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Subject:

[CSL]: Congress Consider Dangerous NSA Bills

From:

J Armitage <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Interdisciplinary academic study of Cyber Society <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Thu, 28 Sep 2006 08:00:26 +0100

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

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text/plain (381 lines)

From: [log in to unmask]
[mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of CDT
Info
Sent: 25 September 2006 21:28
To: [log in to unmask]
Cc: CDT Policy Posts
Subject: Congress Consider Dangerous NSA Bills

A Briefing On Public Policy Issues Affecting Civil Liberties Online
from The Center For Democracy and Technology

(1) Congress Poised to Consider Dangerous NSA Bills
(2) Alice in Wonderland: It's Not Surveillance if Congress Says It Isn't
(3) Both Bills Contain Additional Provisions That Threaten Civil  
Liberties
(4) Make Your Voice Heard - Call Your Senators and Representatives

-----------------------------------------------------------------

(1) Congress Poised to Consider Dangerous NSA Bills

Both Houses of Congress are expected this week to consider partisan  
bills that would both legalize and expand the President's warrantless  
wiretapping program, allowing the intelligence agencies to tap the  
telephone and Internet communications of American citizens without a  
court order.

The version in the House of Representatives is H.R. 5825, sponsored  
by Rep. Heather Wilson (R-N.M.).  The Senate bill, S. 3931, was  
drafted by Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.)  
and introduced by Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.).

Proponents and some press accounts have mischaracterized these bills  
as providing judicial review of the President's program and as  
"modernizing" the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  In fact,  
these bills would prevent meaningful judicial review of the  
President's program and would both ratify and expand to an  
unprecedented level the government's authority to wiretap Americans  
without a warrant.

The bills are of dubious constitutionality.  They would offer no  
identifiable improvement in national security, while turning the  
vacuum cleaner approach of the National Security Agency on the  
communications of innocent Americans.  The bills appear to be  
entirely unnecessary.  Members of Congress secretly briefed on the  
President's surveillance program have said that it could be conducted  
with court orders.

In the Senate, there is a bipartisan alternative, S. 3001, sponsored  
by Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and, remarkably enough, Chairman  
Specter.  The Specter-Feinstein bill would address the specific  
concerns about current law identified by the Administration, while  
preserving the core checks and balances laid down in the Foreign  
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

In the House, the Judiciary Committee and the Committee on  
Intelligence (HPSCI) reported different versions of the Wilson bill  
and rejected the moderate bipartisan alternatives. The House  
leadership, through the Rules Committee, will likely meld the two  
versions of the Wilson bill and send a composite to the House floor  
for a vote this week.

In the Senate, the Specter bill has been introduced as a stand-alone  
bill (S. 3931), but the leadership has said that it might be  
considered in a package (S. 3929) that includes the recent compromise  
authorizing military commissions for terrorists. These issues are too  
important and too complex to be combined in a single bill.  Congress  
should give the privacy rights of the American people and the  
national security needs of the intelligence agencies the full  
consideration they deserve by voting on the NSA bill separately - if  
at all.

More information: http://www.cdt.org/security/nsa

-----------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Alice in Wonderland: It's Not Surveillance if Congress Says It Isn't

Although not identical, the Specter and Wilson bills are similar in  
many respects.  Both bills would permit the National Security Agency  
to turn its vacuum cleaners on American citizens and create a vast  
database of information, which the government could data mine at  
will, outside any judicial or congressional oversight, in a fashion  
reminiscent of the Total Information Awareness program.

None of these changes is necessary to meet the terrorist threat.  In  
fact, a truly updated and technology-neutral approach would permit  
the government, with a court order, to intercept communications  
regardless of the sophistication of the terrorists.

The bills achieve their results in an Alice in Wonderland fashion:  
they define large categories of electronic surveillance as not being  
electronic surveillance.

Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), if the  
collection of information fits within the Act's definition of  
"electronic surveillance," then it requires a court order or must  
fall under one of the Act's exceptions.

However, if the recording of conversations and the collection of  
information are excluded from the definition of electronic  
surveillance, then they not covered by the Act and can be carried on  
without a warrant and without reporting to Congress.

The radically revamped Specter bill and the Wilson bill would cut  
back the definition of electronic surveillance with the following  
results:

President's Program - No Longer Electronic Surveillance: With the  
sweep of a legislative wand, the bills would exclude the President's  
warrantless surveillance program from coverage under FISA, because  
the President's program targets suspected terrorists who are outside  
the United States, even though it collects also the conversations of  
US citizens on the US end of those communications. The problem with  
this approach, of course, is that the person on the phone or email in  
the United States has rights too.  That party may be a journalist, an  
aid worker, or any of a number of other types of totally innocent  
citizens, yet under the Specter and Wilson bills their conversations  
and email would be intercepted without a warrant.

Scooping Up International Communications - No Longer Electronic  
Surveillance: The bills don't stop there.  While the President has  
assured the American public that his program is limited to situations  
where someone who may be associated with al Qaeda is overseas,  
calling into the US, the Specter and Wilson bills would authorize  
warrantless interception of every single call into and out of the  
United States, so long as the government was not targeting anyone in  
particular.

Purely Domestic Calls - May Not be Electronic Surveillance: The bills  
even go a step further and allow the recording of purely domestic  
calls, so long as the surveillance was "directed at" a foreign power  
or agent.  Under this approach, any citizen's calls to the Israeli  
embassy or the New York office of the Greek-owned Olympic Airways  
could be recorded without a warrant.

Call-Identifying and Pattern Data for Domestic Communications- No  
Longer Electronic Surveillance: Finally, the bills' crabbed  
definition means that the government can record who is calling whom  
and how often, and record the "To" and From" lines on all email, even  
for purely domestic communications, so long as it was targeting no  
one in particular. Under this approach, for the first time ever, NSA  
would be able to train its vacuum cleaner on the domestic calls and  
email of US citizens, creating a permanent database capable of being  
data mined or searched without even a subpoena.

Singly or together, the ramifications of these changes are bracing,  
especially with the dismantling of the wall between intelligence and  
law enforcement agencies.

The Specter bill and the version of the Wilson bill reported by the  
House Judiciary Committee give the Attorney General the power to  
issue directives to phone companies and Internet service providers  
compelling them to cooperate with the government in conducting  
warrantless surveillance.  The Attorney General orders can be  
enforced in court and any service provider that fails to obey can be  
found in contempt.  Although service providers would have the right  
to challenge the legality of a directive, it is unlikely that any  
service provider would initiate a challenge, since the bills also  
entitle the companies to be paid for assisting in the surveillance  
and give them complete immunity for compliance with an order.  (The  
version of the Wilson bill reported by the Intelligence Committee  
states that the Attorney General "may require, by written  
certification" cooperation in warrantless surveillance but it does  
not have such explicit enforcement provisions.)

The Wilson and Specter bills also would allow the government to apply  
for an order within -- and conduct warrantless surveillance in an  
emergency for -- seven days, up from three days under the current  
version of FISA.

Senators Larry Craig (R-Idaho), John Sununu (R-N.H.) and Lisa  
Murkowski (R-Alaska) on Sept. 25 announced that they had agreed to  
support the Specter bill.  They cited changes made when Sen. Frist  
introduced the Specter bill as S. 3931.  The changes make no  
difference to the fundamentals of the bill.  They do not address the  
fundamental concern that the bill carves out of FISA large amounts of  
domestic surveillance.

The Senators cite deletion of language that raises questions about  
the roles Congress and the Executive Branch play in regulating  
surveillance activity within the United States.

The deleted language was meaningless.  The current version of the  
bill (introduced by Sen. Frist) still repeals the exclusivity  
provision and renders FISA optional, encouraging the President to  
proceed on his program and others without judicial approval and  
setting up case-by-case constitutional challenges of how far the  
President can go without a court order.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Both Bills Contain Additional Provisions That Threaten Civil  
Liberties

The bills are similar in many respects, but they also contain some  
unique provisions.  A conference committee comprised of key members  
of the House and Senate would have to work out any differences in the  
bills after they were passed by both bodies of Congress.

Chairman Specter's Bill

-Exclusivity versus Blank Check

Chairman Specter negotiated his bill with the Administration and, in  
exchange for including several dangerous provisions in the bill,  
obtained an unwritten and unenforceable promise that the President  
would allow the FISA court to determine whether his warrantless  
wiretapping program is legal.  In exchange for this promise, Chairman  
Specter agreed to repeal the "exclusivity" provision that made FISA  
(in the intelligence gathering context) and Title 18 (in the criminal  
context) the exclusive means by which the government could conduct  
electronic surveillance inside the United States. Deleting the  
"exclusivity" provision means that this President and all future  
Presidents need never submit another request to the FISA court.  
Whether that would be constitutional or not is entirely unclear,  
casting a cloud over intelligence gathering.

-Program Warrants

Chairman Specter also agreed to provisions that would authorize a  
domestic spying program far broader and more intrusive on the privacy  
of innocent Americans than the one the President and Attorney General  
have described.  The Chairman's bill would authorize surveillance  
program warrants that could be directed at domestic calls without the  
government having to identify whom it is targeting,  in stark  
contrast to the individualized warrants normally mandated by the  
Fourth Amendment.  These program warrants could be approved for an  
initial 90-day period and then could be renewed for an indefinite  
duration.

-Forum Shopping by the Government

What's more, rather than ensuring judicial review of the  
constitutional merits of the President's program, the Specter bill  
actually undermines judicial review by allowing the government to  
seek dismissal in any district court of any challenge to a  
communications intelligence activity of the government or, if the  
government thinks the district court will rule against it, to  
transfer the challenge to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court  
of Review (FISCR).

Over 30 such cases are currently pending in federal courts around the  
country.  Chairman Specter's bill would allow the government to seek  
dismissal of them on procedural grounds in the district court or to  
have all of them transferred to the FISCR, where the government would  
still be able to assert the standing  doctrine and the state secrets  
privilege and also would have the benefit the FISCR's special  
procedures that allow the government to present its evidence in  
secret, making it more difficult for parties challenging the  
government program to overcome the evidentiary burdens they would face.

-Expanded Lone Wolf Provision

The Specter bill also contains a provision that is similar to the  
PATRIOT Act's "lone wolf" provision.  It would allow the government  
to obtain a FISA order to wiretap a non-US person who was engaged in  
activities relating to the development or proliferation of "weapons  
of mass destruction," but who was not connected to a "foreign power."

Representative Wilson's Bill

Both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select  
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) passed versions of Representative  
Wilson's bill.  The House Rules Committee will probably devise a  
single version of the bill that the full House will vote on this  
week.  Although the House Judiciary Committee adopted some innocuous  
amendments, like a requirement that the Attorney General report on  
minimization procedures to the congressional intelligence committees  
and a finding that Congress has the authority to regulate the  
President's inherent power to gather foreign intelligence, the bills  
also contain several dangerous provisions that are not in the Senate  
version of the bill.

-Immunity for Warrantless Surveillance Activity

In addition to expanding warrantless wiretapping as discussed above  
by simply defining much interception of telephone and Internet  
communications to not be electronic surveillance, the House Judiciary  
Committee version would immunize from liability any person from any  
activity related to any electronic surveillance program that was  
intended to protect the US from a terrorist attack.  This provision  
would result in the dismissal of all pending cases challenging the  
program and would preclude anyone in the future from bringing an  
action against the government challenging the legality of the program.

-Warrantless Surveillance Following Any Attack

The HPSCI version contains a provision that would authorize  
warrantless electronic surveillance and warrantless physical searches  
inside the United States for 2 months after an "armed attack against  
the territory of the United States."  The bill does not define "armed  
attack against the territory of the United States" and it does not  
indicate that the attack must be by a foreign terrorist group.  Are  
US embassies "territory of the United States?" Was the July 4, 2002  
attack at the El Al check-in counter at Los Angeles airport, in which  
a solo gunman killed three people, an armed attack against the  
territory of the US?  How about the attacks of the Washington DC sniper?

The HPSCI version also adds a detailed new section - "Authorization  
Following a Terrorist Attack Upon the United States" - that would  
allow warrantless electronic surveillance  for 45 days after "a  
terrorist attack against the United States" as long as the President  
(1) notifies the congressional intelligence committees and (2) a FISA  
judge that the US has been "the subject of a terrorist attack" and  
"identifies the terrorist organizations or  affiliates of terrorist  
organizations believed to be responsible for the terrorist attack."

Finally, the HPSCI version contains a provision allowing the Attorney  
General to authorize warrantless surveillance for renewable periods  
of 90 days if the President determines and notifies the congressional  
intelligence committees that there is "an imminent threat of attack  
likely to cause death, serious injury, or substantial economic damage  
to the United States."  (Warrantless surveillance of US persons would  
be limited to a period of 60 days.)

There is no definition of "imminent threat of attack" and it is not  
limited to attacks in the United States.  Would this include  
"imminent attacks" against US soldiers in Iraq? How is "substantial  
economic damage" defined? These questions are unanswered.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

(4) Make Your Voice Heard - Call Your Senators and Representatives

CDT has created an online resource where concerned citizens can find  
the phone numbers of their Senators and their Representative in the  
House:

http://www.cdt.org/action/nsa/

Call your elected representatives today and urge them to vote against  
the Specter and Wilson bills.  Urge them to support the bi-partisan  
Specter-Feinstein bill in the Senate, and any bipartisan alternative  
that the House leadership allows a vote on.
_______________________________________________

Detailed information about online civil liberties issues may be
found at http://www.cdt.org/.

This document may be redistributed freely in full or linked to
http://www.cdt.org/publications/policyposts/2006/17

Excerpts may be re-posted with prior permission of [log in to unmask]

Policy Post 12.17 Copyright 2006 Center for Democracy and Technology


_______________________________________________
http://www.cdt.org/mailman/listinfo/policy-posts
_______________________________________________
http://www.cdt.org/mailman/listinfo/policy-posts

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Distributed through Cyber-Society-Live [CSL]: CSL is a moderated discussion
list made up of people who are interested in the interdisciplinary academic
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