(As promised in a previous message to the list, here is the latest policy
brief from the African Centre for Technology Studies.  If you have any
questions, please contact: Chris Huggins, African Centre for Technology
Studies (ACTS), [log in to unmask])


African Centre for Technology Studies
Preventing Conflict through Improved Policies on Land Tenure, Natural
Resource Rights, and Migration in the Great Lakes Region
An Applied Research, Networking and Advocacy Project

Land, migration and conflict in Eastern D. R. Congo
Koen Vlassenroot & Chris Huggins

Executive Summary

This policy brief is a summary of a full-length case study, funded by the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to be published
in December 2004 by the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) and the
Institute for Security Studies (ISS). It examines the role of land access in
the conflicts which have affected Eastern Congo, especially since 1993. It
concludes that land shortage or exclusion has provided a conducive
environment for local, national and regional actors to strengthen their
control over territory, social mobility and natural resources. Since the
start of the Congolese war, land has turned from a 'source' of conflict into
a 'resource' of conflict.  Land is a key element for the development and
consolidation of new systems of power, profit and control .  Rebel leaders
have mobilised existing patterns of 'unfree labour' and have turned land
into an asset to be distributed among its members.  Because of the links
between control over land and conflict, the study recommends that a
commission on land ownership should be established and charged with the
responsibility to analyze the dynamics of land access nationwide, with a
focus on areas where land access issues have been related to conflicts, and
deliver a report within a limited timeframe. The commission should conduct
extensive consultations, involving real community input from rural areas.
Their recommendations should be approved by consensus amongst the concerned
parties.

The findings of the commission would be brought to the parliament for
enactment of a new policy on land distribution, allocation and distribution.
The policy would seek to define 'customary land rights' in order to provide
the majority of Congo's people with secure access to land. On the basis of
this experience, a new land law should be formulated.



Introduction

Violent conflict has engulfed parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), principally the East, for much of the last decade, during which some
3.3. million people have died, making it the world's most deadly conflict
since World War 2. With the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the
Sun City Accords, and the subsequent establishment of a Transitional
Government, there is optimism for the future. But areas such as North and
South Kivu Provinces and Ituri Territory remain volatile, as was seen for
example in June 2004, when opposing army factions battled in Bukavu, or in
July 2004, when new clashes broke out between militia groups near Bunia.

It may be asked why this chapter chooses to focus on access to agricultural
and pastoral land, when other factors seem to be far more important sources
of conflicts in the DRC. In addition to various economic and political
issues, ranging from the military and economic strategies of Western powers
and neighbouring countries, the nature of the state in DRC (a classic case
of the 'failed state') and the historical relationships between ethnic
groups, these include natural resources of much greater value, and much more
'lootable' character, than agricultural or pastoral land. Many are found in
the conflict zones of the DRC - such as diamonds, gold, cobalt, cassiterite,
and coltan.

Nonetheless, land remains important for several reasons. Firstly, insecure
or insufficient access to land is a significant factor in the impoverishment
of thousands of rural people, and is therefore a 'structural' cause of
conflict. Economic agendas are important in the formation of militias.
Secondly, in the case of Ituri Territory, contested purchase and expansion
of agricultural and ranching concessions have been identified as one of the
proximate causes of violence; the same may be true in Masisi. Thirdly, the
present conflict has radically changed land access patterns, through a
number of mechanisms including forced displacement; shifts in the level of
authority enjoyed by different customary and administrative leaders.
Conflict is producing new competition for land, as part of a wider
renegotiation of the local economic space and re-drawing of ethnic, class,
and other 'boundaries' between groups.   This is especially the case because
land was turned from a source into a resource for the perpetuation of
conflict.

Based on fieldwork in Ituri Territory and Goma as well as extensive review
of secondary literature, this analysis includes a number of recommendations
for the Government of the DRC, the international community, and civil
society actors, for both short-term and the long-term horizons.

The Local Political Economy of Land-Access

In many parts of the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic Congo,
land has been a source of conflict for many years.  Changes introduced
during the colonial period tended to politicise and exacerbate conflicts
over disputed access to land. On the one hand, colonialism institutionalised
the link between ethnic identity and land access within the political
structures of the state.  On the other hand, it  intensified local
competition for land with the promotion of migration of labour forces from
neighbouring Rwanda. Before the colonial conquest, large parts of eastern
Congo were characterised by markedly stratified patriarchal social
structures.  Access to land was regulated by a hierarchical administration
based on communal territorial ownership.

The Belgian colonial power took notice of the existence of these indigenous
systems and pushed them into a new regime of customary law, which,
consequently 'containerised' the local population .  The process of
'containerisation' involved a 'rigidification' and in some cases a
re-definition of ethnic identities and a codification of customs.  A second
characteristic of the land tenure system was the introduction of a double
system of property rights.  Next to 'custom' existed a 'modern' system for
the white settlers enabling them to establish their plantations, through
application to the central state. All vacant land was declared to be
property of the colonial state. Land was expropriated for settler-owned
concessions, and compensation was paid to the customary leaders (mwami),
rather than to the people. The dual nature of the system allowed for 'forum
shopping' in order to gain access to land, which eventually undermined the
legitimacy of both the customary and statutory systems.

The issue of border identities

Long before the creation of the 'Independent State of Congo' in 1885,
significant numbers of Kinyarwanda speaking people were living in the
highlands of Kivu.  In what is now called North Kivu, there were important
settlements of Banyarwanda, while in the southern parts of the Kivu
highlands there was a presence of a group of Banyarwanda that were mainly of
Tutsi-origin and later would be better known as Banyamulenge.
After the First World War, the Belgian colonial administration strongly
promoted the migration of significant numbers of Rwandan farmers in an
attempt to counteract a strong demographic pressure in Rwanda and to provide
the necessary labor for the newly created agricultural plantations and
mining centers. The colonial administration never succeeded in finding a
sustainable resolution to the identity problem. The so-called 'social
revolution' of 1959 in neighboring Rwanda  - partly the result of colonial
policies of ethnic favouratism - was responsible for the arrival of
additional Rwandan refugees.

In 1910, Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom signed the Convention of
Brussels in order to redraw the boundaries of the Independent State of
Congo.   From then on, the Kinyarwanda speaking population in North Kivu and
the Kirundi-speaking population in South Kivu were considered as indigenous
and were attributed their own customary authority, which was immediately
disputed by the other ethnic groups living in these regions.   The
Tutsi-minority of Rwandan descent living in Rwanda (the Banyamulenge) in S.
Kivu however were not entitled to the same rights.

Competition for land would always remain an important source of tension
between the local population and the Banyarwanda immigrants.  When denied
free access to land through custom after independence, the Banyarwanda
finally started purchasing land.  The Banyarwanda succeeded in acquiring
most of the land in Masisi by simply buying it.  The Hunde chiefs, for their
part, were still expecting tribute from these Banyarwanda for the use of
land that they still supposedly held under their customary powers. This
explains the first major conflict: the 'Guerre des Kinyarwanda', which
lasted for two years, was the first rebellion against chiefly abuse and the
first step of a spiral of unending local violence.

The confusion brought about by the co-existence of 'customary' and 'modern'
land access systems increased after the introduction of a land law, which
was based on individual ownership, in 1973 by the independent Zairian state.
This legislation discarded customary law, so that land occupied under
customary rules no longer had any legal status. The law was to be
supplemented by a Presidential Decree designed to offer some security to
customary land users, but the Decree was never issued. This diffusion forced
most peasants into a position of general uncertainty about their legal
access to land. What was meant as a measure of national integration giving
every Zairian citizen equal access to land, in its application proved to be
a perfect instrument for those already holding a position of political or
economic power to appropriate any land not yet titled. The traditional
authorities became the privileged intermediaries for the sale of land.


Text box: Side-stepping the Land Law in Ituri

Land-related conflicts are partially a result of systemic failings of the
land tenure legislation and the administration and justice system. In Ituri,
local perceptions of community rights mean that market-based systems cannot
operate as provided for in the legislation. In response, some members of the
local elite short-circuited the land administrative system through
corruption. In areas where the concessions were bordered by villages and
farmland, officials were sometimes bribed to ignore various stages of the
titling process, including surveying and consultation with local people.  In
some cases, the local chief may have been paid to accept the expansion of
the concession, while in other cases he may have been ignored. The landowner
would then receive a title document, sometimes bypassing the District and
Province level altogether and going direct to higher authorities in
Kinshasa. Many of the landowners would then do nothing to expand the
concession for a period of at least two years. After this time, the
inhabitants lose the right to appeal against the claim of the landowner.
When this was exacerbated by the use of force and administrative changes
implemented by the UPDF, the result was violent conflict of an 'ethnic'
character. The situation in Ituri reflects a wider national challenge to
land administration and local governance. Many apparently consider the
violence in Ituri to be separate from the patterns of conflict in the Kivu
Provinces, with its own 'historical dynamics'.  While each portion of the
vast country that is DRC has its own particular characteristics, the
political economy of land ownership is a national-level issue.


Alienation of Customary Land in Masisi

In Masisi, the Hunde-chiefs played a crucial role in the selling of large
tracts of land.  Since the introduction of modern land rights and the new
legislation on property, it was impossible to buy land without their
permission; and they would generally benefit from land sales. This opened
the road to clientelistic relations but at the same time reduced the power
of the chiefs, including a loss of their local legitimacy.
Rewarded with ministerial posts and armed with the 1972 law on Zairian
nationality (which granted them Zairian citizenship), the Banyarwanda were
able to concentrate a large number of former colonial estates in their
hands.  In Ituri, similar developments could be observed.  Here, it was
members of the Hema that profited from their easy access to education and to
employment opportunities within the local colonial administration, the mines
and plantations.

In regions such as Bushi, Rutshuru and Masisi, which were faced with
unrelenting population growth. By the end of the eighties, 49 % of the
population in Kivu lived in areas with a density higher than 100 inhabitants
per km2, whereas this number was only 13.4 % in Zaire as a whole . A survey
in Mulungu (Kabare) in 1985 demonstrated that, even with intensive
cultivation, the land holdings of nearly 90 % of the population were
insufficient to support a family.  More than two thirds of all households
worked plots of less than 1 hectare.  One third of all families had less
than 0.3 hectare.  In areas with a large presence of immigrants, competition
for land was easily manipulated to transform the struggle over land into
ethnically motivated conflicts.  This was especially the case for the zone
of Masisi (North Kivu) where, as Tsongo described, 512 families (of which
503 were of Rwandan descent) occupied more than half of the land.
This dynamic has put the resources of poor peasant households under growing
pressure, leading to a) a shift in the economic use of the available space
which resulted in land dispossession and alienation, producing a large
agricultural labour surplus; b) young men opting for a strategy of temporal
migration, causing shifts in local mobility patterns; and c) intensified
competition for wealth accumulation through land which led to a hardening of
social boundaries on an ethnic basis.

With a peasant population under growing stress, one might have expected more
(or earlier) protest or regular outbursts of violence by these farmers
against their rulers.  To understand why this did not happen, the
traditional authorities need to be the focal point of analysis.  In order to
guard their position, and avoid blame for land sales, ethnic discourse
proved to be a perfect instrument.  This significantly raised ethnic
tensions.  These conflicts, however, were not limited to areas where
immigrants had settled. Ethnic tension increased between the indigenous
communities of Babembe and Babuyu in the southern parts of South Kivu when
the 'indigenous' community of Babuyu rejected the land rights of the
'exogenous' community of Babembe on the premise that historically, they were
the sole owners of the land.

It was only after the announcement of the democratisation process, in April
1990, that local competition for land turned into the material basis of
intensified political competition and, eventually violent conflict.
Mobutu's announcement of a democratisation process, in April 1990, could be
best described as yet another strategy to ensure his power.  He knew
precisely how he could manipulate the process of democratisation.  Local
politicians were forced to build themselves a strong power base, for which
it was needed to exploit popular sentiments. Mobutu encouraged
exit-strategies based on ethnic criteria. The introduction of the notion of
'geopolitique' in the early phase of the democratisation process, was the
first element to intensify local ethnic competition.  In North Kivu, a wave
of inter-ethnic violence erupted for the first time in March 1993.  Poor
Hutu farmers from Masisi had lost their land because the local customary
chiefs had sold it to rural capitalists of Banyarwanda origin.  These
farmers settled further west in Walikale where they hoped to get access to
land under the control of the local Nyanga chiefs.  Fearing a growing
influence of these newly arrived Hutu-Banyarwanda, the local population and
their chiefs supported the formation of local militias.  Secondly, a
coalition of local Nande and Hunde politicians, afraid of losing their
political power if the Banyarwanda were registered as Zairian nationals and
participated in the coming elections, had started an exclusion campaign to
prevent the Banyarwanda from political participation. Also, the local
Hutu-Banyarwanda association Magrivi ('Mutuelle des Agriculteurs de
Virunga') encouraged its members to refuse paying tribute to the
autochthonous chiefs and to no longer recognise their authority. Fourthly,
the Rwandan presidency also encouraged local tensions to cut the support
lines between the local Tutsi population and the RPF.  The result was a
bloody confrontation that lasted for more than six months and killed between
6,000 and 10,000 people, while displacing more than 250,000 people.

The fragile settlement between the different communities in North Kivu,
which was eventually forged at the end of 1993, lasted until the arrival of
more than one million Hutu refugees from Rwanda and the settling of the
ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda (ex-Far) and Interahamwe militia in camps in
Masisi and the Ruzizi Plain.  Local antagonism between autochthonous and
Banyarwanda communities was now altered by a new coalition of local
Hutu-Banyarwanda, the refugee-leadership and militias, creating the concept
of 'Hutu-land' and hunting down the local Tutsi population.

In the southern parts of South Kivu, the unresolved question of land rights
and the quest of the Banyamulenge to have their own 'territoire' was linked
to the national debate on political representation.  In addition, the
Banyamulenge were held responsible for the growing insecurity since the
arrival of the Burundian Hutu-refugees after the assassination of the
Burundian president Ndadaye, in October 1993, and the Rwandan Hutu-refugees
in 1994.  Local political and economic competition was directly linked to
regional dynamics of conflict. All Tutsi in the area (including the
Banyamulenge) were characterised by politicians as "recent refugees" and
'foreigners'.

By September 1996, the Kivu provinces had become a toxic brew of local and
regional antagonisms that risked escalating at any time.  These local and
regional elements explain the dynamics behind the formation and the start of
the military campaign, in October 1996, of the 'Alliance des Forces
Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo/Zaire' (AFDL).  This alliance of
local and regional forces easily defeated the remnants of the Mobutu regime
and, in May 1997, arrived in Kinshasa.  While the regional allies were
expecting some remuneration for their war efforts, the AFDL leadership felt
a growing need to distance itself from them if it was to build for itself a
domestic political power base.  The dilemma of the new Congolese authorities
turned out to be the 'raison d'etre' of a second rebel movement, the
'Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie' (RCD).  Yet, what was expected
to be a simple imitation of the 1996 rebellion, soon proved to be the
beginning of a conflict that set in motion new strategies of political and
economic control.

Land and Conflict in Masisi after 1998

The Kivu Provinces, along with Ituri Territory, have been the main arena of
conflict between armed actors (often acting as proxies for signatories of
the Lusaka Agreement) since the cease-fire was signed in 1999. For this
reason, the Kivu Provinces have been identified by some experts as the key
area in the Great Lakes conflict system.

The region is one of the most densely populated in the country. The majority
of the land is the property of a small number of land-owners, who each have
extremely large land holdings as a result of their former access to the
inner circles of Mobutu's patronage system. In a survey in the zone of
Luhoto (North-Kivu) in the beginning of the nineties, it was found that 31%
of these concessions covered 71.2% of the cultivable area.  In addition to
farms and ranches, a large proportion of the area is also devoted to
conservation, in the form of the Virunga National Park.

The area was depopulated during the late 1990s due to conflict. From 1999
until 2002/2003, many returnees from Rwanda and other parts of the DRC were
able to cultivate as 'squatters' on ranch land. When original land owners
returned, along with livestock, some squatters who would not or could not
pay were forcibly evicted by the landowners. However, others used force if
necessary to be able to stay:  these occupations are reportedly enforced by
armed elements.   Some believe these armed people - who are reportedly to be
generally not in uniform - are part of the Local Defence Forces (LDF), under
the command of the Governor of North Kivu. It is also believed that some
ex-RCD troops have effectively become a private security force for wealthy
and politically connected land-owners.

Due to the importance of the customary authorities in land issues, their
role has been politized. A number of customary chiefs have been prevented
from taking their posts, especially through political interference in the
process of succession. Frequently, leaders seen as anti-RCD have been
accused of being sympathetic to the Mayi-Mayi, or of neglecting their
duties.  Those who oppose the RCD often claim that violence has been used or
threatened against legitimate chiefs who oppose them.
This situation is partly due to the failure of the national legislation to
defend customary land rights of the peasants, but is also a failure to
implement the law properly. For example, unlike most parts of the DRC, some
75% of land in Masisi is under title. However, these titles are often simply
not respected. Lack of information about the land law is one element which
enables inequities to continue.

The interference of the Provincial authorities in the activities of
customary authorities has served to exacerbate local land tenure insecurity.
If leadership changes in controversial circumstances, local communities tend
to become divided over the issue. In a situation where customary land tenure
arrangements for subsistence production (including sharecropping and other
rental agreements) are secured through verbal contracts and testimony
through neighbours and customary leaders, and titles generally do not exist,
anything that tends to undermine local social cohesion has negative effects
on land tenure security.
Though systematic data on the current status of land claims is difficult to
obtain, the characteristics of governance in North Kivu suggest that the
land claims and interests of one community may be given pre-eminence above
others. Generalized insecurity is likely to continue for some time, until a
genuinely unified Congolese army is able to impose order in rural areas. A
greater threat however is posed by a possible collapse of the transition
process.
The UN Panel of Experts has warned that the use of force and administrative
coercion to pursue land claims, against the backdrop of ethnic violence that
has plagued the region particularly over the last ten years, "could rekindle
long-standing conflicts with other ethnic communities over land."

Conclusions

Our analysis has pointed out that the political manipulation of the land
issue is part of a larger, historical process. Local elites have tried to
consolidate their power position or escape from state control and gain some
economic autonomy by control over land.  In return, Mobutu turned land into
a reward to be distributed among the members of his own patronage system.
Both processes have led to large-scale poverty and food insecurity.

Second, in eastern DRC, the relationship between land and conflict is
complex and multidimensional.  While land shortage or exclusion did not
necessarily lead to conflict, these structural elements have provided a
conducive environment for local, national and regional actors to strengthen
their control over territory, social mobility and natural resources.  Land,
in this sense, has become an objective of armed struggle while at the same
time land insecurity could be manipulated to mobilise rural populations.

Third, since the start of the Congolese war, land has turned from a 'source'
of conflict into a 'resource' of conflict.  Land is a key element for the
development and consolidation of new systems of power, profit and control .
Rebel leaders have mobilised existing patterns of 'unfree labour' and have
turned land into an asset to be distributed among its members.  These
practices are both based on inclusion and exclusion: those belonging to the
ethnic network in control are granted free access to land; those not
belonging to it become the main victims.


- Recommendations for Short-Term Action

*       Foreign governments, particularly neighbouring countries, should
desist from any military support to military or other actors in the DRC. If
neighbouring governments are found to be engaging in destructive,
destabilizing politics, the international community should condemn their
actions and reduce or freeze foreign assistance accordingly.

*       Despite their historical role in the alienation of land, the
customary chiefs retain some legitimacy, particularly in areas where many
local people see the ex-rebel authorities as illegitimate. They must
therefore be involved in the mitigation and ultimately the resolution of
land conflicts, but only through a process of open discussion about the role
of various parties in the land access crisis.

*       This should be part of a wider process of network-building between
local, national and international institutions in order to build a
constituency for peace and justice. The should involve a long-term but
low-profile programme of engagement by donors, informed by close grassroots
involvement and research.

*       Evidence from Ituri and other areas suggests that local markets are
the practical focus for local peace-making agreements. These spontaneous
agreements should be supported, not just by NGO efforts to reconstruct
market facilities and roads, but also by MONUC in terms of security
arrangements.

*       The judiciary should be strengthened in order to become more
effective, and the Transitional Government should take steps to ensure that
they are able to operate without political interference. Strengthening of
judicial institutions should be at improving access to justice, particularly
for the rural peasant population. In relation to land, this should
eventually involve awareness-raising of the legal frameworks to land
ownership.


- Recommendations for Longer-Term Action

*       A commission on land ownership should be established and charged
with the responsibility to analyze the dynamics of land access nationwide,
with a focus on areas where land access issues have been related to
conflicts, and deliver a report within a limited timeframe. The commission
should conduct extensive consultations, involving real community input from
rural areas. Their recommendations should be approved by consensus amongst
the concerned parties.

*       The findings of the commission would be brought to the parliament
for enactment of a new policy on land distribution, allocation and
distribution. The policy would seek to define 'customary land rights' in
order to provide the majority of Congo's people with secure access to land.
On the basis of this experience, a new law should be formulated within a
year of the policy being finalized.

The views and opinions expressed in this report are the authors' own and do
not necessarily reflect or represent the position of ACTS or USAID.

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