This is interesting, although it is not clear to me in what sense
environmental conditions are "novel". Btw, to perceived similar conditions,
some sort of case-based reasoning might be applied.
ross
Il 24-01-2007 18:12, "Johnson, Jeffrey C" <[log in to unmask]> ha scritto:
> The "emic" distinction is an important one and reflects much about the
> discussion surrounding the role of beliefs (and other important
> cognitive influences). The goal issue aside, it is often the case the
> behavior is a reaction to some set of environmental conditions, often
> times novel or unexpected. In this case I am reminded of one of Volney
> Stefflre's "banal" (his term) propositions "that people will behave
> similarly towards things they perceive as being similar."
>
> Jeff Johnson
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [log in to unmask]
> [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Rosaria
> Conte
> Sent: Wednesday, January 24, 2007 7:26 AM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: [SIMSOC] Newbie on the list - working on emergence of norms
>
> NAACSOS - http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/naacsos/
> Another good question, thanks Alan.
> Goals are not sufficient for autonomous agents. Another essential
> ingredient
> of autonomy is beliefs. An autonomous agent acts on the grounds of own
> goals
> and own beliefs. To state it differently, autonomous agenthood requires
> that
> two filters are applied to external inputs: belief filter, which decides
> whether and what input to accept as a believe, and goal filter, which
> decides whether and which input to select as a goal.
>
> ross
>
>
> Il 23-01-2007 11:34, "Alan Penn" <[log in to unmask]> ha scritto:
>
>> OK - so I take it that having a goal is necessary for agent autonomy.
> Is it
>> sufficient?
>> [Alan Penn]
>>>
>>> In the mail "Re: [SIMSOC] Newbie on the list - working on emergence
> of n",
>>> Alan Penn wrote:
>>>> A quick question. For an agent to be autonomous must it have a goal?
> In
>>>> other words is it possible to imagine a simulation with autonomous
> social
>>>> agents in which individual agents do not possess 'goals'.
>>>
>>>
>>> Alan,
>>>
>>> But what would "autonomous" mean in that context ?
>>>
>>> Briefly, it seems to me impossible to define "autonomy" as an
> objective
>>> and
>>> absolute notion. One cannot be autonomous per se, but only with
> respect to
>>> a given set of dependencies (relativity), and an observer
> (subjectivity).
>>>
>>> These dependencies can be broken down in two sub-categories :
> constraints
>>> and objects. Constraints can be seen as the "laws" of the environment
> in
>>> which the subject acts ("Autonomy is freedom under laws",
> Jean-Jacques
>>> Rousseau), and may include as well other agents' actions. Objects are
> the
>>> "things" with respect to which the subject (or the agent) can be
> described
>>> as autonomous by the observer. And these "things" can either be goals
> (if
>>> they are explicitly manipulated by the agent) or "tasks" (in which
> case,
>>> the goal might be implicit and buried in the definition of the task,
> but
>>> nonetheless still exist).
>>>
>>> Don't know if I made myself clear enough. Anyway, the sentence "this
> agent
>>> is autonomous" (or not) does not possess any meaning by itself. The
>>> correct
>>> way to put it would be : "under these constraints, and with respect
> to
>>> this
>>> goal/task, this agent can be described by this observer as
> autonomous".
>>> So,
>>> defining agents, for example in a social simulation, as autonomous,
>>> without
>>> defining their goals appears to me as an ontological impossibility
> (but I
>>> can be wrong).
>>>
>>> Cheers
>>> Alexis
>>
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