>Good Morning,
>
>Jim, you wrote in part:
>>I'm hoping this doesn't sound too nit-picky about language--this is
>>certainly not my intent <s> in writing this. Lately I have been wrestling
>>with the importance of intention(s) in evaluating *acts* versus evaluating
>>*agents.* I honestly would just appreciate hearing more peoples' thoughts
>>about why the killing *intent* in hunting is bad/morally wrong/blameworthy
>>. . . .
>>
>>Jim
>
>Jim, it seems to me that "intention" is an important part of the equation.
>But isn't that an integral part of the analysis of *agents*? And, imho, an
>equally important aspect is: what are the agents' options? If one
>kills/hurts another, the intention should, imho, be examined as well as the
>options in order to judge "bad/morally wrong/blameworthy". It seems to me
>that even if the intention is not morally suspect in and of itself, if there
>are other non-hurtful options for achieving moral ends, then that action is
>blameworthy.
>
>Or do I misunderstand you?
>
>Sincerely,
>Ray
No, I think this is helpful. This is one reason why defenders of civil
disobedience sometimes see violence as justified, because it is "uniquely
efficacious" in achieving certain moral ends. John Lawrence writes:
"The requirement that violence can be right if it is uniquely efficacious
as a means to morally obligatory end depends upon the moral principle that
one ought to avoid unnecessary injury. Violence which is merely
efficacious as one among several alternatives, some of which are unviolent
in character, violates this principle. It could be said that the element
of injury in violence establishes its prima facie wrongness, but that this
does not tell us whether violence is always unjustified. To put it
another way, violence always has disvalues, but is not for that reason,
automatically wrong." (47) [Lawrence, John. "Violence." Social Theory and
Practice 1 (Fall 1970): 31-49.]
In some ways, I think Lawrence's latter point relates to my earlier
response to Brian Luke's article about hunter ethics. Paraphrasing
Lawrence: Luke wants to make a case that the element of injury in hunting
establishes its prima facie wrongness--but I replied that this does not
tell us whether hunting is always unjustified; hunting is not
*automatically* wrong. . . . Plus, the question of options here is
relevant: defenders of the hunt see hunting as uniquely efficacious at
achieving certain moral ends, and there aren't equal substitutes. This was
the point in my earlier email citing Bruce Schoenfeld's comment about
bullfighting--at its best, the bullfight should ennoble and enhance our
life--hunting should do the same.
Jim
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