On Fri, 24 Apr 1998, Stephen A. Allen wrote:
> Dennis' point is well taken, but there is, I think, one
> problem that still needs to be raised. One thing is clear
> from the sources I've mentioned, and the others which have
> been discussed in this thread, and that is that the dead
> are not "merely bodies." Or, to be more specific, it seems
> to me that the dead retain some sort of spiritual value,
> positive or negative, after death.
One needes to be careful with terminology. The value of the body after
death is related to the eventual resurrection of the body, to the
reuniting of body and soul. The body is treated with respect, proper
ceremony etc. because it has been a servant to the soul and will be such
in the future. If that is what one means by "spiritual" value, fine. But
in a strict sense this would not be a "spiritual" value, rather, a
specifically bodily value, namely the proper bodily role of serving the
soul; the two forming a unity, a team working together but clearly
distinct.
Otherwise, there would
> be no need to debate the question of whether a deceased,
> pregnant woman can be buried in consecrated ground. The
> crux of the question is whether the unbaptized status of
> the fetus is more important to the purity of the
> consecrated ground than the baptized status of the woman.
> In other words, these texts suggest not only that "a living
> fetus is a living human person, distinct from the person of
> its mother," but that a dead fetus is also distinct from
> the person of its dead mother. In this light, especially
> in comparison with other legal texts of the 12th and 13th
> centuries, Goffredus' answer is surprising.
Certainly as two bodies, they are distinct bodies. The person of the
mother is no longer present, the person of the fetus is no longer present,
since personhood is tied to the soul, normally embodied, here, disembodied
until the resurrection.
I would interpret Goffredus as saying that, though the two bodies are
distinct, one is inside the other; one would not ordinarily bury the body
of an pagan/unrepentant sinner in consecrated ground but in this case, one
cannot physically separate the two bodies without violating the mother's
body so one will have to prevail over the other; Goffredus chooses the let
the baptized mother's status prevail over the unbaptized status of the
fetus. This seems eminently reasonable but even if one took the
opposite position, one would not be merging the two bodies into an
indistinct one body, rather would be recognizing the distinctness of both
but choosing to let the other one prevail.
My original comments were not intended to say that dead bodies lose their
individuality as bodies but to challenge the notion that Goffredus can be
read as supporting the contemporary pro-choice view that a fetus is merely
part of its mother's body rather than a distinct person. The issue is how
one reads "part." I was suggesting that it be read as "within"--distinct
but within. Stephen Allen and I are not at odds here; I merely wished to
clarify my original post.
Dennis Martin
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