I think this discussion about the role of cognition in simulation of social
phenomena is very interesting, but perhaps some points about the social &
cognitive mening of embeddedness, and consequently the meaning and role of
social "constraints", might help.
Personally, I agree with Kathleen's definition
>I use the term to indicate that individuals do not exist in a vacuum
>but rather are connected to others (agents, robots, webbots, groups,
>institutions, organizations, etc.) through webs of interaction and
>knowledge, assignment to tasks, shared goals, etc. These webs or networks
>are seen as mutually constraining and enabling.
and I also agree with the hypothesis, that in some cases has been
confirmed, that social constraints make agents' behaviors more predictable.
However, I also think that agents are not only _constrained_ by social
institutions, organizations, etc. but also _shaped_ by them. More
concretely, this means that the set of possible behaviors that agents may
display is not necessarily reduced by social forces, but may sometimes be
enlarged or simply modified.
This in turn means that it is impossible to predict anything without
(a) a theory of social entities, their functions, and their effects on
agents' behaviors. But on the other hand, it is pointless to try to predict
these effects without a
(b) a theory of how agents
- form the social structures they are involved in. This cannot always be
reduced to a behavioral effect (like queuing models). Sometimes, patterns
of social relationships, networks, etc. _emerge_ from agents' cognitive
properties, be the agents aware of this or not. Different agents with
different mental features (e.g., goals and abilities) will form different
patterns of interdependence. If one does not model agents' mental
diversity, one does not fully understand a fundamental source of social
embeddedness.
- Adapt/contribute to make social institutions, etc. effective. Whether
more or less constrained, deliberative agents have the capacity to form and
break their commitments, to accept and drop social collective intentions,
to form and revise their (social) beliefs, and have the capacity to decide
whether and to what extent to support a given norm, institution, etc.. Now,
these decisions are _not_ unaccountable, nor unpredictable, nor purely
ideosyncratic. Of course, to account for them makes the theory of social
forces more complex and less straightforward: but this only means that we
must refine our theoretical instruments! To account for the _link_ between
the two levels of complexity (mental and social) is always necessary in
order to fully understand either level.
thanks for your attention
ross
Rosaria Conte, Division of AI, Cognitive and Interaction Modelling -
PSS (Project on Social Simulation)
IP/Cnr, V.LE Marx 15 - 00137 Roma
voice: +39+6+86090210
fax: +39+6+86090214
email: [log in to unmask]
http://pscs2.irmkant.rm.cnr.it/users/rosaria/home.html
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