Dear Colleagues,
Travelling again.
This continued discussion on definitions reminds me (on the second day of
Pentecost) of the passage in Acts when the tongues of fire descend:
"When the day of Pentecost came, they were all together in one place.
Suddenly a sound like the blowing of a violent wind came from heaven and
filled the whole house where they were sitting. They saw what seemed to be
tongues of fire that separated and came to rest on each of them. All of
them were filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues
as the Spirit enabled them."
Since the Spirit is on vacation today, I'll offer a few quick thoughts on
definitions, examples, clarity, and common discourse.
The matter of definitions is not a matter of establishing a perfect and
common consensus on what a word must mean to all of us at all times. It is
a matter of making clear how each of us who uses a term uses that term now
and in the present conversation.
In asking for definitions, I am asking for each speaker to be clear on what
he or she says.
Don's call for examples is another way of asking us to be clear what it is
that we mean or what are we talking about in the present conversation.
Definitions, examples, clear writing are all the kind of thing that formed
the discourse community of the Royal Society when they called for a "close,
natural, naked way of speaking" closer to the "language of artisans or
mechanics" than that of the scholars of their own day. (Please forgive me
if my quotes are not entirely correct. I am quoting from memory today.)
For the moment, I would suggest that Rosan can make progress by moving away
from the label or term "design cognition" to ask about a more clear kind of
issue: "how designers solve problems."
It doesn't seem to me we need to ask about or posit a process
called "design cognition." Rosan has clarified the topic that interests
her. Provided that this is what she actually wants to know, we can
operationalize the problem by asking "how do designers solve problems?"
This leads to several different kinds of subsidiary issues: There may be
more problems, but I see a few that stand out on a first review:
1) What aspects of problem-solving in design are embodied?
2) What aspects of problem-solving in design are connected to the specific
kinds of design problems a designer may attempt to solve?
3) What aspects of problem-solving in design are general?
4) What aspects of problem-solving in design are connected to the generic
apects of design problems without regard to the specific kinds of problems
that designers may attempt to solve?
It may be, of course, that these are the wrong questions or that they are
poorly stated. For example, perhaps the first question should be:
"1) What aspects of problem-solving in design -- if any -- are embodied?"
It may be that some of these questions are useful, others not useful.
At this moment, I suggest that by clarifying what we mean -- getting the
language clear on this -- we can make some progress.
So let's consider moving away from the rather difficult and undefinable
term "design congition" to ask about what interests us: "how do designers
solve problems."
With that as a background, I'm curious about what it is that Rosan wants to
know.
I'll reflect on some of the other questions over the next few days. For
now, Dire Straits has just come on the radio, and I shall accept their
invitation to do the walk of life.
Warm wishes on a hot Annendag Pinse in Oslo,
Ken Friedman
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