The (geo)politics of reconstruction in Aceh....surely of interest to
critical geographers...
Jan 4, 2005
The Acehnese deserve better
After more than a century of misery, it is time to make amends in Aceh
By Anthony Reid
FOR THE STRAITS TIMES
THE magnitude of the devastation visited on Aceh on Dec 26 is almost
beyond comprehension. No natural disaster in Indonesian, or indeed
South-east Asian, history comes close to the mounting toll of death and
destruction of this undersea earthquake and tsunamis. The whole thickly
populated coastal strip from Lhokseumawe in the east to Meulaboh in the
west appears to have been devastated.
In the district of West Aceh, where communication is very difficult at
the best of times, life appears to have almost vanished from all the
coastal towns and villages, normally home to about 200,000 people. Only
200 living people were found by the first relief unit to be able to land
in Meulaboh, its capital, from a pre-tsunami population of about 60,000.
While one hopes that many were able to flee inland, they will face
mounting difficulties to stay alive as unwanted guests of the scattered
hill villages.
The provincial capital, Banda Aceh, normally home to 200,000 people and
to most of the military and civilian infrastructure, has been
devastated. The Indonesian disaster response has been tragically slow,
but little more could be expected given the disruption to military and
civilian facilities. Although the military has 30,000 men on a war
footing in Aceh, it appears to have been largely incapacitated by the
disaster. Reportedly, only one of its helicopters in the province
survived.
Even worse is likely to come, as the lack of clean water and adequate
food and shelter takes its toll on the survivors. Those bringing
international aid encounter disorganisation, demoralisation and distrust
between the military and people. They need clarity as to who is in
charge.
This appalling disaster comes after more than a century of misery for
the stoic people of this richly endowed region. Aceh has had only a few
decades of peace since being invaded by the Dutch in 1873 with very
little warning. Forty years of bitter resistance to Dutch occupation
lost Aceh perhaps a fifth of its population and transformed it from one
of South-east Asia's more prosperous and strategically important centres
to an embittered backwater.
Aceh was effectively under military occupation by the Dutch until 1942
and the Japanese until 1945. After a brief experience of running its own
show in 1945 to 1951, it was again under military occupation in 1953 to
1962, during the Daud Beureu'eh rebellion, and in 1989 to 1998, when
then president Suharto's army sought to suppress the Aceh independence
movement (GAM) of Hasan di Tiro. Still, GAM became very popular under
democratic conditions after Suharto's fall.
Finally, since May 2003, a military solution has again been attempted,
and thousands more people have been killed in military offensives and
punitive actions, without notably removing the core of resistance.
Throughout this emergency period, foreign journalists, aid workers and
others have been excluded from the province, as the government sought to
remove Aceh from international headlines.
Having suffered the brutal militarisation of its institutions and its
society for over a century, now Aceh has been hit by a colossal natural
disaster, the losses of which on a single day dwarf even the tens of
thousands that the region has lost to warfare.
To its credit, the international community has also responded in an
unprecedented way. The military forces of Singapore, the United States
and Australia are already in Aceh dispensing desperately needed
supplies, and US$2 billion (S$3.3 billion) has been pledged in aid to
the affected regions, of which at least half should in fairness be
destined for Aceh. The aid givers have their first chance at the Jakarta
summit on Thursday to try to ensure that Aceh's poisonous politics do
not again negate all efforts for assistance.
In catastrophes such as this, military forces are best able to deliver
aid quickly, and the foreign military units naturally look to their
local counterparts to guide and direct. But in Aceh, the military has
been the major part of the problem, not the solution.
Over the past 50 years it has killed and rendered homeless too many
Acehnese for there to be trust between people and army. The carefully
constructed reform legislation to give the widest possible autonomy to
Aceh (the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam or NAD law of 2001) has been
completely vitiated by military control of all the levers of power since
May 2003.
The need for the underfunded military to raise money from various
business and protection rackets has ensured that little of Aceh's wealth
has yet benefited its people.
The foreign aid, in other words, must be delivered to the people who
need it as directly as possible, without the mediation of the Indonesian
military. The best way to ensure this would be for the summit meeting to
endorse and carry forward the ceasefire that both GAM and President
Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono have said they favour. TNI units on the ground
in Aceh have been quoted as ignoring this ceasefire, and the higher
command needs encouragement in its resolve to bring them into line. Both
TNI and GAM need to be disarmed during the long process of
reconstruction, with law enforcement becoming the responsibility of Aceh
police stiffened by international police units under United Nations'
responsibility.
Both TNI and GAM forces may be able to assist in the reconstruction of
areas where they are strong, but only if they are disarmed while doing
so, and thereby unable to continue the division and brutalisation of the
populace.
The Yudhoyono government has, to its credit, declared open access to
Aceh for international aid givers. This runs counter to the instincts of
the local military, and again the international community will need to
be clear about permanently full access, not just for aid givers, but for
the journalists who will sustain global interest in the problem.
The government of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, in which Mr
Yudhoyono was largely responsible for Aceh policy, had allowed
international peace monitors (from Thailand and the Philippines) during
the peace agreement of 2002 to 2003.
This crisis demands an even more generous response towards accepting the
internationalisation of Aceh's reconstruction. The UN needs to assume
authority for the international aid effort, in cooperation with Mr Alwi
Shihab, the civilian minister President Yudhoyono has placed in charge.
Only the demilitarisation of Aceh under some form of international
guarantee can make possible the full implementation of the NAD autonomy
law and the emergence through elections of a leadership Acehnese can
trust.
Acehnese have suffered enough. They deserve this.
The writer is director of the Asia Research Institute at the National
University of Singapore and the author of three books on Aceh's history.
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