Dear David,
It is a pleasure to see your calm and thoughtful post. This kind of clear
writing encourages clear thinking among all of us, even if the problem is
difficult and will not yield to simple-minded solutions.
I am afraid that this will be an uncharacteristically long
post-uncharacteristic for me. I urge people not to read it if it becomes
boring. Itıs just that once in a while a topic comes up that needs more
than a sound bite. Perhaps it would be better if it was developed and
published somewhere else--I have written on this in other places. But you
seem to be asking for something to start a new discussion of the matter on
the list. Maybe this will help. I promise I will try not to write another
post on the list for a year!
I hope it is clear that in criticizing the review I am not praising the
book. In fact, I donıt know much about the book-to my knowledge it hasnıt
turned up in the States yet, though it may at some point. I do know bad
reviewing. You mention that some people agree with the reviewıs analysis. I
doubt this. The analysis is not very good, and perhaps the struggle of the
writer that you report is a sign of this. I suspect that what people agree
with is the conclusion, the final judgment that this is a bad book, and that
folks are glad to see any analysis that points toward that conclusion.
Letıs put aside the review, as you have. My comments to this point are
simply to ensure that no one imagines that I am defending the book.
I certainly agree with you that the problem of improving the quality of
doctoral dissertations is important, and I gather that it is this problem
that you are asking the list to comment upon. A sustained conversation on
this matter, at least beginning on this list, is a good idea.
It seems clear that the problem we are talking about is not a single problem
but many problems wrapped together. You have already indicated something
like this when you identified some of the factors-perhaps weak supervision,
dispute and uncertainty about the nature of doctoral inquiry, uncertainty
about the role of practice in doctoral research, and so forth.
Others may approach the matter in different ways, but I believe I would
begin by thinking about the problem as a wicked problem-a problem where
different perspectives and values are in play, not yielding to a simple
assessment of right and wrong. I begin here because I donıt want to become
entrapped in ideologies about research or the nature of art and design. I
am interested in seeing through the ideologies into the reality of what we
are dealing with. Maybe this is simply my own ideology, but at least it is
honestly stated.
Why is there wickedness in this situation? Some will argue, perhaps with
some justification, that it is simply a matter of ignorance and poor
thinking. But I believe there is much more to it than this, and that if we
fail to probe deeper we will simply come back to an impasse-our current
situation.
I believe that a large part of the wickedness comes from a deep respect for
practice and making. With that respect, which I deeply share, comes a fear
that a different agenda or philosophy of method will undermine or even
replace making-a fear that I do not share. But the fear is not
unreasonable. Isnıt this precisely what Chris Alexander expressed in his
repudiation of the design methods movement in the 1971 introduction to the
reprinting of his doctoral dissertation? He asks how one can possibly
separate ³the study of designing from the practice of design.² Of course it
is possible, but therein lies the challenge of our work as researchers,
whether we agree with Alexander or not.
Frankly, I believe that behind all of the silliness of the debate over
doctoral work in art and design--and you have to admit that there has been
some silliness--lies one of the deepest cultural problems of our time. Art
and design, despite all of their differences, are struggling to assert the
value of making. This is a break with the culture of the past, however one
may wish to characterize it. We are once again in our culture beginning to
recognize that making and production are not secondary to thought and action
but central to them.
I know that some people are aghast at the idea that art and design practice
are forms of research. I am not. The failure to recognize and defend the
sense in which art and design practice is a form of research is part of the
problem. Again, we are back to the wickedness of the situation and the
intrusion of ideology. This attitude, it seems to me, blocks productive
discussion and keeps us from finding a way forward that serves all
interests. We should bypass the ideological dispute and get on to a design
solution.
What we need is a new perspective-a new line of thinking that lets us see
the situation in a different way. If we had this, then maybe it would be
possible to move on to the many smaller problems that must be
addressed-improving supervision and so forth. Without a new perspective,
we will only end up writing bad reviews and nasty assessment exercises that
tear the community apart rather than bring it together.
I found a discussion in John Dewey that has helped me a great deal to see
the matter in a different way. In the book ³Logic: The Theory of Inquiry,²
Dewey makes a powerful distinction between ³common sense inquiry² and
³formal inquiry.² Common sense inquiry, he argues, is practiced by everyone
as they go about their daily work, whether as professionals or ordinary
people. I believe that Herb Simon gets his idea of design as a widespread
practice from Dewey and his time at Chicago, where Dewey's ideas were
strong. Formal inquiry grows out of common sense inquiries and moves
further into the abstractions and relationships that are necessary for a
deep understanding a problem or a subject. Simon, too, argues something like
this, but not in the final direction that Dewey pursues--and, hence, the
profound difference between Dewey and Simon.
I wonıt repeat Dewey's arguments here, but I will point out that this
distinction does two important things for us in our current impasse. First,
it recognizes the legitimate sense in which art and design practice is a
form of inquiry. It supports practice in a powerful way that goes far
beyond the pale ideas of people like Donald Schon, whose work, while
helpful, is no more than a distant echo of Deweyıs more significant
discussion. Second, it leads us to ask what are the strategies of formal
inquiry that yield the diversity and pluralism that is evident in our
different standards, methods, and goals of research in art and design.
To some extent, particularly in recent years, my own work centers precisely
on the matter of the diverse strategies that come to bear in design and
design research. In fact, I argue against a monistic approach to design and
design research. To me, there is no single principle or method that rises
above all others. The wickedness of design comes precisely from the
reasonable pluralism that we find everywhere. People who canıt appreciate
that pluralism and who do not have the ingenuity to figure out how it works
and how to work with it are condemned to become preachers of their own
monism.
With Deweyıs distinction in mind, it is very reasonable to see how practice
and making can enter into a doctoral dissertation. It can enter in several
ways, each interesting and relevant. In turn, it is also reasonable to see
how we may critique dissertations and doctoral research in art and design.
A set of ideas follow about how we may improve supervision, help students to
structure the arguments of their dissertations, sort out significance from
insignificance in work, and so forth. All of these matters are, of course,
in themselves wicked problems with diverse perspectives and values. But at
least there is a more open space for creating productive discussions. There
have been too many preachers involved in this discussion in the past.
In June I will attend a doctoral defense in Europe that involves significant
art and design practice. From what I have seen so far, it is also a formal
inquiry in Deweyıs sense, with a significant theoretical component and a
discussion of the strategy of inquiry that I call Productive Science. I look
forward to that defense.
I would welcome the opportunity sometime to present the idea of Productive
Science as a useful alternative to Design Science and other strategies of
inquiry in design. There is a long, respectable lineage to the strategy,
including work by some of the best minds in design, though we have not put
together the ideas in a working form and given it the name that I have. I
believe that Productive Science has the potential to get some of our work
past the frustration and impasse that we now have. But this is for another
time.
Regards,
Dick
Richard Buchanan
School of Design
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