FYI,
KDJ
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/03/201132093458329910.html
The drawbacks of intervention in Libya: Concerns over oil markets, geopolitics
and refugees might be behind no-fly zone decision, scholars argue.
Asli U. Bâli and Ziad Abu-Rish Last Modified: 20 Mar 2011 16:34
The no-fly zone could involve on Libyan runways, radars, and anti-aircraft
artillery installations carrying the potential for significant collateral
damage against civilians and civilian infrastructure [GALLO/GETTY]
The Libyan uprising is entering its fourth week. The courage and persistence of
the Libyan people's efforts to overthrow Gaddafi have been met with ongoing
regime brutality ranging from shoot-to-kill policies to the indiscriminate use
of artillery against unarmed civilians.
In addition to the current no-fly zone, the UN Security Council unanimously
issued a resolution imposing tough measures against the Libyan regime including
an arms embargo, asset freeze, travel ban and a referral of the situation in
Libya to the International Criminal Court for investigation.
The desire to act in solidarity with the Libyan people demands that we assess
the available options against the core principle of legitimacy that any
intervention must satisfy: Do no harm (that is, do not do more harm on balance
by intervening).
The likelihood that coercive intervention would satisfy this principle is
severely constrained when evaluated against the historical record, logistical
realities, and the incentives and interests of the states in a position to
serve as the would-be external interveners.
Put simply, coercive external intervention to alter the balance of power on the
ground in Libya in favor of the anti-Gaddafi revolt is likely to backfire
badly.
The attendant costs would, of course, be borne not by those who call for
intervention from outside of Libya but by the Libyan people with whom we hope
to show solidarity. In what follows we argue that embracing the call for
solidarity requires a much more careful appraisal of the interventionist
option, precisely because the potential risks will be borne by Libyan
civilians.
Mixed motivations
Of the arguments against intervention, the most straightforward draws on an
assessment of the long history of external intervention in the Middle East and
North Africa.
There is no need to rehearse that history here since the failure of such past
interventions to advance the humanitarian welfare or political aspirations of
local populations is well-established. But because the possibility of
intervention is debated in some circles as if the starting point is a clean
slate, it is important to begin by recalling this dismal history. For instance,
the imposition of a no-fly-zone on Iraq did little in and of itself to shift the
balance of power against the Saddam Hussein regime, but it did result in the
deaths of hundreds of civilians.
Further, the no-fly zone served as a predicate for the subsequent invasion and
occupation of Iraq insofar as the ongoing use of this coercive measure against
the regime from 1991 until 2003 was cited in support of the argument that there
was "implied authorisation" to forcibly topple the regime.
While humanitarian considerations are often invoked in defense of intervention,
humanitarianism is far from the only issue on the table. Other reasons that
have been adduced in favor of intervention in Libya include vindicating
international norms, re-establishing the leadership of the US in the region,
preventing spill-over of the refugee crisis into Europe, and the stabilisation
of world oil markets. The Libyan people are struggling to change their regime
on their own terms and there is no reason to presume an overlap between these
various logics of intervention and their interests.
The historical record clearly establishes that an external regime change
intervention based on mixed motives - even when accompanied with claims of
humanitarianism - usually privileges the strategic and economic interests of
interveners and results in disastrous consequences for the people on the
ground. Indeed, the discord currently evidenced among Western powers concerning
intervention in Libya is precisely based in their doubts as to whether their
strategic interests are adequately served by such a course.
The incongruence between the interests of external interveners and those on the
ground in Libya is already apparent. Beyond their eleventh hour timing, serious
mobilisations for intervention on the part of Western powers were issued only
after most Western nationals had been safely evacuated from Libya.
The fact that outside powers were unwilling to act while their nationals were on
Libyan soil demonstrates their understanding that treating the regime with
coercion may lead to civilian deaths either directly as a result of an
intervention or indirectly through reprisals against civilians identified as
opponents.
Furthermore, the evacuation channels made available to Western nationals –
airlifts across the Mediterranean – were not and are not being offered to
Libyan civilians nor African migrant workers trapped in Libya. If the
humanitarian welfare of civilians in Libya were paramount, they, too, would
have been offered this secure escape route. Instead, once Western nationals
were safely out of harm’s way, coercive measures were adopted without any
effort to protect or evacuate the civilians that were left behind in Tripoli
and beyond.
No-fly zone, local calls, and solidarity
To be clear, we are not categorically rejecting any and all forms of
intervention irrespective of the context. Instead, we reject forms of
intervention that, on balance, are likely to produce more harm than benefit.
This is a context-specific determination that requires an assessment of the
forseeable consequences of particular proposed interventions. With respect to
the context in Libya today we are critical of current proposals for
intervention in light of the identities and interests of would-be interveners
and the limited understanding of intra-Libyan political dynamics on which they
rely. There are circumstances under which a no-fly zone might conceivably serve
a humanitarian purpose.
In particular, if air strikes were the principal means by which the regime was
inflicting civilian casualties, there would be a much stronger case for a
no-fly zone. Though the military situation within Libya remains unclear, the
empirical evidence that is available suggests that Gaddafi’s artillery poses a
more serious threat to both civilians and rebels than air strikes.
In addition, the regime's aerial assaults have primarily employed helicopter
gunships, which would be difficult to counter through a no-fly zone because
they fly lower and are harder to target than warplanes.
Further, the no-fly zone imposed through the UN Security Council involves
attacks on Libyan runways, radars, and anti-aircraft artillery installations
with the potential for significant "collateral damage" against civilians and
civilian infrastructure. A no-fly zone that risks killing Libyans would also
run the risk of strengthening the regime's hand by enabling Gaddafi to style
himself as an anti-imperialist defender of Libyan sovereignty.
Rather than persuading elements of the military and air force to defect, such a
move might produce a counter-productive rally-round-the-flag effect in parts of
Libya still under the control of the regime.
The fact that for logistical and political reasons a no-fly zone poses a serious
risk of backfiring is an important consideration. But it is not the only reason
to question whether heeding local calls for a no-fly zone necessarily represent
an act of solidarity.
Fragmentation risk
Furthermore, a response to calls emanating from one region may risk fragmenting
the country. The fact that we know so little about the domestic context among
non-regime actors in Libya is precisely the reason that the types of external
intervention currently taking place are likely to backfire.
The desire to act in solidarity with local Libyans struggling for their
liberation is important. But without a clear sense of the consequences of a
particular intervention – or the interests and diverse actors likely to be
impacted – there is no way to satisfy the do-no-harm principle. Notwithstanding
the provenance of the no-fly zone – whether within Libya or the Arab League –
and their attendant "authenticity" or legitimacy, we cannot justify
intervention unless we can appraise its likely consequences for the civilian
population with whom we are allegedly acting in solidarity.
This difficulty is further compounded by the fact that neither the Western nor
Arab powers currently calling for intervention have a record of privileging
particular domestic partners based on the interests or aspirations of local
populations. There is little reason to expect that Libya will be exceptional in
this regard, particularly in light of the mixed motives of any potential
intervener.
We do not argue that the international community has no obligation to support
Libyan civilians. To the contrary, we strongly believe there is such an
obligation, but that current coercive options pose serious risks to the Libyan
population with little concomitant benefit in terms of humanitarian
protections.
The interests of potential external interveners are not well aligned with those
of Libyans on the ground beyond that of regime change.
Further, the identities of involved in the process of intervention reinforce
concerns about such proposals. Many members of the Arab League are currently
undertaking repression of democratic uprisings against their rule. The
legitimacy and representativeness of any call they issue should be called into
question by their own internal anti-democratic practices.
As Saudi troops operate in Bahrain to shore up the defenses of an authoritarian
ruling family against its own people, the bankruptcy of calls for intervention
in Libya by members of the GCC and the Arab League is evident.
Members of the Group of 8 are also compromised by their ambivalence towards
democratic demands met with repression by their regional allies and their own
long history of brutal interventions and direct support of authoritarian
regimes.
ICC referral 'counter-productive'
Libyans have already made great inroads on the ground and without external
support towards a goal of regime change in which they will determine the
day-after scenarios for their country.
To date, measures adopted by the international community have done little to
aid, and may have undermined, Libyan efforts at liberation. For instance, the
call for an ICC referral in the measures adopted by the UN Security Council was
most likely counter-productive. The first priority should have been a negotiated
exit strategy for Gaddafi and his family, not unlike the path already paved for
the other recently deposed Arab despots, Ben Ali and Mubarak.
Instead, by immediately referring the regime for investigation by the ICC the
international community has signaled to Gaddafi that neither he nor his
children will be allowed to go quietly, potentially redoubling his resolve to
fight to the last.
Allowing a negotiated exit to exile in an African or South American country
would not have precluded a subsequent ICC referral, but might have facilitated
an early end to the violence currently ravaging Libya. Further, the same
resolution that referred Libyan authorities to the ICC contained a specific
exemption from ICC jurisdiction for foreign interveners not party to the Rome
Statute, anticipating and providing impunity in some cases for civilian deaths
that result from possible UN Security Council-authorised operations in Libya
down the line.
The ICC referral has been described as an attempt to incentivise those around
Gaddafi to defect. Rather than vindicating international accountability, this
logic of incentives suggests impunity for last-minute defectors notwithstanding
decades of crimes against the Libyan population.
At its most basic, the ICC referral represents the triumph of a set of
international goals (vindicating a constrained conception of international
accountability through the Libyan regime) over the immediate interest in an
early resolution of the Libyan crisis through the provision of a regime exit
strategy. This privileging of international over local interests is typical of
external intervention and would only be exacerbated by options involving the
use of force.
Useful assistance
We argue for forms of international assistance that reverse this privileging and
begin from the known interests of Libyan civilians. At a minimum, resources must
be mobilised to offer relief supplies to the Libyan population that is currently
outside of the control of the regime (bearing in mind some of the problematic
dynamics also associated with such forms of "aid").
Urgent priority should be given to addressing shortages of medical supplies and
provision of essential foods and clean water. Beyond these basics, an
evacuation corridor for civilians – including non-Libyan African workers
trapped in the territory – should be secured and responsibility for shouldering
the burden of refugee flows should not be restricted to Tunisia and Egypt.
To the contrary, rather than imposing these costs on Libya's poorest neighbors –
in the early stages of transitions of their own – Libya’s relatively wealthy
northern neighbors in Europe should be absorbing a much larger share of the
costs, human and material, of offering refuge to fleeing civilians.
The fact that the airlifting of Libyan and other African civilians to safety out
of Tripoli is an option that is not currently on the table speaks eloquently to
the misalignment of priorities. Dropping the xenophobic European rhetoric on
the "dangers" of African immigration would also have the benefit of removing
one of the Libyan regime's major levers with the EU.
As Gaddafi threatens to terminate the agreements by which he has been
warehousing African migrants at Europe's behest, he lays bare the cruel logic
of tacit alliances (based on immigration, energy, and security interests) that
has long lent support to his rule.
A Europe willing to take concrete steps to facilitate the evacuation to its own
shores of civilians who wish to leave Libyan territory regardless of
nationality would at least have broken with its record of shameful complicity
in regime brutality.
Acting in solidarity with the Libyan people within a do-no-harm principle
presents many constraints and frustratingly few options. This is not because of
an absence of concern for the interests of the Libyan population but because
there are few good options beyond the provision of relief supplies and
evacuation channels.
Support Libyan rebels?
There may be other alternatives short of external coercive intervention that
might be considered – such as sharing tactical intelligence with Libyan rebels
or jamming regime communications – though such options would have to be
carefully evaluated in light of potential risks.
By contrast, overt and covert coercive options ranging from no-fly zones to
arming Libyan rebels or using regional commandos to train them all implicate
external actors in altering the balance on the ground in unpredictable ways.
To engage in such coercive strategies without being able to evaluate the full
range of consequences amounts to subordinating the interests of the Libyan
people to our own sense of purpose and justice.
We strongly advocate creative strategies of solidarity with the Libyan people
while underscoring that calls for coercive external intervention do not
qualify. Indeed, it is possible that demands for Western support to the rebels
may already have done more harm than good.
In the end, we argue for humility in imagining the role we might play in the
course of Libyans' struggle. The international community is neither entitled to
take the reins today nor dictate the post-regime scenario tomorrow. Further,
those of us who wish to stand in solidarity with Libyans from outside of their
country must recognise that we may not be best placed to identify which local
actors enjoy broad-based support.
Solidarity cannot be reduced to the diplomatic politics of recognition nor to
arguments for external intervention.
In the end, we counsel acting from the outside only when our actions are clearly
aligned with the interests of Libyan civilians. Imaginative strategies to offer
much-needed relief and refuge to Libya’s vulnerable population represent a
challenge the international community has yet to meet. That is a good starting
point for transnational solidarity.
Asli Ü. Bâli is a professor of law at the UCLA School of Law. Her research
interests also include comparative law of the Middle East.
Ziad Abu-Rish is a doctoral candidate in UCLA's Department of History. He is the
co-editor of Jadaliyya Ezine.
The article above first appeared on Jadaliyya.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily
reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.
"When we cannot communicate, we get sick, and as our sickness increases, we
suffer and spill our suffering on other people."
-Thich Nhat Hanh
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Kevin M. DeJesus
PhD Candidate (ABD)
Department of Geography
York University
4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M3J 193
Co-Editor, H-Net Mideast Politics
http://www.h-net.org/~midepol/
Mobile:
416-819-8850
Home Office:
31 Alexander Street
Apartment 202
Toronto, Ontario Canada M4Y 1B2
|
