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MOONSHOT-COMMUNITY  February 2013

MOONSHOT-COMMUNITY February 2013

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Subject:

Re: It's Trust Routers all the way down: obtaining RADSEC credentials for TRs and TIDRs

From:

Jim Schaad <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Jim Schaad <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Fri, 15 Feb 2013 12:26:04 -0800

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (142 lines)

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sam Hartman [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
> Sent: Thursday, February 14, 2013 3:10 PM
> To: Jim Schaad
> Cc: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: It's Trust Routers all the way down: obtaining RADSEC
credentials
> for TRs and TIDRs
> 
> >>>>> "Jim" == Jim Schaad <[log in to unmask]> writes:
> 
>     Jim> QUESTIONS:
> 
>     Jim> 1.  To what degree do the trust router components tightly
>     Jim> coupled to the AAA proxy on the Relying Party and the IdP need
>     Jim> to get the Trust Route flooding information?  If the trust
>     Jim> router next to the RP needs to talk to different trust
>     Jim> infrastructures based on COI, then it needs to know what COIs
>     Jim> are in each Trust Router.  In a private mail to Sam & Margaret,
>     Jim> I suggested a reason why the trust router next to the IdP might
>     Jim> need to get the same information.
> 
> 
> In the current architecture, trust routers basically need the full routing
table.
> 
> However, a temporary identity client (coupled with the RP proxy) and a
> temporary identity server  (coupled with the IDP) never need the full
routing
> table.
> a TIC only talks to one trust router or possibly to multiple ones for
> redundancy.
> TICs never make routing policy decisions.
> If you need routing policy decisions, introduce a real trust router.

Ok - first, having a term for an object is helpful so I will start using TIC
and TIS as well as TR in this discussion.  

I am not as sure as you are that the TIS will never need a subset of the
routing table, and that flooding might be the best way to supply that.  But
until I have a discovered a reason that is incontrovertible I will not argue
the case.


> 
> 
>     Jim> 2.  To what degree does a Trust Router in the system have a
>     Jim> special relationship with the IdP(s) that authenticate the
>     Jim> Trust Route infrastructure.  It is my opinion that there will
>     Jim> be one (or more) TRs that are "privileged" in that they will
>     Jim> have a pre-configured existing relationship with the trust
>     Jim> router IDP entity (TR-IDP).  If there are multiple TRs in a
>     Jim> web, not all of the TRs may have this "privileged" relationship
>     Jim> and if there are multiple "clones" of TR-IDP or multiple IDPs
>     Jim> that can allow access to the TR COI then 1) every IDP has some
>     Jim> TR which is in a privileged relationship and 2) a single TR may
>     Jim> have a privileged relationship with zero or more IDPs.
> 
> Well, a TR doesn't directly have a privileged relationship with the
TR-IDP, or
> what I'm calling an APC realm.
> However, the APC realm does run some TIS.
> Generally, a TIS has a small ACL for who can talk to it. Generally that
ACL
> includes only a small number of trust routers who are directly connected
to
> the TIS.

I have decided that while I have a good idea of what a COR is (but not
necessarily what you had previously labeled as one), I have absolutely no
idea what the actual definition of an APC is.  Please tell me the difference
between an APC and a federation.

So you are saying that the TIS attached to the TR-IDP has a privileged
relationship for trust routers in that it can answer the question - do I
know the IDP to validate this TR with an affirmative as oppose to a
negative.  However as you stated in the previous message a TR is always
completely distinct from an IDP.

> 
> So, there are privileged trust routers in the sense that they are
authorized to
> create temporary identities in the APC realm.
> I'd expect a small number of these per APC realm.

I have a problem with this.  It is a TIS that creates temporary identities
in the APC realm not the TR.  TRs merely act as trusted introducers from the
TIC to the TIS but do not create the temporary identity.

> 
> Note that there can be more than one APC realm per APC. I haven't
explained
> that yet, although Josh and I did a walk through of how that works after
my
> message Tuesday.
> I'll write that up soon.

Ok - my head hurts even more.

> 
> Note there's another form of privilege: each trust router has a privileged
> relationship with exactly one RP realm--the realm in which it accepts
> authentications.

What is an RP realm?  I don't understand this statement.

> 
> That is, there's one realm worth of RADSEC servers that a trust router can
talk
> to.
> That realm is responsible for connecting the trust router's acceptor
> components to the rest of the universe.

I think that this is an incorrect statement.  A trust router can sit on the
border between two different APCs and route requests between them.  Such a
router would by definition be able to talk to RADSEC servers in both realms
- at least indirectly if not directly.

> 
>     Jim> 3.  What information does the RP AAA proxy need for indexing of
>     Jim> the temp ids for a given IdP's AAA proxy server?  At a minimum
>     Jim> I think this is the COI, the APC, the IdP Server Realm..
>     Jim> Additionally one would have the keys, the temp id and the
>     Jim> lifetime of the temp id.
> 
> 
> For indexing? There's a key identifier that's part of TLS PSK. I think the
IDP
> realm and TLS PSK ID should be sufficient to look up a key on an RP proxy.
> However, the set of communities (both APCs and COIs) that key is valid for
is
> important to track.
> Lifetime as well once that becomes finite.

I think that a temp key can only be used for a single COI unless we are
going to start sending the COI information as a RADIUS attribute.  Since the
trust protocol currently is carrying and validating for a single COI rather
than a group, the returned identity is only going to be good for that one
COI.  Doing more is not covered.

Jim

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