time"
> > should be approximately identical with the Northern Limit Line (NLL).
> >
> >
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