Dear Klaus
I agree that we "cannot ascertain consensus on what two or more people
actually see, feel, or experience." When we get to this point of
agreement we have already established something more interesting and
useful to design: we have established a theory of mind.
While I can not know what you see, I not only can imagine it is
something like what I see (which it frequently is) but I can also
establish, by questioning what I see, how it might be that you come to a
different conclusion about what is there. This is the everyday day event
when we say "I see what you are talking about".
For a designer this allows that they can inhabit various possible minds
based on their experience of other minds and they can survey other minds
to determine just how something might be seen. This ability can be
developed - it is part of de-centering that has been mentioned from time
to time.
my car is white
keith russell
OZ Newcastle
>>> Klaus Krippendorff <[log in to unmask]> 05/25/05 3:57 AM
>>>
interesting comment
i like to make a distinction between con-sensus and consensus.
why do we have such a quick consensus (agreement that is asserted in
language) that the car we con-sense (see jointly and at the same time)
is
black? because we have learned to use the word "black" in the presence
of
things that other people label "black." color blinds can learn to say
the
word "green" or "red" when they see a traffic sign, not because they see
green or red, but because designers use sensory redundancy, enabling the
red/green colorblind to identify colors by the position of the light.
you can observe con-sensus -- whether we face the same thing
you can ascertain consensus by verbally agreeing that something should
be
called so and so
but you cannot ascertain consensus on what two or more people actually
see,
feel, or experience.
klaus
-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and
related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf
Of Filippo A. Salustri
Sent: Tuesday, May 24, 2005 8:11 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: theory as a car: theory and theorist and their contexts
Klaus,
Right. I agree, almost completely. Indeed, I said as much (tho
possibly not as well), when I prattled on about being cut off from
reality by my perceptions.
Indeed, the "spectrum of light" you refer to may itself be regarded only
as an artifact of our perceptions.
Still, with relatively little effort, most humans can quickly reach
consensus about 'black' versus 'blue'. The act of reaching that
consensus is extremely interesting to some people. More power to them -
we need people to think about such things. I just prefer to work on
other things. Like: assuming such consensus is possible (and it is,
unless I'm imagining the whole universe), then how can we facilitate
gaining one kind (not the only kind) of understanding of (our models of)
reality through entirely conscious (rational) methods?
One way to account for inconsistencies in the consensus we build is
through the use of 'context'. Another way is through logic.
It ain't a silver bullet - but it can afford a certain perspective that
is unique compared to other methods.
Cheers.
Fil
Klaus Krippendorff wrote:
> regarding the problem of two people seeing the same thing and one
saying
it
> is black and the other that it is blue, this says more about the
> conventional use of the two words in the context of sensory
experiences
than
> about the color of the thing.
>
> things do not have color. color is a phenomenon created by the human
eye.
> everyone for him or herself. we cannot see the color that others see.
all
> we have are conventions of using color terms -- see wittgenstein on
private
> language
>
> there is no obvious correlation between the spectrum of light
reflected by
> the thing and the color that is perceived
>
> klaus
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and
> related research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]]On Behalf
> Of Filippo A. Salustri
> Sent: Friday, May 20, 2005 10:21 AM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: theory as a car: theory and theorist and their contexts
>
>
> Chuck, Klaus, et al:
>
> Charles Burnette wrote:
>
>>Klaus:
>>[...]
>>
>>>On 5/18/05 2:50 AM, "Klaus Krippendorff"
<[log in to unmask]>
>
> wrote:
>
>>[...]
>>It seems to me that an assertion "it is a black car" is an assertion
by
>>someone who professes to know the correlation between the terms and
the
>>meanings people attach to them however they do so, using scientific
>
> evidence
>
>>or otherwise. In my opinion, they are no less accountable for what
they
>
> say
>
>>than someone who says "I see a black car"
>
>
> Given the two statements together ("The car is black" and "I see a
black
> car"), one naturally looks for a distinction between them. And the
> obvious distinction is that the former is an 'assertion' while the
> latter is a report of a 'perception'. However, if only one of the
> statements occurred in some dialogue, then making that distinction
would
> be more difficult.
>
> This is why I believe in 'design science'. In design practice, we
might
> expect the 2 statements to be equivalent thanks to the use of 'is' in
> some metaphorical sense. But when design researchers and scientists
> reason about design, they should use language more crisply, precisely
to
> be clear about the thoughts they are trying to communicate.
>
> One might argue that 'reality' is only available to us via our
> perceptions, so "The car is black" really means the same thing as "I
see
> a black car." But this too is science. The only difference is that
one
> readily admits to the observation, whereas the other assumes a certain
> amount of inductive inference going on the background. To wit:
>
> If 1 person notes the car to be black and 1 other person notes the car
> to be blue, then what colour is the car?
>
> Now, if 1 person notes the car to be black, but 1000 other persons
note
> the car to be blue, then what colour is the car? Why?
>
> We take F=ma as a 'fact' or an assertion only because we've never had
a
> reason not to in light of millenia of evidence. When one reads about
> new scientific research, the language is littered with "We observed
> that..." and "Our measurements indicate..." and other phrases that are
> equivalent to "I see...." Over time, as more and more occurences of
the
> observations are noted, and the implications of the observations are
> observed (i.e. prediction), then the phrasing changes to the assertive
form.
>
> I would suggest that the real difference between the two statements is
> in the context of the person thinking about the statements. Chuck
seems
> to be adopting the context of the person uttering the statement,
whereas
> Klaus seems to be adopting the context of a "detached observer" of
> some other agent who is uttering the statement.
>
> Both interpretations are correct within their respective contexts, but
> they do clash a bit when the contexts mingle.
>
>
>>[...]
>>This is the wrong interpretation of whatever you think my "distinction
>>between language and what it is about" is. Language can be about
anything.
>
>
> This is important. Language can be about anything, including
language.
> Goedel had a few things to say about that. And that's why it's
> important to be aware at all times of the context of statements in a
> language, because it's the context that provides the means to resolve
> most of the dilemmas that arise.
>
> And that's why I like logic so much. :-)
>
>
>>[...]
>>Chuck
>
>
> Cheers.
> Fil
> --
> Prof. Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
> Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
> Ryerson University Tel: 416/979-5000 x7749
> 350 Victoria St. Fax: 416/979-5265
> Toronto, ON email: [log in to unmask]
> M5B 2K3 Canada
http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/
>
--
Prof. Filippo A. Salustri, Ph.D., P.Eng.
Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering
Ryerson University Tel: 416/979-5000 x7749
350 Victoria St. Fax: 416/979-5265
Toronto, ON email: [log in to unmask]
M5B 2K3 Canada http://deed.ryerson.ca/~fil/
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