Dear Keith,

If I think about your two long posts, I'd have to say we are speaking about different phenomena. Within the framework of planning, Rittel and Webber (1973) address the issue of selecting, interpreting, and attempting to solve problems. So, no, planning is not problem solving, and yes, Rittel and Webber do address the challenge of solving problems. In the course of doing so, they speak of problems of a certain kind.

Rittel and Webber define wicked problems in a specific way. As I wrote to David, they could have used another word. To ask whether something is a "wicked problem" as Rittel and Webber define it, it is simple to substitute another term — foe example, the variable [X] -- for the term "wicked problem."

Using the variable [X] you can ask whether anything meets Rittel and Webber’s (1973: 161-166) criteria of the wicked problem.

“1) There is no definitive formulation of [X]. 2)  [X] has no stopping rule. 3) Solutions to  [X] are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad. 4) There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to  [X]. 5) Every solution to  [X] is a 'one-shot operation'; because there is no opportunity to learn by trial-and-error, every attempt counts significantly. 6)  [X] does not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan. 7) Every [X] is essentially unique. 8) Every  [X] can be considered to be a symptom of another problem. 9) The existence of a discrepancy representing a  [X] can be explained in numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s resolution. 10) The planner has no right to be wrong.”

On this basis, ocean currents do not make an  [X] or a wicked problem out of the location of bits of a plane. No matter how difficult it is to solve this problem in fact, it is essentially a solvable though extremely difficult problem.

There is a significant difference between extremely difficult scientific problems and "wicked problems" as Rittel and Webber define them. This including currently intractable problems for which we do not yet have method — scientists and mathematicians have solved many such problems over the centuries by developing new methods and new branches of research. There are many ways to solve extremely difficult problems and currently intractable problems that should, in theory, be tractable. (For numerous specific examples, see: Aczel 1996; Einstein 1998 [1905]; Hersh 1998; Singh 1997).

There is also a rich tradition of choosing and developing methods to solve problems (For examples, see: Polya 1990; Feynman 1993.)

Richard Feynman (1993: 13-16) tells a story about his childhood. His father and he were studying birds. Some children in Feynman's school class thought that he was not learning about birds because he wasn’t learning the names of the birds. Feynman knew that the names of these creatures mattered less than the patterns of their lives: behavior, habitat, and everything else that comprises what birds are and what they do. Feynman (1993: 14) writes, “I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something sand knowing something.”

You don't have to call things "wicked problems." Rittel and Webber define something — that's what counts. You've got to account for the qualities of that something. Difficult problems in physics, mathematics, oceanography, climatology, and the like are not — in principle — wicked problems.

Difficult scientific problems have answers. These answers are true or false. These problems have stopping rules, and there are criteria for solutions. These kinds of problems often have enumerable or exhaustively describable sets of potential solutions, and they tend to have a well-described set of permissible operations. Scientific problems are not unique with respect to their theoretical properties and we do not solve them by negotiation.

The examples you give are not examples of wicked problems.

Warm wishes,

Ken

Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | University Distinguished Professor | Swinburne University of Technology | Melbourne, Australia | University email [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> | Private email [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> | Mobile +61 404 830 462 | Academia Page http://swinburne.academia.edu/KenFriedman

Guest Professor | College of Design and Innovation | Tongji University | Shanghai, China ||| Adjunct Professor | School of Creative Arts | James Cook University | Townsville, Australia

--

Keith Russell wrote:

"In a follow up to my past post about reification and hypostatisation - the more current example would of course be the doppler effect being used to determine where the missing plane travelled.

"Are the vagaries of ocean currents etc to be seen as making a wicked problem out of the precise current location of the bits of plane?"

--

References

Aczel, Amir D. 1996. Fermat’s Last Theorem. Unlocking the Secret of an Ancient Mathematical Problem. London: Penguin Books.

Einstein, Albert. 1998 [1905]. Einstein’s Miraculous Year. Five Papers that Changed the Face of Physics. Edited and introduced by John Stachel. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Feynman, Richard P. 1993. What do you care what other people think? London: HarperCollins.

Hersh, Reuben. 1998. What is Mathematics, Really? London: Vintage.

Polya, G. 1990. How to Solve It. A New Aspect of Mathematical Method. London: Penguin Books.

Rittel, Horst W J, and Melvin M. Webber. 1973. "Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning." Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, (1973), 155-169.

Singh, Simon. 1997. Fermat’s Last Theorem. The Story of a Riddle that Confounded the World’s Greatest Minds for 358 Years. London: Fourth Estate.



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