March 4, 2004
How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web
By DON VAN NATTA Jr. and DESMOND BUTLER
The New York Times
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/international/europe/04PHON.html?th
LONDON, March 2 - The terrorism investigation code-named Mont Blanc began
almost by accident in April 2002, when authorities intercepted a cellphone
call that lasted less than a minute and involved not a single word of
conversation.
Investigators, suspicious that the call was a signal between terrorists,
followed the trail first to one terror suspect, then to others, and
eventually to terror cells on three continents.
What tied them together was a computer chip smaller than a fingernail. But
before the investigation wound down in recent weeks, its global net caught
dozens of suspected Qaeda members and disrupted at least three planned
attacks in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, according to counterterrorism and
intelligence officials in Europe and the United States.
The investigation helped narrow the search for one of the most wanted men in
the world, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who is accused of being the mastermind of
the Sept. 11 attacks, according to three intelligence officials based in
Europe. American authorities arrested Mr. Mohammed in Pakistan last March.
For two years, investigators now say, they were able to track the
conversations and movements of several Qaeda leaders and dozens of
operatives after determining that the suspects favored a particular brand of
cellphone chip. The chips carry prepaid minutes and allow phone use around
the world.
Investigators said they believed that the chips, made by Swisscom of
Switzerland, were popular with terrorists because they could buy the chips
without giving their names.
"They thought these phones protected their anonymity, but they didn't," said
a senior intelligence official based in Europe. Even without personal
information, the authorities were able to conduct routine monitoring of
phone conversations.
A half dozen senior officials in the United States and Europe agreed to talk
in detail about the previously undisclosed investigation because, they said,
it was completed. They also said they had strong indications that terror
suspects, alert to the phones' vulnerability, had largely abandoned them for
important communications and instead were using e-mail, Internet phone calls
and hand-delivered messages.
"This was one of the most effective tools we had to locate Al Qaeda," said a
senior counterterrorism official in Europe. "The perception of anonymity may
have lulled them into a false sense of security. We now believe that Al
Qaeda has figured out that we were monitoring them through these phones."
The officials called the operation one of the most successful investigations
since Sept. 11, 2001, and an example of unusual cooperation between agencies
in different countries. Led by the Swiss, the investigation involved agents
from more than a dozen countries, including the United States, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Germany, Britain and Italy.
Cellphones have played a major role in the constant jousting between
terrorists and intelligence agencies. In their requests for more
investigative powers, Attorney General John Ashcroft and other officials
have repeatedly cited the importance of monitoring portable phones. Each
success by investigators seems to drive terrorists either to more advanced -
or to more primitive - communications.
During the American bombing of Tora Bora in Afghanistan in December 2001,
American authorities reported hearing Osama bin Laden speaking to his
associates on a satellite phone. Since then, Mr. bin Laden has communicated
with handwritten messages delivered by trusted couriers, officials said.
In 2002 the German authorities broke up a cell after monitoring calls by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, who has been linked by some top American officials to Al
Qaeda, in which he could be heard ordering attacks on Jewish targets in
Germany. Since then, investigators say, Mr. Zarqawi has been more cautious.
"If you beat terrorists over the head enough, they learn," said Col. Nick
Pratt, a counterterrorism expert and professor at the George C. Marshall
European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.
"They are smart."
Officials say that on the rare occasion when operatives still use mobile
phones, they keep the calls brief and use code words.
"They know we are on to them and they keep evolving and using new methods,
and we keep finding ways to make life miserable for them," said a senior
Saudi official. "In many ways, it's like a cat-and-mouse game."
Some Qaeda lieutenants used cellphones only to arrange a conversation on a
more secure telephone. It was one such brief cellphone call that set off the
Mont Blanc investigation.
The call was placed on April 11, 2002, by Christian Ganczarski, a
36-year-old Polish-born German Muslim whom the German authorities suspected
was a member of Al Qaeda. From Germany, Mr. Ganczarski called Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, said to be Al Qaeda's military commander, who was running
operations at the time from a safe house in Karachi, Pakistan, according to
two officials involved in the investigation.
The two men did not speak during the call, counterterrorism officials said.
Instead, the call was intended to alert Mr. Mohammed of a Qaeda suicide
bombing mission at a synagogue in Tunisia, which took place that day,
according to two senior officials. The attack killed 21 people, mostly
German tourists.
Through electronic surveillance, the German authorities traced the call to
Mr. Mohammed's Swisscom cellphone, but at first they did not know it
belonged to him. Two weeks after the Tunisian bombing, the German police
searched Mr. Ganczarski's house and found a log of his many numbers,
including one in Pakistan that was eventually traced to Mr. Mohammed. The
German police had been monitoring Mr. Ganczarski because he had been seen in
the company of militants at a mosque in Duisburg, and last June the French
police arrested him in Paris.
Mr. Mohammed's cellphone number, and many others, were given to the Swiss
authorities for further investigation. By checking Swisscom's records, Swiss
officials discovered that many other Qaeda suspects used the Swisscom chips,
known as Subscriber Identity Module cards, which allow phones to connect to
cellular networks.
For months the Swiss, working closely with counterparts in the United States
and Pakistan, used this information in an effort to track Mr. Mohammed's
movements inside Pakistan. By monitoring the cellphone traffic, they were
able to get a fix on Mr. Mohammed, but the investigators did not know his
specific location, officials said.
Once Swiss agents had established that Mr. Mohammed was in Karachi, the
American and Pakistani security services took over the hunt with the aid of
technology at the United States National Security Agency, said two senior
European intelligence officials. But it took months for them to actually
find Mr. Mohammed "because he wasn't always using that phone," an official
said. "He had many, many other phones."
Mr. Mohammed was a victim of his own sloppiness, said a senior European
intelligence official. He was meticulous about changing cellphones, but
apparently he kept using the same SIM card.
In the end, the authorities were led directly to Mr. Mohammed by a C.I.A.
spy, the director of central intelligence, George J. Tenet, said in a speech
last month. A senior American intelligence official said this week that the
capture of Mr. Mohammed "was entirely the result of excellent human
operations."
When Swiss and other European officials heard that American agents had
captured Mr. Mohammed last March, "we opened a big bottle of Champagne," a
senior intelligence official said.
Among Mr. Mohammed's belongings, the authorities seized computers,
cellphones and a personal phone book that contained hundreds of numbers.
Tracing those numbers led investigators to as many as 6,000 phone numbers,
which amounted to a virtual road map of Al Qaeda's operations, officials
said.
The authorities noticed that many of Mr. Mohammed's communications were with
operatives in Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Last April, using the phone
numbers, officials in Jakarta broke up a terror cell connected to Mr.
Mohammed, officials said.
After the suicide bombings of three housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, on May 12, the Saudi authorities used the phone numbers to track
down two "live sleeper cells." Some members were killed in shootouts with
the authorities; others were arrested.
Meanwhile, the Swiss had used Mr. Mohammed's phone list to begin monitoring
the communications and activities of nearly two dozen of his associates.
"Huge resources were devoted to this," a senior official said. "Many
countries were constantly doing surveillance, monitoring the chatter."
Investigators were particularly alarmed by one call they overheard last
June. The message: "The big guy is coming. He will be here soon."
An official familiar with the calls said, "We did not know who he was, but
there was a lot of chatter." Whoever "the big guy" was, the authorities had
his number. A Swisscom chip was in the phone.
"Then we waited and waited, and we were increasingly anxious and worried
because we didn't know who it was or what he had intended to do," an
official said.
But in July, the man believed to be "the big guy," Abdullah Oweis, who was
born in Saudi Arabia, was arrested in Qatar. "He is one of those people able
to move within Western societies and to help the mujahedeen, who have lesser
experience," an official said. "He was at the very center of the Al Qaeda
hierarchy. He was a major facilitator."
In January, the operation led to the arrests of eight people accused of
being members of a Qaeda logistical cell in Switzerland. Some are suspected
of helping with the suicide bombings of the housing compounds in Riyadh,
which killed 35 people, including 8 Americans.
Later, European authorities discovered that Mr. Mohammed had contacted a
company in Geneva that sells Swisscom phone cards. Investigators said he
ordered the cards in bulk.
The Mont Blanc inquiry has wound down, although investigators are still
monitoring the communications of a few people. Christian Neuhaus, a
spokesman for Swisscom, confirmed that the company had cooperated with the
inquiry, but declined to comment.
Last year, Switzerland's legislature passed a law making it illegal to
purchase cellphone chips without providing personal information, following
testimony from a Swiss federal prosecutor, Claude Nicati, that the Swisscom
cards had become popular with Qaeda operatives. The law goes into effect on
July 1.
One senior official said the authorities were grateful that Qaeda members
were so loyal to Swisscom.
Another official agreed: "They'd switch phones but use the same cards. The
people were stupid enough to use the same cards all of the time. It was a
very good thing for us."

************************************************************************************
Distributed through Cyber-Society-Live [CSL]: CSL is a moderated discussion
list made up of people who are interested in the interdisciplinary academic
study of Cyber Society in all its manifestations.To join the list please visit:
http://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/lists/cyber-society-live.html
*************************************************************************************