> My God shaped (w)hole wasn't entirely in jest, since (at least in this
> context) the business of S, D and B is metaphysics.
Quite explicitly so for B. An a-theist metaphysics, but
unapologetically a metaphysics nevertheless. Considerable polemics
with Heidegger (in absentia) on this point.
> However, even though God is indeed the object of enquiry for Duns Scotus,
> you can substitute another or different placeholders (having a different
> object in view) and the _nature_ of those enquiries need not alter all that
> much. This is the position when Deleuze highlights the expressivity of
> Spinoza's *being*, for example: the focus has become how we divide reality.
> And when Badiou uses *diagonalisation* or *forcing* he is presumably also
> addressing division but building upon more advanced forms of set theory in
> order to consider the consequences of uncountability (in the case of
> *diagonalisation*) or consistency (in the case of *forcing*). But this is
> Dominic's terrain....
With B, I don't think it's so much about how you carve the cake as
about how beings are composed. The count-as-one isn't the selection of
a subset of the All, as the All can't be a set (it would be the set of
all sets, which *cannot be*), but the "spontaneous" presentation of
some being as a consistent multiple; all that lies behind this
presentation is "pure inconsistent multiplicity", which doesn't
pre-exist it (since to exist is to be presented as a consistent
multiple...) but is retroactively posited by the operation of the
count itself...
Dominic
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