...If Russia intended a recent increase in skirmishing to lure the
Georgians into a war they could not win, the tactic worked to
perfection. If not, we have to ask what convinced Mr Saakashvili that
Georgia could reclaim South Ossetia by force and - perhaps - what
assurances he might have thought he had from Washington. In any event,
the enterprise bespoke extraordinary recklessness. Mr Saakashvili might
have led his country to democracy - a thoroughly admirable achievement -
but challenging an increasingly-nationalistic Russia so close to its
volatile southern border was likely to be a gamble too far...


Leading article: A conflict that has cost Georgia's democracy dear

Wednesday, 13 August 2008
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/leading-article-a-
conflict-that-has-cost-georgias-democracy-dear-892815.html


With the order given by Russia's President, Dmitry Medvedev, for a halt
to military operations against Georgia, this summer's small war in the
Caucasus looks as though it is coming to an end. The brevity and
precision of Mr Medvedev's televised statement made for a sharp contrast
with President Mikheil Saakashvili's rambling address to massed ranks of
Georgians at a rally in Tbilisi and left no doubt about which side had
emerged the victor.

Short - and nasty - this conflict may have been, but it leaves many
mysteries behind it. We still have no accurate idea of the extent of
casualties or the scale of the damage. While there is much human
suffering and many refugees - alas, these are inevitable consequences of
the resort to arms - latest reports from the ground suggest that both
sides may have exaggerated their losses.

Perhaps the biggest mystery, though, is why Georgia decided to take on
Russia now. Of course, the situation had long been profoundly
unsatisfactory from Georgia's point of view: two chunks of its country -
South Ossetia and Abkhazia - were outside its control and undisguised
platforms for Russian trouble-making. But this state of affairs had
pertained for the best part of 15 years. The dispute should have been
soluble by diplomatic means.

If Russia intended a recent increase in skirmishing to lure the
Georgians into a war they could not win, the tactic worked to
perfection. If not, we have to ask what convinced Mr Saakashvili that
Georgia could reclaim South Ossetia by force and - perhaps - what
assurances he might have thought he had from Washington. In any event,
the enterprise bespoke extraordinary recklessness. Mr Saakashvili might
have led his country to democracy - a thoroughly admirable achievement -
but challenging an increasingly-nationalistic Russia so close to its
volatile southern border was likely to be a gamble too far.

The most immediate cost will be Tbilisi's hopes of integrating the
enclaves into Georgia proper. Their populations will be even warier of
Georgian rule and even more intent on keeping Russia's protection. There
could also be a cost to Mr Saakashvili's authority, if his people judge
that his hotheadedness contributed to his country's defeat.

The greater, and longer-term, cost will be Georgia's ambition to become
accepted as a fully paid up member of the Western world, through
membership of the European Union, but especially Nato. When the
Europeans delayed Georgia's first step towards Nato membership last
April, against the wishes of the United States, it was because they
feared the very scenario that has just played out - except that the
allies would have been bound by treaty to go to Georgia's aid. It is now
not only Georgia's ambitions that have been set back, but also those of
Ukraine - though never as single-minded an applicant as Georgia.

But East-West relations - the term seems suddenly relevant again - have
also suffered in the wake of this six-day war. In repelling Georgia's
assault on South Ossetia, Russia continued hostilities for longer, and
moved far deeper into Georgian territory, than was required to eject
Georgian troops from the enclave. President Medvedev yesterday rejected
accusations that Russia was intent on "regime change" in Georgia. But
removing Mr Saakashvili now is not necessary. Russia's barely contested
military sweep into Georgia was a flexing of its muscles that leaves it
undisputed master of the region once again. The red lines of a new power
balance have been drawn.