Lima, 29 october 1998


Dear friends,

Let me share the present context of this weak peace with the article
of the economist send by a member of the Forum Peru-Ecuador,Pierre
Buchard <[log in to unmask]>.

Sincerely,

Cesar Gayoso
Politcal Analyst


The Economist, Oct 31st-Nov 6th 1998


              THE AMERICAS

              Peace in the Andes
              Q U I T O    A N D    L I M A




              In 1978, Argentina and Chile, both under military rule, almost
went to war over their far-southern frontier. Since then, elected
governments have settled all but one of their many territorial
disagreements. In 1982 Argentina’s junta invaded the British Falkland
Islands. In London this week, Carlos Menem, while maintaining Argentina’s
claim to them, reaffirmed its renunciation of force to that end. In 1995
Peru and Ecuador fought—briefly, but not for the first time—over their
border.
              This week they signed an accord to ensure it was the last
time. It may prove historic: an end to territorial war in South America?


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              “WE HAVE won a peace that we did not have.” With those words
Ecuador’s president, Jamil Mahuad, who played a large part in winning
it, summed up the border accord that he and Peru’s President Alberto
Fujimori signed in the Brazilian capital, Brasilia, on Monday. For all the
decades of patriotic sentiment and drum-beating—more from the media than
the generals—that preceded it, he was right: a piece of almost useless
territory will be left to its wildlife, and two nations long at odds over
their rival claims to it can get on, as neighbours, with things that
matter.

              The deal concerns only a small length of frontier. But much
lay behind it. In 1941—to go no further back—the two countries went to war
about a huge area east of the Andes. That was ended by the Rio Protocol of
1942, guaranteed by the United States, Brazil, Argentina and Chile.
It declared Peru, winner of the war, to be owner of the land. The line of
the resultant frontier was mostly plain, save for some 80 kilometres (50
miles). Over this—and after decades of unhappiness in Ecuador, leading it
in 1960 to denounce the Rio Protocol itself—shooting broke out again in
1981 and 1984, and in early 1995 a minor war.

              Under pressure from the four guarantors, the fighting was
confined to the area, small-scale and soon ended. But repeated bilateral
talks did not bring a deal. Much was settled by July this year, but not
all. In mid-August, almost as Mr Mahuad took office, a further bout of
shooting looked possible. The guarantors flexed their muscles, and pushed
the rival presidents—not too unwillingly—to agree to accept whatever the
four put forward. But would the rival legislatures also agree?



              On October 16th, to some surprise, both did. A deal was on.
The guarantors’ package unwrapped last week in essence leaves Peru with
what it has long claimed and held, confirming that the frontier lies along
the high peaks of the Condor range. But it gives Ecuador—as private
property, not as part of its territory—a square kilometre of land inside
Peru beyond them, at Tiwintza, where Ecuadorean soldiers lie buried after
a fierce fight in 1995. Each country will set up an ecological park
alongside the border, where police will be allowed, but not soldiers. More
significant in practical terms, Ecuador—though not winning the sovereign
access it wanted—gets navigation rights on the Amazon and its tributaries
within Peru, and can set up two trading centres there.

              The issue now is whether the deal will hold. Probably, but how
do the rival publics feel about it? Disappointing Ecuador’s territorial
hopes, the guarantors’ ruling has left many there, including the armed
forces, in two minds. Yet even disgruntled generals say they will accept
it. A polling firm Market, commissioned by a television station, has found
60% of Ecuadoreans agreeing that there is no alternative.

              As more about the deal filters through to them and voters
identify with political leaders, positions could polarise, predicts
Market’s director, Blasco Peñaherrera. Younger Ecuadoreans will be more in
favour than the old, he says; poorer ones, whose sons have fought, are
more likely than the well-off, who often evade military service, to resent
the accord. On the southern coast, especially in Ecuador’s largest city,
Guayaquil, close to Peru and a focus of opposition to Mr Mahuad, who is
from the highlands, nationalist feelings run high.

              Opposition politicians, in disarray since losing the recent
elections, have seized on the accord as a chance to attack Mr Mahuad.
Leaders of the Social Christian Party have called for rejection of the
humiliating”offer of Tiwintza. A former national president, Rodrigo Borja,
has labelled the deal a dismemberment” of Ecuadorean territory.

              Back from signing the agreement, Mr Mahuad urged Congress not
to lose the lucidity” with which it had so far supported the pursuit of
peace. The politicians, too often guided by party or private interest,
had indeed shown a new maturity in voting to accept the guarantors’
decisions in advance. Now they have to show the same maturity in accepting
consequent treaties with Peru that will bring both countries the real
dividends of peace.

              These will cover confidence-building, Amazonian trade and
border integration. The two countries’ trade is modest, but it could
quickly treble, say businessmen. A potential $3 billion of investment,
backed by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (it had
already pledged $500m), could reach neglected border regions over the next
ten years. Cross-border electricity and oil links could be built.

              Mr Mahuad deserves his countrymen’s thanks for this deal. Yet
to get it politically he needs its dividends: it is not popular, albeit
vocal opposition has not been great. With the diplomacy behind him—it has
occupied much of his attention since he took office—he now has an ailing
economy and huge social problems to tackle. Born in a border province, and
almost beaten to the presidency by a candidate from the coast, he knows he
cannot neglect these regions. And they are not alone.

              Happy Fujimori, less happy his voters

              With the frontier to be fixed essentially where Peru has long
said it lies, the fact of a settlement is the big gain for most Peruvians.
We have crossed the threshold from an uncertain past to a foreseeable
future,” a radiant President Fujimori said at the signing of the accord in
Brazil, whose President Fernando Henrique Cardoso had worked tirelessly to
bring it about. “The phantom of war has withdrawn, never to return.”

              Resolving the border conflict has long been one of Peru’s
national objectives. Even so, many Peruvians are asking whether it was
necessary to make even the limited concessions—notably, over Tiwintza—to
achieve it. They were told after the 1995 war that every bit of territory
taken by Ecuador’s troops, as Tiwintza was, had been recovered. Why give
it back, even as mere real estate?
              
              A poll in Lima a day after the accord was announced showed
82% disapprovaL of that, and 66% against the role of the four guarantor
countries.

              Eduardo Ferrero, who resigned as foreign minister on October
2nd, last week said he had done so because of the risk, due to
presidential diplomacy” that the land could be handed to Ecuador. There
was no need, he said: the guarantors had made plenty of other concessions
to Ecuador. But an earlier holder of his post, Francisco Tudela, for
months last year a hostage of guerrillas holding the Japanese ambassador’s
residence, called the concession “symbolic and generous” and said he
himself would readily have signed the accord.

              Also disputed, especially by residents of the Amazon region,
are the concessions to Ecuador of navigation rights and land facilities
for business there. Though far from the area in dispute, the town of
Iquitos saw riots a day after details of the deal were announced; five
people died, dozens were injured and hundreds arrested. Such concessions
were laid down in the Rio Protocol; but these are too generous, say
critics.

              Yet these links, and many more that should follow the deal,
will benefit both countries. So too should the cuts in military budgets
that ought, logically, to come. Peru, notably, has spent a good deal
recently on warplanes. Not that the top brass are keen: Ecuador’s were
quick to deny that “anyone is going to think of slimming the armed forces”
or their budgets. Yet neither country now faces any external threat; and
Ecuador, unlike Peru, faces no guerrillas either.
 
	      South America may, for the foreseeable future, in 1995 have
seen its last war over territorial claims. It still has some wars to fight
between civil needs and military desire.






[FORUM TPSIPOL PERU-ECUADOR ON LINE.Editor C. Gayoso ]







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