> I agree with Maarten that it is possible to act without a goal...not
> only is it possible, but it is the norm in everyday social life. In my
> research on improvisational groups, I find that "acting without
> planning" is the norm, and "goals" or "plans" or "intentions" are
> retroactively applied by the group's later responses.
Again, goal-driven behavior does not necessarily imply planning. Moreover,
the methodological question which goal to attribute post hoc to given
actions should not be confused with the question how to model autonomous
agenthood. Of course one might deny that social agents are autonomous, but
this would be a rather discomforting conclusion :-)
ross
>
> Rosaria Conte wrote:
>>
>> What is the "goal" you are referring to? The goal of eating to fill
>> your belly? The goal of only eating at restaurants that allows you
>> to sit according to your norm? The goal of eating together with
>> friends at Wagamama?
>>
>> Whatever. Depending on their goal state, agents take one or another
>> decision: if one badly wants to find her way in that place (she is
>> hungry, or likes torture, or else) she will decide to stay and ³learn²
>> how to survive in that environment; if she wants to be quiet, sheıll
>> probably just leave and maybe find amore comfortable one. The point is
>> that you need to feed goals into your agents if you want them to take
>> autonomous decisions.
>>
>>
>> My point here is that the concept of a goal is just not appropriate
>> in dealing with social behavior. Goals are for dealing with problem
>> solving behavior,
>>
>> Goals are for dealing with proactive action. Only a subset of actions
>> need problem-solving. You seem to identify goals with deliberate
>> planning. This is what I called a ratiomorphic view of goal-based
>> behavior, a couple of mails ago.
>>
>>
>> I just act based on my practice, and only when things don't work,
>> might I create a plan for new action, which can be based on practice
>> as well, so it will just be another activity (or script).
>>
>> Which practice do you choose at any given moment, and why? Practices are
>> only frozen plans. Consciously or consciously, goals lead to practice
>> selection, activation, possibly adaptation, application or rejection,
>> and finally to planning when no such practice is available.
>>
>> cheers
>>
>> ross
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jan 22, 2007, at 10:05 AM, Rosaria Conte wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Now, problem solving is not an individual activity, but a
>> group activity. It will be the communication of the "norm"
>> of the restaurant (which we can easily represent as a
>> belief) by one of the others, that makes
>> the newcomer "learn" the new norm/convention/practice.
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately, things are not so simple: the belief in itself is
>> insufficient. The agent will learn the proper behavior to the
>> extent that she forms the corresponding goal. If she doesnıt,
>> for example because she finds such a local rule irritating, she
>> may leave the restaurant at once and cancel it from the list.
>> The ³learning² as you say is both a belief- and a goal-based
>> process. Or, better, it is ruled by the interplay between new
>> beliefs and pre-existing goals.
>>
>>
>>
>> cheers
>>
>> ross
>>
>>
>> On Jan 22, 2007, at 2:44 AM, Alan Penn wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Talking of the restaurant script I went for lunch at
>> Wagamama the other day a noodle chain that has long
>> benches and tables and is very popular. You queue up and
>> then they ³say how many people?², you say 6 or whatever,
>> and they try to find you 6 places at the long table that
>> are next to and/or opposite each other. Now you soon
>> find this is a problem, because they have a computer
>> system to take your order. The waiter has a handheld
>> device, the menu is the place mat, you choose what you
>> want and they type it into the handheld, but then you
>> cant shove upı to put together say two single vacant
>> seats to allow a couple to sit together because that
>> would completely confuse the computer system and
>> everyone would get the wrong order. OK you get the
>> picture. Now, as a new person into this unconventionalı
>> restaurant many of the assumptions we make about norms,
>> or conventions, donıt hold you have to learn them.
>> What I found was that you had to figure out the logic of
>> whyı the seemingly stupid requirement not to move had
>> come into place. Once you understood why, then you could
>> sympathise with the staff who were continuously having
>> to reinforce the norm rule donıt moveı against peopleıs
>> conventional tendency to shove up and let the couple sit
>> down. Part of the interest here is that it is the act of
>> getting to know the odd rules that is part of the fun.
>> It means that old wagamama handsı have social knowledge
>> to pass onto newbies. This is how you orderı etc. and
>> the poorly designed computer system becomes a key
>> marketing feature no question here J more of a shaggy
>> dog story.
>>
>> Alan Penn
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> *From:* News and discussion about computer simulation
>> in the social sciences [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
>> *On Behalf Of *Rosaria Conte
>> *Sent:* 22 January 2007 08:50
>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>> *Subject:* Re: [SIMSOC] Newbie on the list - working on
>> emergence of norms and beliefs
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Rosario, if ³cognitive agents are necessary but
>> insufficient to account for societal phenomena² then
>> how do we account for our own societal phenomena?
>> *Sufficiently* cognitive and social agents will
>> enable the creation of societal phenomena, without
>> the need for top-down imposed social dynamics
>> (simulations from Sugarscape on have shown this).
>>
>>
>> Thanks for these questions, Mike (btw, my name is
>> Rosari/a/, not Rosario :-), which I hope I can
>> contribute to clarify a bit, at least in the way I use
>> them. But first, let me say that to me ³to account²
>> doesnıt mean ³to create²: natural organisms, including
>> humans, *create* their societies; however, they seem to
>> have trouble in *accounting* for them :-) ... My point
>> is that we need theories of social dynamics, what does
>> not mean to ³impose² a social dynamics, to use your words.
>>
>> Iım curious (sincerely) how you differentiate between
>> norms and conventions. Is ³donıt steal² a norm or a
>> convention? Does someone following the ³go to a
>> restaurant² script pay their check because of a social
>> norm or a social convention, or are these two less
>> separate than we might think?
>> I did not take paying the bill as representative of the
>> ³eat-at-restaurant² script, as it recurs in many other
>> scripts. But this is actually not so crucial: I think
>> ask-for-menu and wait-to-be-served are convention-based
>> activities, rather than norm-ruled ones. In general,
>> unlike a pure convention, a norm is a deontic command
>> (often implicit), i.e. a command containing and
>> conveying obligations, permissions, etc.. People do not
>> ask-for-menu because (they believe) they have an
>> obligation to do so. But certainly this is the reason
>> why they pay their bills. Donıt-steal certainly is a
>> norm, in the sense that it entails a deontic (indeed, it
>> is also a legal norm). Btw, it is interesting to
>> observe that the confine between conventions and norms
>> is not clear-cut and examples might refer to both:
>> conventions may acquire a mandatory force, and this is
>> one the factors leading to norm-emergence. At
>> restaurant, pay-the-tip is one example of such a double
>> nature. The *non-sexist convention* in language has
>> acquired a mandatory force, derived from the
>> politically-correct ideology.
>>
>> To this point, I would say that agents subject to a
>> norm /do/ emanateı them, typically through
>> communication (verbal, postural, etc.) of approval,
>> disapproval, etc.
>> I would say that unless by doing so they put
>> obligations into existence for instance, a mother, a
>> teacher, a priest and other authorities put norms into
>> existence they do not ³emanate² norms, but they
>> transmit and defend existing ones.
>>
>> Agents may not create a norm or convention consciously,
>> Absolutely, but a fortiori do not emanate them, if by
>> emanation we mean a deliberate act of issuing the norm.
>> However, there is an interesting point here: agents may
>> unconsciously create norms, in the sense that their
>> behaviors, and even their communication may be *read* as
>> conveying obligations: silence maybe interpreted as
>> disapproval etc. To the extent that this interpretation,
>> and the obligation contained, propagates in society,
>> both the model and the interpreters are collaborating in
>> creating a new norm. Nobody emanated it, but nonetheless
>> the norm emerged from agentsı interaction. This is one
>> good example of the social dynamics we ought to account for.
>>
>> just as slang is rarely consciously made, but they do
>> nevertheless communicate it, which is the medium for
>> norm/convention perpetuation.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I am, sadly, unfamiliar with Bratman: how do you
>> differentiate between goals and intentions?
>>
>>
>> Intentions are goals chosen for action: a goal (i.e., a
>> wanted state of the world) may be already realized, or
>> unexecutable. In either case, it will not be chosen for
>> action.
>> Cheers
>>
>> ross
>>
>>
>>
>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>> *From:* News and discussion about computer simulation in
>> the social sciences [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
>> <mailto:[log in to unmask]> *On Behalf Of
>> *Rosaria Conte
>> *Sent:* Friday, January 19, 2007 6:31 AM
>> *To:* [log in to unmask]
>> *Subject:* Re: [SIMSOC] Newbie on the list - working on
>> emergence of norms and beliefs
>>
>> This is becoming too broad a discussion, from my point
>> of view. My view in a nutshell is
>>
>>
>> * cognitive agents are necessary *but* insufficient
>> to account for societal phenoemna: what *else* is
>> needed? Theories of social dynamics, for which
>> cognitive architecture is irrelevant.
>> * a script-like behavior like going to a restaurant
>> is a convention-based rather than norm-ruled
>> behavior ,
>> * conventions are behavioral regularities, more or
>> less as Lewis defined them: i.e. preferences which
>> increase in presence of othersı preferences for a
>> given action. Norms are instead deontic commands,
>> either emanated by personal authorities (Von
>> Wright), or emerging spontaneously and gradually
>> * a norm emanated by a personal authority is a legal
>> norm; a norm emerging spontaneously is a social norm
>> * communities of practice usually generate
>> conventions, and sometimes social norms
>> * agents subjects to a norm do not emanate them, but
>> they simply allow them to emerge
>> * goals are essential to model autonomous agents,
>> including going to restaurant, but they are not
>> intentions (in Bratmanıs sense)
>> * theories like Newell and Simonıs, or Miller et
>> al.ııs, are *not* theories of human cognition, but
>> address that zone of the scientific noosphere
>> which is populated by abstract intelligent
>> systems, and this is exactly what those theories
>> meant to do. Whether they apply to human cognition
>> is not clear at all.
>> *
>>
>>
>> Sorry for the schematic answer :-)
>> ross
>>
>> Il 19-01-2007 7:57, "Maarten Sierhuis"
>> <[log in to unmask]> ha scritto:
>> I must say, this is turning into an interesting debate.
>> Let me at least state that my in intent is to come to
>> common understanding and not to attack those who might
>> have a different view on things.
>>
>>
>> Bellow, I am trying to make some comments ... again ;-)
>>
>>
>> Doei ... MXS
>>
>> On Jan 18, 2007, at 1:09 AM, Rosaria Conte wrote:
>>
>>
>> But, then, what does the statement mean? Can you give
>> some examples of the use of cognitive agents that are
>> not based on a cognitive architecture?
>>
>>
>> There is a misunderstanding here: I said that a theory
>> of norm emergence based on cognitive agents does *not*
>> imply that a cognitive model (and the underlying
>> architecture) is a model of large scale *societal*
>> behavior: in other words, although cognitive agents
>> contribute to societal processes, the latter should not
>> be modeled as cognitively designed (a great deal of
>> social dynamics is extra-mental).
>>
>> Ok, I think I get it. Just to clarify ... so you are
>> talking about wanting to model large scale societal
>> behavior and not individual problem solving. And, to
>> model this large scale societal behavior you want to
>> model the society as individual cognitive agents, using
>> a cognitive architecture that is based on goal-driven
>> planning agents. From this simulation you now want to
>> observe the large scale behavior and, probably,
>> categorize this behavior into norms. This will then lead
>> to a theory of norm emergence in large societies.
>>
>> You say that. "it does not imply that the cognitive
>> model [of the individual agents?] is a model of large
>> scale societal behavior:" Here is where I get stuck. Am
>> I correct in restating your claim as; Doing this does
>> not mean that your theory is based on any cognitive
>> theory. Or is this not what you claim? Let me argue
>> against this claim (assuming that is your claim for a
>> moment): If the large scale behavior in your model is
>> generated based on the behavior of individuals in the
>> model, than the large scale behavior IS created by the
>> individual agents. Then, if the behavior of the
>> individuals is generated by a cognitive model for each
>> agent, is it not true that the large scale behavior is
>> also generated by the cognitive models? Ergo, the theory
>> you create based on this behavior is also based on the
>> cognitive theory that underlies the cognitive models of
>> the individual agents. Thus, if you use a goal-driven
>> planning theory (such as the BDI theory of Bratman),
>> than, your norm emergence theory is based on Bratman's
>> BDI theory. Not?
>>
>>
>> My personal view is that norms and practice are closely
>> related.
>>
>>
>> This is a conventionalist view of norms. In any attempt
>> to distinguish them from conventions, norms are
>> accounted as something rather different from practices.
>>
>> I have not done any research on norms or norm
>> emergence, so forgive me if I am way off. However, I
>> have read some of the work of Geert and Gert Jan
>> Hofstede on Cultures and Organizations. I don't recall
>> them talking about norms specifically, but they do talk
>> about values and practices. Here is an interesting quote
>> from them, that I was implicitly using in my debate:
>>
>> "Symbols, heroes, and rituals have been subsumed under
>> the term practices. As such, they are visible to an
>> outside observer; their cultural meaning, however, is
>> invisible and lies precisely and only in the way these
>> practices are interpreted by the insider ... The core of
>> culture ... is formed by values."
>>
>> One of my questions is if Hofstede's rituals are
>> practice activities. I think so, but that's beside the
>> point.
>>
>> Question: How are norms the same or different from values?
>>
>> If they are similar, or at least related, then I would
>> still claim that norms are related to practices.
>>
>> Here is an example with which I can try to explain this
>> relationship, imho:
>>
>> - Practices are like norm-based scripts that everyone
>> within the community of practice knows and uses to
>> behave in a similar way.
>>
>> - Take for example, the script of "Eating at a resaurant."
>>
>> - There is a norm-based script (practice) of how to
>> behave; For the customer, the waiter, the cook, the
>> owner of the restaurant, etc.
>>
>> - This script is different depending on where you are
>> from, i.e. your community of practice and thus ... your
>> norms.
>>
>> - For example, In Holland, when you go to a restaurant,
>> you walk in and sit down at any empty table you might
>> like to sit at. Then, the waiter will come over and asks
>> you what you would like. In the US, this is not how you
>> do things normally, although in some restaurants you
>> may, which confuses the hell out of most Americans. The
>> norm is that you wait to be seated by a hostess. To
>> emphasize this norm, most restaurants have a symbol,
>> namely a sign that says "wait to be seated."
>>
>> This is how I relate norms to practices and societies
>> (i.e. communities of practice), and I would say that the
>> norms in a community are generated by the practices of
>> that community. The norm *is* implemented by the script,
>> or what I like to call, the activities of the
>> individuals in the community.
>>
>> Note that scripts are what activities are about. There
>> is NO need for goals or goal-driven planning; Possibly
>> only when we talk about a problem solving activity, but
>> there is no problem to be solved to go eat at a
>> restaurant, and thus there is no need for goals, and in
>> fact, the concept of a goal is simply confusing and not
>> a good representation of how we go eat at a restaurant.
>> In that sense, I agree with you that the norm of eating
>> at a restaurant has no relation to any goal-based
>> cognitive theory. But, that also means, don't use such a
>> theory to implement the activity of having an agent eat
>> at a restaurant. Use an activity-based theory, that
>> talks about, what you call, "extra mental" behavior.
>> Activity Theory by Vygotsky, and Situated Action by
>> Suchman, as well as Cognition in Practice by Lave are
>> more suited in this case, then Bratman, Newell or
>> Anderson's theory of cognition.
>>
>>
>> How can it be that entities reason upon representations
>> of norms, but don't issue or understand these norms?
>>
>>
>> Very simple. Lets start from *legal* norms:
>>
>> What are legal norms? This suggests there is a
>> classification of norms.
>> agents need to form a mental representation of the
>> norms impinging on them in order to autonomously decide
>> whether to comply with them or not.
>>
>> Ok ... so that's what I would call that they need to
>> "understand" norms. In terms of my example of the
>> "eating at a restaurant" activity, agents will
>> understand this by being able to perform the activity in
>> the appropriate situation, i.e. when going to a
>> restaurant. Belonging to a group (a community of
>> practice) makes you "inherit" the activity and thus the
>> norm.
>> However, agents usually emanate no norm:
>>
>> You mean, agents don't create norms? How about fads?
>> They are started by someone. I wouldn't call Malcolm
>> Gladwell's The Tipping Point a scientific treatise, but
>> he does tell a pretty good story about certain fads that
>> are created by individuals as tipping points that create
>> a fad.
>> often, they donıt even have the faintest idea how norms
>> are issued, by whom and through which processes. The
>> same a fortiori is true for *social* norms.
>>
>> Who is the "they?" The agents that don't emanate norms?
>> I guess this is true in some circumstances, but not true
>> in others. For example, I think most of the teenage
>> girls in California can tell you exactly who created and
>> how the fad of wearing expensive purses and getting
>> little dogs came about; Paris Hilton, via television and
>> smut magazines :-(
>>
>>
>> I am not aware of any cognitive agents that are not, in
>> some way shape or form, based on a theory of human
>> cognition.
>>
>>
>> GPS is no theory of human cognition but it is meant to
>> be a /General/ theory of intelligent, planning systems.
>>
>> Wait a minute. Newel's last book was even called
>> Unified Theories of Cognition.
>> Miller, Galanter and Pribramıs work (from the early
>> 60s) is a general theory of intelligent, goal-driven
>> systems which has poor relation with any pre-existing
>> theory of human cognition.
>>
>> Not according to Simon and Newell. Moreover, the tools
>> that are being used for modeling and simulating
>> "intelligent" agents are almost all based on goal-driven
>> systems (Brahms is one of the, if not the, exception).
>>
>>
>> It is probably my lack of knowledge about those who
>> define a theory of cognition for animals, other than
>> human, that I can't say much about this. But, I would
>> say that the theory of artificial minds is very much
>> related to that of the theory of human cognition.
>>
>>
>> Perhaps unfortunately,, this is not the case. The
>> hegemonial, although no more so recent, trend in
>> cognitive psychology is the modular view of the mind,
>> that so far to my knowledge no-one took as a reference
>> for computational modeling and agent architecture.
>> As to symbolic theories of animal intelligence, in
>> cognitive primatology, lots of people (Tommasello,
>> Visalberghi etc.) are working on primatesı and
>> childrenıs social imitation and cooperation with
>> experimental and observational approaches, trying to
>> understand related cognitive determinants of these
>> behaviors.
>>
>> Cheers
>> ross
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> (...)
>> More so, many scientist (e.g. neuroscience,
>> anthropology, cognitive science) have in recent years
>> developed counter theories to the theory of the human
>> mind as a "symbolic copy machine."
>>
>>
>>
>> Although it is not entirely clear to me what a symbolic
>> /copy /machine is, I do believe instead that cognitive
>> science in general has no much to say against the theory
>> of human mind as a symbolic system.
>>
>>
>> To claim that cognition is based on symbolic
>> processing, it means that that there is a copy function
>> within the process, and symbolic structures are copied
>> from one place to another in order to store and recall
>> the symbolic structures.
>>
>>
>> However, this by no means implies a particular
>> commitment to a view of agents as necessarily conscious,
>> ratiomorphic, and deliberative.
>>
>>
>> Yes it does, at least deliberative, which I would
>> posit needs consciousness. I am not sure what
>> ratiomorphic is.
>>
>>
>> A cognitive (based upon symbolic representations) view
>> of the mind should not be equalized with a strictly
>> deliberative view of agenthood.
>>
>>
>> Maybe not in the field where you operate, but I would
>> claim that in philosophy and cognitive psychology it
>> does. Maybe you can give some examples that make your
>> claim explicit.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ... (but, alas, not every human activity is goal-driven).
>>
>>
>>
>> Of course. However, a cognitive theory of goals defines
>> them as symbolic internal representations triggering and
>> guiding actions; by no means, again, this implies that
>> goals are also attributed the property of being
>> rational, consistent, conscious and necessarily chosen
>> for action (and therefore planned).
>>
>>
>> But that is not what the goal-based theories say. More
>> importantly, if one uses a BDI agent architecture (or an
>> expert system based architecture, such as Jess) to model
>> reasoning in your agents, then you are either implicitly
>> or explicitly claiming that "goals are also attributed
>> the property of being rational ..." Simply because these
>> architectures are based on the theory that rational,
>> consistent, conscious choosing of actions is planned and
>> goal-based. In other words, imho, you cannot use these
>> architectures to implement your agent system and then
>> claim that your model does not rely on these theories.
>> That is why we developed our own BDI-like architecture
>> that is not based on these theories, but on theories of
>> situated action and activity theory, which do not use
>> the concept of a goal to model reasoning, and does not
>> use goal-based planning to simulate perception-action
>> and deliberation.
>>
>>
>>
>> Cheers
>> ross
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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