From: Bruce Schneier [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: 15 September 2005 09:06
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: CRYPTO-GRAM, September 15, 2005
CRYPTO-GRAM
September 15, 2005
by Bruce Schneier
Founder and CTO
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
[log in to unmask]
<http://www.schneier.com>
<http://www.counterpane.com>
A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.
For back issues, or to subscribe, visit
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.
You can read this issue on the web at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0509.html>. These same essays
appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog>. An RSS feed is available.
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
In this issue:
Movie-Plot Threats
Katrina and Security
The Keys to the Sydney Subway
Crypto-Gram Reprints
New Cryptanalytic Results Against SHA-1
Zotob
News
Airline Security, Trade-offs, and Agenda
Cameras in the New York City Subways
Counterpane News
Lance Armstrong Accused of Doping
Peggy Noonan and Movie-Plot Terrorist Threats
Trusted Computing Best Practices
Comments from Readers
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Movie-Plot Threats
Sometimes it seems like the people in charge of homeland security spend
too much time watching action movies. They defend against specific
movie plots instead of against the broad threats of terrorism.
We all do it. Our imaginations run wild with detailed and specific
threats. We imagine anthrax spread from crop dusters. Or a contaminated
milk supply. Or terrorist scuba divers armed with almanacs. Before
long, we're envisioning an entire movie plot, without Bruce Willis
saving the day. And we're scared.
Psychologically, this all makes sense. Humans have good imaginations.
Box cutters and shoe bombs conjure vivid mental images. "We must
protect the Super Bowl" packs more emotional punch than the vague "we
should defend ourselves against terrorism."
The 9/11 terrorists used small pointy things to take over airplanes, so
we ban small pointy things from airplanes. Richard Reid tried to hide a
bomb in his shoes, so now we all have to take off our shoes. Recently,
the Department of Homeland Security said that it might relax airplane
security rules. It's not that there's a lessened risk of shoes, or that
small pointy things are suddenly less dangerous. It's that those movie
plots no longer capture the imagination like they did in the months
after 9/11, and everyone is beginning to see how silly (or pointless)
they always were.
Commuter terrorism is the new movie plot. The London bombers carried
bombs into the subway, so now we search people entering the subways.
They used cell phones, so we're talking about ways to shut down the
cell-phone network.
It's too early to tell if hurricanes are the next movie-plot threat
that captures the imagination.
The problem with movie plot security is that it only works if we guess
right. If we spend billions defending our subways, and the terrorists
bomb a bus, we've wasted our money. To be sure, defending the subways
makes commuting safer. But focusing on subways also has the effect of
shifting attacks toward less-defended targets, and the result is that
we're no safer overall.
Terrorists don't care if they blow up subways, buses, stadiums,
theaters, restaurants, nightclubs, schools, churches, crowded markets
or busy intersections. Reasonable arguments can be made that some
targets are more attractive than others: airplanes because a small bomb
can result in the death of everyone aboard, monuments because of their
national significance, national events because of television coverage,
and transportation because most people commute daily. But the United
States is a big country; we can't defend everything.
One problem is that our nation's leaders are giving us what we want.
Party affiliation notwithstanding, appearing tough on terrorism is
important. Voting for missile defense makes for better campaigning than
increasing intelligence funding. Elected officials want to do something
visible, even if it turns out to be ineffective.
The other problem is that many security decisions are made at too low a
level. The decision to turn off cell phones in some tunnels was made by
those in charge of the tunnels. Even if terrorists then bomb a
different tunnel elsewhere in the country, that person did his job.
And anyone in charge of security knows that he'll be judged in
hindsight. If the next terrorist attack targets a chemical plant, we'll
demand to know why more wasn't done to protect chemical plants. If it
targets schoolchildren, we'll demand to know why that threat was
ignored. We won't accept "we didn't know the target" as an answer.
Defending particular targets protects reputations and careers.
We need to defend against the broad threat of terrorism, not against
specific movie plots. Security is most effective when it doesn't make
arbitrary assumptions about the next terrorist act. We need to spend
more money on intelligence and investigation: identifying the
terrorists themselves, cutting off their funding, and stopping them
regardless of what their plans are. We need to spend more money on
emergency response: lessening the impact of a terrorist attack,
regardless of what it is. And we need to face the geopolitical
consequences of our foreign policy and how it helps or hinders terrorism.
These vague things are less visible, and don't make for good political
grandstanding. But they will make us safer. Throwing money at this
year's movie plot threat won't.
This essay was originally published in Wired:
<http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,68789,00.html>
I am now doing a biweekly column for them. You can read the essays at
Wired.com, or you can wait until I reprint them in Crypto-Gram.
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Katrina and Security
Leaving aside the political posturing and the finger-pointing, how did
our nation mishandle Katrina so badly? After spending tens of billions
of dollars on homeland security (hundreds of billions, if you include
the war in Iraq) in the four years after 9/11, what did we do wrong?
Why were there so many failures at the local, state and federal levels?
These are reasonable questions. Katrina was a natural disaster and not
a terrorist attack, but that only matters before the event. Large-scale
terrorist attacks and natural disasters differ in cause, but they're
very similar in aftermath. And one can easily imagine a Katrina-like
aftermath to a terrorist attack, especially one involving nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons.
Improving our disaster response was discussed in the months after 9/11.
We were going to give money to local governments to fund first
responders. We established the Department of Homeland Security to
streamline the chains of command and facilitate efficient and effective
response.
The problem is that we all got caught up in "movie-plot threats,"
specific attack scenarios that capture the imagination and then the
dollars. Whether it's terrorists with box cutters or bombs in their
shoes, we fear what we can imagine. We're searching backpacks in the
subways of New York, because this year's movie plot is based on a
terrorist bombing in the London subways.
Funding security based on movie plots looks good on television, and
gets people reelected. But there are millions of possible scenarios,
and we're going to guess wrong. The billions spent defending airlines
are wasted if the terrorists bomb crowded shopping malls instead.
Our nation needs to spend its homeland security dollars on two things:
intelligence-gathering and emergency response. These two things will
help us regardless of what the terrorists are plotting, and the second
helps both against terrorist attacks and national disasters.
Katrina demonstrated that we haven't invested enough in emergency
response. New Orleans police officers couldn't talk with each other
after power outages shut down their primary communications system --
and there was no backup. The Department of Homeland Security, which was
established in order to centralize federal response in a situation like
this, couldn't figure out who was in charge or what to do, and actively
obstructed aid by others. FEMA did no better, and thousands died while
turf battles were being fought.
Our government's ineptitude in the aftermath of Katrina demonstrates
how little we're getting for all our security spending. It's
unconscionable that we're wasting our money fingerprinting foreigners,
profiling airline passengers, and invading foreign countries while
emergency response at home goes underfunded.
Money spent on emergency response makes us safer, regardless of what
the next disaster is, whether terrorist-made or natural.
This includes good communications on the ground, good coordination up
the command chain, and resources -- people and supplies -- that can be
quickly deployed wherever they're needed.
Similarly, money spent on intelligence-gathering makes us safer,
regardless of what the next disaster is. Against terrorism, that
includes the NSA and the CIA. Against natural disasters, that includes
the National Weather Service and the National Earthquake Information
Center.
Katrina deftly illustrated homeland security's biggest challenge:
guessing correctly. The solution is to fund security that doesn't rely
on guessing. Defending against movie plots doesn't make us appreciably
safer. Emergency response does. It lessens the damage and suffering
caused by disasters, whether man-made, like 9/11, or nature-made, like
Katrina.
This essay was originally published in the Minneapolis Star Tribune:
<http://www.startribune.com/stories/562/5606306.html>
My preliminary thoughts are here:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/security_lesson.html>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
The Keys to the Sydney Subway
Global secrets are generally considered poor security. The problems
are twofold. One, you cannot apply any granularity to the security
system; someone either knows the secret or does not. And two, global
secrets are brittle. They fail badly; if the secret gets out, then the
bad guys have a pretty powerful secret.
This is the situation right now in Sydney, where someone stole the
master key that gives access to every train in the metropolitan area,
and also starts them.
Unfortunately, this isn't a thief who got lucky. It happened twice in
Sydney, and it's possible that the keys were the target
So, what can someone do with the master key to the Sydney subway? It's
more likely a criminal than a terrorist, but even so it's definitely a
serious issue
I don't know if RailCorp should change the locks. I don't know the
risk: whether that "range of security measures" only protects against
train theft -- an unlikely scenario, if you ask me -- or other
potential scenarios as well. And I don't know how expensive it would
be to change the locks.
Another problem with global secrets is that it's expensive to recover
from a security failure.
And this certainly isn't the first time a master key fell into the
wrong hands: "[RailCorp chief executive Vince] Graham said there was
no point changing any of the metropolitan railway key locks.
"'We could change locks once a week but I don't think it reduces in any
way the security threat as such because there are 2000 of these
particular keys on issue to operational staff across the network and
that is always going to be, I think, an issue.'"
A final problem with global secrets is that it's simply too easy to
lose control of them.
Moral: Don't rely on global secrets.
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/the_keys_to_the.html>
<http://smh.com.au/news/national/two-sets-of-keys-to-sydneys-trains-stol
en/2005/08/30/1125302547374.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/bpk4a>
<http://news.ninemsn.com.au/article.aspx?id=15096
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Crypto-Gram Reprints
Crypto-Gram is currently in its seventh year of publication. Back
issues cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found
on <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. These are a selection
of articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.
Security at the Olympics:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0409.html#2>
Trusted Traveler program:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0409.html#5>
No-fly list:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0409.html#10>
Accidents and security incidents:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0309.html#1>
Benevolent worms:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0309.html#8>
Special issue on 9/11, including articles on airport security,
biometrics, cryptography, steganography, intelligence failures, and
protecting liberty:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0109a.html>
Full Disclosure and the Window of Exposure:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0009.html#1>
Open Source and Security:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#OpenSourceandSecurity>
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?U25716849>
Factoring a 512-bit Number:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#Factoringa512-bitNumber>
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?J17752849>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
New Cryptanalytic Results Against SHA-1
Xiaoyun Wang, one of the team of Chinese cryptographers that
successfully broke SHA-0 and SHA-1, along with Andrew Yao and Frances
Yao, announced new results against SHA-1 at Crypto's rump
session. (Actually, Adi Shamir announced the results in their name,
since she and her student did not receive U.S. visas in time to attend
the conference.)
Shamir presented few details -- and there's no paper -- but the time
complexity of the new attack is 2^63. (Their previous result was 2^69;
brute force is 2^80.) He did say that he expected Wang and her
students to improve this result over the next few months. The
modifications to their published attack are still new, and more
improvements are likely over the next several months. There is no
reason to believe that 2^63 is anything like a lower limit.
But an attack that's faster than 2^64 is a significant
milestone. We've already done massive computations with complexity
2^64. Now that the SHA-1 collision search is squarely in the realm of
feasibility, some research group will try to implement it. Writing
working software will both uncover hidden problems with the attack, and
illuminate hidden improvements. And while a paper describing an attack
against SHA-1 is damaging, software that produces actual collisions is
even more so.
The story of SHA-1 is not over. Again, I repeat the saying I've heard
comes from inside the NSA: "Attacks always get better; they never get
worse."
Details of the SHA break:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/02/cryptanalysis_o.html>
NIST's Hash Function Workshop, to be held in late October:
<http://www.csrc.nist.gov/pki/HashWorkshop/index.html>
Effects of the attack on S/MIME, TLS, and IPsec:
<http://www.educatedguesswork.org/movabletype/archives/2005/07/deploying
_a_new.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/cz4lf>
Xiaoyun Wang's two papers from Crypto:
Efficient Collision Search Attacks on SHA-0
<http://202.194.5.130/admin/infosec/download.php?id=1>
Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1
<http://202.194.5.130/admin/infosec/download.php?id=2>
The rest of her papers:
<http://www.infosec.sdu.edu.cn/people/wangxiaoyun.htm>
Story of them being denied visas to attend the conference:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/chinese_cryptog.html>
<http://www.navyseals.com/community/articles/article.cfm?id=7757>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Zotob
I've been reading the massive press coverage about Zotob, and can't
figure out what the big deal is about. Yes, it propagates in Windows
2000 without user intervention, which is always nastier. It uses a
Microsoft plug-and-play vulnerability, which is somewhat
interesting. But the only reason I can think of that CNN did rolling
coverage on it is that CNN was hit by it.
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/15/zytob_worm/print.html>
<http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11281>
<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/112bcc04-0f0d-11da-8b31-00000e2511c8.html>
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/16/irc_bot/>
<http://it.slashdot.org/it/05/08/16/2247228.shtml?tid=220&tid=188>
<http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2005/0,4814,103929,00.html>
<http://www.newsfactor.com/story.xhtml?story_id=37727>
<http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/index.php/id;1841567960;fp;2;fpid;1>
<http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11285>
Technical details:
<http://www.sophos.com/virusinfo/analyses/w32zotoba.html>
<http://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/zotob_a.shtml>
<http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.zotob.a.htm
l> or <http://tinyurl.com/8so5h>
Vulnerability:
<http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS05-039.mspx>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
News
SANS NewsBites is a weekly email digest of the computer-security news
stories out there. There is some commentary, but it's kept to an
absolute minimum. It's primarily short descriptions and links to news
articles. There are a lot of email newsletters, but this is one that I
read every time. Subscribing is free, which is a great deal for one of
the most useful computer-security news sources on the Internet. And,
as an aside, I'm on the editorial board. Past issues and sign up:
<http://www.sans.org/newsletters>
Research in behavioral risk analysis:
<https://www.fastlane.nsf.gov/servlet/showaward?award=0527598>
Interesting law-review article on crime-facilitating speech:
<http://www.law.ucla.edu/volokh/facilitating.pdf>
Privacy-enhanced computer display:
<http://www.merl.com/projects/privatedisplay/>
If you have an audio recording of somebody typing on an ordinary
computer keyboard for fifteen minutes or so, you can figure out
everything he typed.
<http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=893>
<http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~tygar/papers/Keyboard_Acoustic_Emanations_R
evisited/preprint.pdf> or <http://tinyurl.com/dzgda>
Putting aside geopolitics for a minute, it's interesting to read the
technical security details about the barrier the Israelis built around
Gaza:
<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFul
l&cid=1126059637154> or <http://tinyurl.com/bsjyb>
In Beyond Fear, pages 207-8, I wrote about the technical details of the
Berlin Wall. This is far more sophisticated.
Marcus Ranum's "The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security":
<http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/>
Criminals are learning forensic science, and juries are getting
unrealistic expectations of forensic science, both from television
shows like CSI.
<http://www.newscientist.com/channel/opinion/mg18725163.800>
Fascinating article on A.G. Tolkachev, a Russian who spied for the CIA
for almost ten years. I was particularly interested in reading the
tradecraft descriptions.
<http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol47no3/article02.html>
An awful essay suggesting a U.S. national firewall:
<http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,1831969,00.asp>
Here's a criminal who videotaped keys as they were being used and then
duplicated them:
<http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/local/12554094.htm?template=conte
ntModules/printstory.jsp> or <http://tinyurl.com/7pd2n>
A researcher writes about how criminals adapt to security features of
identity cards, like chip and pin:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/identity_cards.html>
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/crime/article/0,2763,1562681,00.html>
<http://smh.com.au/news/World/New-tech-may-increase-ID-theft-expert/2005
/09/05/1125772436375.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/7759a>
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4213848.stm>
<http://software.silicon.com/security/0,39024655,39151961,00.htm>
The Digital-ER mailing list is dedicated to discussing technical
solutions to emergency and crisis management.
<http://lists.networkcommand.com/mailman/listinfo/digital-er>
A fun, and ultimately tragic, story about a bad game-show random-number
generator.
<http://www.rotten.com/library/conspiracy/Press_Your_Luck/>
Security at Hogwarts
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/09/hogwarts_securi.html>
<http://ritestuff.blogspot.com/2005/08/harry-potter-and-half-assed-secur
ity.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/9smud>
<http://www.veryard.com/trust/potter.htm>
There's a discussion on SlashDot about the security of code signing,
and particularly my comments on the topic in the book Secrets and Lies.
<http://ask.slashdot.org/askslashdot/05/08/31/2045201.shtml?tid=172&tid=
156&tid=4> or <http://tinyurl.com/bsbd7>
Cryptome has a list of 276 MI6 agents:
<http://cryptome.org/mi6-list-276.htm>
Debate the security, legality, ethics, and wisdom of this here:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/276_british_spi.html>
Here's a new Internet data-mining research program with a cool name:
Unintended Information Revelation
<http://www.contractoruk.com/news/002194.html>
The security of tamper-evident paper mailings, the kind used by banks
and credit-card companies to send PIN numbers and passwords:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/tamper-evident.html>
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4183330.stm>
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/PIN-Mailer.pdf>
Good article on security at Visa in light of the CardSystems incident.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/25/business/25visa.html>
The article echoes some of the security arguments I made here:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/visa_and_amex_d.html>
Identity thief steals house:
<http://www.plastic.com/article.html;sid=05/08/23/19205287;cmt=60>
Cingular employee sells used cell phones with personal information
still on them:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/privacy_risks_o.html>
<http://www.wfmynews2.com/watercooler/watercooler_article.aspx?storyid=4
7473> or <http://tinyurl.com/dggys>
Risks of losing small portable devices:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/risks_of_losing.html>
U.S. government computers attacked from China:
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/24/AR20050
82402318.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/bup8w>
Did you know you could be arrested for carrying a police uniform in New
York City? Even if you're an actor playing the part of a policeman in
a play?
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/actors_playing.html>
<http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2005-08-22-sag-warning_x.h
tm> or <http://tinyurl.com/a8f5w>
Interesting research grant from the NSF: A Socio-Technical Approach to
Internet Security.
<https://www.fastlane.nsf.gov/servlet/showaward?award=0550008>
Here's a piece of interesting research out of Ohio State: it's a
passive sensor that could be cheaper, better, and less intrusive than
technologies like backscatter x-rays.
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/ambient_radiati.html>
<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/08/050814172841.htm>
Advertisers are beaming unwanted content to Bluetooth phones at a
distance of 100 meters.
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/bluetooth_spam.html>
<http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn7883>
RFID in British license plates:
<http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,68429,00.html>
Thieves are using Bluetooth phones to find Bluetooth-enabled laptops in
parked cars, which they then steal.
<http://www.cambridge-news.co.uk/news/region_wide/2005/08/17/06967453-80
02-45f8-b520-66b9bed6f29f.lpf> or <http://tinyurl.com/ey9zw>
Nice example of unintended security consequences of a new
technology. And more evidence that new features need to be turned off
by default.
Infants on the terrorist watch list:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/infants_on_the.html>
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/08/15/no.fly.babies.ap/index.html>
The Kutztown 13: Thirteen high-school kids were charged with felonies
for bypassing the security of their school-issued laptops.
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/08/computer_crime.html>
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/10/kutztown_13/>
<http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,68480,00.html>
<http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/andrewkantor/2005-08-18-kutztown
-kids_x.htm> or <http://tinyurl.com/9a8ql>
Charges were eventually dropped:
<http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/09/02/0712237>
Looks like the DHS and TSA are finally beginning to realize that small
pointy things are not a terrorist threat to aviation.
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/08/13/national/w2
34140D88.DTL> or <http://tinyurl.com/d6wr4>
Privacy implications of unmanned planes patrolling borders:
<http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0805/>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Airline Security, Trade-offs, and Agenda
All security decisions are trade-offs, and smart security trade-offs
are ones where the security you get is worth what you have to give
up. This sounds simple, but it isn't. There are differences between
perceived risk and actual risk, differences between perceived security
and actual security, and differences between perceived cost and actual
cost. And beyond that, there are legitimate differences in trade-off
analysis. Any complicated security decision affects multiple players,
and each player evaluates the trade-off from his or her own perspective.
I call this "agenda," and it is one of the central themes of Beyond
Fear. It is clearly illustrated in the current debate about rescinding
the prohibition against small pointy things on airplanes. The flight
attendants are against the change. Reading their comments, you can
clearly see their subjective agenda:
"'As the front-line personnel with little or no effective security
training or means of self defense, such weapons could prove fatal to
our members,' Patricia A. Friend, international president of the
Association of Flight Attendants, said in a letter to Edmund S. 'Kip'
Hawley, the new leader of the Transportation Security Administration.
'They may not assist in breaking through a flightdeck door, but they
could definitely lead to the deaths of flight attendants and
passengers'....
"The flight attendants, whose union represents 46,000 members, said
that easing the ban on some prohibited items could pose a safety risk
on board the aircraft and lead to incidents that terrorize passengers
even if they do not involve a hijacking.
"'Even a plane that is attacked and results in only a few deaths would
seriously jeopardize the progress we have all made in restoring
confidence of the flying public,' Friend said in her letter. 'We urge
you to reconsider allowing such dangerous items -- which have no place
in the cabin of an aircraft in the first place -- to be introduced into
our workplace.'"
The flight attendants are not evaluating the security countermeasure
from a global perspective. They're not trying to figure out what the
optimal level of risk is, what sort of trade-offs are acceptable, and
what security countermeasures most efficiently achieve that
trade-off. They're looking at the trade-off from their perspective:
they get more benefit from the countermeasure than the average flier
because it's their workplace, and the cost of the countermeasure is
borne largely by the passengers.
There is nothing wrong with flight attendants evaluating airline
security from their own agenda. I'd be surprised if they didn't. But
understanding agenda is essential to understanding how security
decisions are made.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/16/AR20050
81601467.html> or <http://tinyurl.com/8fepc>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Cameras in the New York City Subways
New York City is spending $212 million on surveillance technology:
1,000 video cameras and 3,000 motion sensors for the city's subways,
bridges, and tunnels.
Why? Why, given that cameras didn't stop the London train
bombings? Why, when there is no evidence that cameras are effective at
reducing either terrorism and crime, and every reason to believe that
they are ineffective?
One reason is that it's the "movie plot threat" of the moment. (You
can hear the echoes of the movie plots when you read the various quotes
in the news stories.) The terrorists bombed a subway in London, so we
need to defend our subways. The other reason is that New York City
officials are erring on the side of caution. If nothing happens, then
it was only money. But if something does happen, they won't keep their
jobs unless they can show they did everything possible. And
technological solutions just make everyone feel better.
If I had $212 million to spend to defend against terrorism in the U.S.,
I would not spend it on cameras in the New York City subways. If I had
$212 million to defend New York City against terrorism, I would not
spend it on cameras in the subways. This is nothing more than security
theater against a movie plot threat.
On the plus side, the money will also go for a new radio communications
system for subway police, and will enable cell phone service in
underground stations, but not tunnels.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/23/nyregion/23cnd-mta.html>
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/23/AR20050
82301488.html?nav=rss_technology> or <http://tinyurl.com/ckdst>
<http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20050823/us_nm/security_new_york_dc_2&printe
r=1;_%20%20ylt=Aij95wnkz9LkKve4ql_VU8EXIr0F;_ylu=X3oDMTA3MXN1bHE0BHNlYwN
0bWE-> or <http://tinyurl.com/9h9q9>
<http://it.slashdot.org/it/05/08/23/2237220.shtml?tid=172&tid=215>
Effectiveness of cameras:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/surveillance_ca.html>
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/05/surveillance_ca_1.html>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Counterpane News
Counterpane Joins Sourcefire Certified Snort Integrator Program
<http://www.counterpane.com/pr-20050824.html>
Teleware is Counterpane's new partner and reseller in Scandinavia and
the Baltic.
<http://www.counterpane.com/pr-20050822.html>
WilTel Communications announces an alliance with Counterpane.
<http://www.counterpane.com/pr-20050912.html>
Countermeasures is a quarterly newsletter covering techniques to combat
threats and protect the integrity of networked systems. The first
issue will go out on the 19th, but you can view a partial preview here:
<http://www.counterpane.com/countermeasures.html>
Schneier is speaking at the Texas Regional Infrastructure Security
Conference in Austin, TX on September 19th.
<http://www.trisc.org/>
Schneier is speaking at ACLU events in Columbus and Dayton on September
20-21.
<http://www.acluohio.org/schneier.htm>
Schneier is speaking at the ACLU Hawaii Awards Dinner on September 25th.
<http://www.acluhawaii.org/>
Schneier is speaking at the Information Security Forum in Munich on
October 10th.
<http://www.securityforum.org/html/frameset.htm>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Lance Armstrong Accused of Doping
Lance Armstrong has been accused of using a banned substance while
racing the Tour de France. From a security perspective, this isn't
very interesting. Blood and urine tests are used to detect banned
substances all the time. But what is interesting is that the urine
sample was from 1999, and the test was done in 2005.
Back in 1999, there was no test for the drug EPO. Now there
is. Someone took a old urine sample -- who knew that they stored old
urine samples? -- and ran the new test.
This ability of a security mechanism to go back in time is interesting,
and similar to police exhuming dead bodies for new forensic analysis,
or a new cryptographic technique permitting decades-old encrypted
messages to be read.
It also has some serious ramifications for athletes considering using
banned substances. Not only do they have to evade any tests that exist
today, but they have to at least think about how they could evade any
tests that might be invented in the future. You could easily imagine
athletes being stripped of their records, medals, and titles decades in
the future after past transgressions are discovered.
On the other hand, athletes accused of using banned substances in the
past have limited means by which to defend themselves. Perhaps they
will start storing samples of their own blood and urine in escrow, year
after year, so they'd have well-stored and untainted bodily fluids with
which to refute charges of past transgressions.
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2094-1753419,00.html>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Peggy Noonan and Movie-Plot Terrorist Threats
Peggy Noonan is opposed to the current round of U.S. base closings
because, well, basically because she thinks they'll be useful if the
government ever has to declare martial law.
I don't know anything about military bases, and what should be closed
or remain open. What's interesting to me is that her essay is a
perfect example of thinking based on movie-plot threats:
"Among the things we may face over the next decade, as we all know, is
another terrorist attack on American soil. But let's imagine the next
one has many targets, is brilliantly planned and coordinated. Imagine
that there are already 100 serious terror cells in the U.S., two per
state. The members of each cell have been coming over, many but not all
crossing our borders, for five years. They're working jobs, living
lives, quietly planning.
"Imagine they're planning that on the same day in the not-so-distant
future, they will set off nuclear suitcase bombs in six American
cities, including Washington, which will take the heaviest hit.
Hundreds of thousands may die; millions will be endangered. Lines will
go down, and to make it worse the terrorists will at the same time
execute the cyberattack of all cyberattacks, causing massive
communications failure and confusion. There will be no electricity;
switching and generating stations will also have been targeted. There
will be no word from Washington; the extent of the national damage will
be as unknown as the extent of local damage is clear. Daily living will
become very difficult, and for months -- food shortages, fuel shortages.
"Let's make it worse. On top of all that, on the day of the suitcase
nukings, a half dozen designated cells will rise up and assassinate
national, state and local leaders. There will be chaos, disorder,
widespread want; law-enforcement personnel, or what remains of them,
will be overwhelmed and outmatched.
"Impossibly grim? No, just grim. Novelistic? Sure. But if you'd been a
novelist on Sept. 10, 2001, and dreamed up a plot in which two huge
skyscrapers were leveled, the Pentagon was hit, and the wife of the
solicitor general of the United States was desperately phoning him from
a commercial jet that had been turned into a missile, you would have
been writing something wild and improbable that nonetheless happened a
day later.
"And all this of course is just one scenario. The madman who runs North
Korea could launch a missile attack on the United States tomorrow, etc.
There are limitless possibilities for terrible trouble."
This game of "let's imagine" really does stir up emotions, but it's not
the way to plan national security policy. There's a movie plot to
justify any possible national policy, and another to render that same
policy ineffectual.
Noonan writes: "This of course is pure guessing on my part. I can't
prove it with data."
That's precisely the problem.
<http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/pnoonan/?id=110007154>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Trusted Computing Best Practices
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is an industry consortium that is
trying to build more secure computers. They have a lot of members,
although the board of directors consists of Microsoft, Sony, AMD,
Intel, IBM, SUN, HP, and two smaller companies who are voted on in a
rotating basis.
The basic idea is that you build a computer from the ground up
securely, with a core hardware "root of trust" called a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM). Applications can run securely on the computer,
can communicate with other applications and their owners securely, and
can be sure that no untrusted applications have access to their data or
code.
This sounds great, but it's a double-edged sword. The same system that
prevents worms and viruses from running on your computer might also
stop you from using any legitimate software that your hardware or
operating system vendor simply doesn't like. The same system that
protects spyware from accessing your data files might also stop you
from copying audio and video files. The same system that ensures that
all the patches you download are legitimate might also prevent you
from, well, doing pretty much anything.
In May, the Trusted Computing Group published a best practices
document: "Design, Implementation, and Usage Principles for TPM-Based
Platforms." Written for users and implementers of TCG technology, the
document tries to draw a line between good uses and bad uses of this
technology.
"The principles that TCG believes underlie the effective, useful, and
acceptable design, implementation, and use of TCG technologies are the
following:
"Security: TCG-enabled components should achieve controlled access to
designated critical secured data and should reliably measure and report
the system's security properties. The reporting mechanism should be
fully under the owner's control.
"Privacy: TCG-enabled components should be designed and implemented
with privacy in mind and adhere to the letter and spirit of all
relevant guidelines, laws, and regulations. This includes, but is not
limited to, the OECD Guidelines, the Fair Information Practices, and
the European Union Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC).
"Interoperability: Implementations and deployments of TCG
specifications should facilitate interoperability. Furthermore,
implementations and deployments of TCG specifications should not
introduce any new interoperability obstacles that are not for the
purpose of security.
"Portability of data: Deployment should support established principles
and practices of data ownership.
"Controllability: Each owner should have effective choice and control
over the use and operation of the TCG-enabled capabilities that belong
to them; their participation must be opt-in. Subsequently, any user
should be able to reliably disable the TCG functionality in a way that
does not violate the owner's policy.
"Ease-of-use: The nontechnical user should find the TCG-enabled
capabilities comprehensible and usable."
It's basically a good document, although there are some valid
criticisms. I like that the document clearly states that coercive use
of the technology -- forcing people to use digital rights management
systems, for example, are inappropriate: ">The use of coercion to
effectively force the use of the TPM capabilities is not an appropriate
use of the TCG technology."
I like that the document tries to protect user privacy: "All
implementations of TCG-enabled components should ensure that the TCG
technology is not inappropriately used for data aggregation of personal
information."
I wish that interoperability were more strongly enforced. The language
has too much wiggle room for companies to break interoperability under
the guise of security: "Furthermore, implementations and deployments
of TCG specifications should not introduce any new interoperability
obstacles that are not for the purpose of security."
That sounds good, but what does "security" mean in that
context? Security of the user against malicious code? Security of big
media against people copying music and videos? Security of software
vendors against competition? The big problem with TCG technology is
that it can be used to further all three of these "security" goals, and
this document is where "security" should be better defined.
Complaints aside, it's a good document and we should all hope that
companies follow it. Compliance is totally voluntary, but it's the
kind of document that governments and large corporations can point to
and demand that vendors follow.
But there's something fishy going on. Microsoft is doing its best to
stall the document, and to ensure that it doesn't apply to Vista
(formerly known as Longhorn), Microsoft's next-generation operating system.
The document was first written in the fall of 2003, and went through
the standard review process in early 2004. Microsoft delayed the
adoption and publication of the document, demanding more
review. Eventually the document was published in June of this year
(with a May date on the cover).
Meanwhile, the TCG built a purely software version of the
specification: Trusted Network Connect (TNC). Basically, it's a TCG
system without a TPM.
The best practices document doesn't apply to TNC, because Microsoft (as
a member of the TCG board of directors) blocked it. The excuse is that
the document hadn't been written with software-only applications in
mind, so it shouldn't apply to software-only TCG systems.
This is absurd. The document outlines best practices for how the
system is used. There's nothing in it about how the system works
internally. There's nothing unique to hardware-based systems, nothing
that would be different for software-only systems. You can go through
the document yourself and replace all references to "TPM" or "hardware"
with "software" (or, better yet, "hardware or software") in five
minutes. There are about a dozen changes, and none of them make any
meaningful difference.
The only reason I can think of for all this Machiavellian maneuvering
is that the TCG board of directors is making sure that the document
doesn't apply to Vista. If the document isn't published until after
Vista is released, then obviously it doesn't apply.
Near as I can tell, no one is following this story. No one is asking
why TCG best practices apply to hardware-based systems if they're
writing software-only specifications. No one is asking why the
document doesn't apply to all TCG systems, since it's obviously written
without any particular technology in mind. And no one is asking why
the TCG is delaying the adoption of any software best practices.
I believe the reason is Microsoft and Vista, but clearly there's some
investigative reporting to be done.
<http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org>
The document:
<https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/downloads/bestpractices/Best_Prac
tices_Principles_Document_v1.0.pdf> or <http://tinyurl.com/cgphx>
Commentary on the document:
<http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/bechtold/archives/003155.shtml>
Trusted Network Connect:
<https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/downloads/TNC/>
Commentary and rebuttals of my essay:
<http://blogs.zdnet.com/Ou/?p=96>
<http://it.slashdot.org/it/05/09/01/1419222.shtml?tid=172&tid=109>
<http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/bechtold/archives/003272.shtml>
Ross Anderson on Trusted Computing:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html>
Me on Trusted Computing, back when Microsoft called it Palladium:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0208.html#1>
A version of this essay previously appeared in several places:
<http://news.com.com/Something+fishys+going+on/2010-7350_3-5844412.html>
or <http://tinyurl.com/aztkd>
<http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-5844520.html>
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2005/09/02/1125302718391.html>
<http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/09/02/1125302718391.html>
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Comments from Readers
From: Stephen Wilson <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Comment on MD5 legal case in Australia
The court case -- perhaps unfortunately -- was not as technical as you
imply in the last Crypto-Gram. There is nothing in the newspaper
articles you quote nor in the public domain that refers to MD5 being
broken. Rather, the case has been dismissed because the government
lawyers simply could not find an expert witness in the time allotted
who could talk sensibly about the technology. So it's a legal
technicality, not a crypto technicality, at work here!
Interestingly, this speed camera hash issue has some more history. A
year ago, another Sydney motorist succeeded in having a different
matter thrown out of court on a really extreme technicality. The
relevant legislation here said at the time that the digest code
generated by the speed cameras consisted of "letters, numerals and
symbols" but because an MD5 hash only has letters and numerals -- and
nothing else like &%^@#(! -- the motorist argued that the law was
flawed and therefore the devices could not be relied upon. The law was
fixed almost overnight to drop vague references to "symbols".
So you see, there is a sport amongst lawyers here to tackle speed
camera technology on a range of technicalities. Just wait till they
find out about the "real" problems with MD5!
From: Shachar Shemesh <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: Profiling and El Al
I think your characteristics of what El Al are doing as "profiling" are
a bit off. It's not that they do not profile (as well as all the rest
of the Israeli defense system), it's just that they only profile those
who deserve less attention.
In general, the El Al screening process questions EVERYONE, and to an
amount of detail that are, quite frankly, embarrassing. However, the El
Al screening process made a few decisions in the sake of security. 90%
of the people flying El Al are Jewish Israeli citizens. In the history
of aviation, this population has been responsible for zero terrorist
attacks. An Israeli-born Jewish selector (as almost all El Al's
security selectors are) can easily tell, without looking at a passport,
whether someone does or does not belong to said group. Being as that is
the case, this specific group gets a special treatment in the form of
reduced severity questioning.
The thing to understand is that in order to bypass this profiling, one
cannot simply pretend to be out of his/her group. If an Israeli Arab
pretends to be an African business man, he will likely be questioned
more, not less, due to stepping outside of his profile. He is even
going to be questioned, in details, if he manages to pose as a
Christian American-born business man. On the other hand, trying to pose
as a Jewish Israeli is very highly likely to get noticed, due to the
fact that the security screener knows how a Jewish Israeli looks, what
his accent is like, etc. To understand just how much this is the case,
I will note that I'm routinely approached, in Hebrew, whenever I step
near an El Al counter anywhere in the world. This takes place before I
take my passport or flying tickets out of my bag.
This same policy is employed in many other areas. When hot alerts for a
terrorist attack that is supposed to come out of, say, Gaza are known,
it is not uncommon to close down the passages between Gaza and Israel.
Due to the huge economical pressure that such closure puts on the
Palestinian population (most of which make their living inside Israel),
profiles-based permission are granted. At first these were fairly wide.
Married people over 30 who have kids, women, etc. As the terrorists
consistently found people inside the profiled whitelists, these were
consistently narrowed. The thing is that allowing married people
through was not done because the Israeli security thought that it's
impossible that someone from that group could be a terrorist, but
because between the option of closing the passages down for EVERYONE,
and closing them down to most, they preferred to let some through.
Don't get me wrong. I agree with you completely that profiling in the
USA is a bad idea, when done like that. I just think that it's a bad
idea because circumstances within America are very different, and that
makes profiling statistically ineffective, making the democratic
related costs far exceed the benefit. If, however, El Al were to start
questioning EVERYONE (i.e. -- no white profiling), the prices in terms
of time before flight and cost of ticket would mean they would have to
provide a security level which is considerably less high.
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses,
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Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM to colleagues and friends who
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CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of
the best sellers "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied
Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish and Twofish
algorithms. He is founder and CTO of Counterpane Internet Security
Inc., and is a member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent writer and lecturer on
security topics. See <http://www.schneier.com>.
Counterpane is the world's leading protector of networked information -
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authority on effective mitigation of emerging IT threats. Counterpane
protects networks for Fortune 1000 companies and governments
world-wide. See <http://www.counterpane.com>.
Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not
necessarily those of Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
Copyright (c) 2005 by Bruce Schneier.
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