From: CDT Info
To: [log in to unmask]
Sent: 28/04/2004 22:35
Subject: Policy Post 10.08: No Design Mandates for Internet, CDT Tells FCC
CDT POLICY POST Volume 10, Number 8, April 28, 2004
A Briefing on Public Policy Issues Affecting Civil Liberties Online
from
The Center for Democracy and Technology
(1) Industry and Public Interest Groups Oppose FBI Attempt to Extend
Wiretap Design to the Internet
(2) Illegal, Unwise and Unnecessary to Apply CALEA to the Internet
(3) CALEA Is Fundamentally Broken, and Is Especially Un-suited to the
Internet
______________________________________________
(1) Industry and Public Interest Groups Oppose FBI Attempt to Extend
Wiretap Design to the Internet
On April 27, 2004, a diverse group of companies, trade associations
and public interest groups from across the political spectrum filed a
Joint Statement at the Federal Communications Commission urging
rejection of an FBI petition to extend controversial wiretap design
mandates to the Internet.
The FBI's petition, filed March 10, 2004, asked the FCC to declare
that providers of broadband access and "Voice over IP" (or Voice on
the Net) services are covered by the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). The FBI also asked the FCC to create a
regulatory process under which new communications protocols,
applications, or services must be reviewed and approved by the FBI
and FCC before they can be deployed.
In addition to organizing and signing the Joint Statement, CDT filed
its own extensive comments on April 12, 2004, and reply comments on
April 27, 2004.
FBI Petition to FCC for CALEA Rulemaking, Mar. 10, 2004
http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/20040310fbipetition.pdf
Joint Statement of Industry and Public Interest, April 27, 2004
http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/20040427jointcaleareply.pdf
CDT Comments to FCC on CALEA Petition for Rulemaking, April 12, 2004
http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/20040412CDTCALEAComments.pdf
CDT Reply Comments, April 27, 2004
http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/20040427cdtcaleareply.pdf
______________________________________________
(2) Illegal, Unwise and Unnecessary to Apply CALEA to the Internet
As both CDT's comments and the Joint Statement of Industry and Public
Interest explain, the text of CALEA makes clear that it does not
apply to the Internet. Congress in 1994 decided that CALEA should
cover only telecommunications common carriers offering traditional
wireline and wireless phone services. It does not apply to the broad
category of "information services," such as Internet access, email
and other on-line services.
Imposing CALEA on the Internet, and in particular imposing a
prior-review requirement on new communications technologies, would
destroy the ability of U.S. companies to innovate on the Internet.
The Joint Statement and CDT's comments explain that such a decision
would reverse more than a decade of sound policy decisions to allow
the Internet to develop and grow without significant interference or
constraint. Building surveillance capabilities into broadband access
and Internet applications also could adversely affect privacy and
open the potential for privacy abuses.
In any event, the FBI has presented no evidence of a broad problem
meriting imposition of design mandates. Under existing law, the FBI
already can "wiretap the Internet," and service providers regularly
work with law enforcement to satisfy lawful wiretap orders quickly
and fully. Service providers not subject to CALEA already have
committed substantial resources to developing new technical
capabilities to facilitate surveillance of advanced technologies.
In its petition and in its Reply Comments, the FBI provided no
specifics about situations in which law enforcement is unable to
intercept an Internet voice communication or any other Internet
communication, but instead has made only vague assertions. There has
been no demonstrated need to apply the failed CALEA regime to the
Internet.
Further information is available at:
CDT One-Pager on the Internet and Law Enforcement Surveillance, March
19, 2004: http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/20040315voiponepager.pdf
CDT's CALEA/VoIP Page: http://www.cdt.org/digi_tele/voip.shtml
____________________________________________
(3) CALEA Is Fundamentally Broken, and Is Especially Un-suited to the
Internet
CALEA was adopted in 1994 in response to law enforcement concerns
that wiretaps would be more difficult to implement in digital
telephone networks than they had been with the analog phone system.
CALEA required telecommunications common carriers to design basic
wiretap capabilities into their networks. Congress specifically
excluded the Internet from CALEA.
As it was implemented and interpreted by the FCC, CALEA gave the FBI
very precise design control over telephone switches. CDT believes
this was contrary to the intent of Congress, but over the course of a
lengthy legal battle, the FBI was able to convince the FCC to mandate
very specific features, including - at substantial cost to carriers
and the government - features that gave the government capabilities
beyond those that had been available in older phone systems.
There is now almost universal agreement that CALEA is fundamentally
broken. A recent report by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
at the Department of Justice states that ten years and half a billion
dollars after enactment, CALEA compliance stands at less than 20% for
wireline telephones. This is due in large part to the FBI's
insistence on imposing detailed mandates on the telephone industry.
After the industry worked hard to issue a standard that accommodated
most of the FBI's demands, the FBI challenged the standard anyway and
launched years of litigation. As CDT explained in its reply comments
to the FCC, it would be an enormous mistake to impose this broken
regime on the Internet.
DOJ OIG report, "Implementation of the Communications Assistance for
Law Enforcement Act by the Federal Bureau of Investigation," April
19, 2004, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/audit/FBI/0419/final.pdf
____________________________________________
Detailed information about online civil liberties issues may be found
at http://www.cdt.org/.
This document may be redistributed freely in full or linked to
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_10.08.shtml.
Excerpts may be re-posted with prior permission of [log in to unmask]
Policy Post 10.08 Copyright 2004 Center for Democracy and Technology
_______________________________________________
http://www.cdt.org/mailman/listinfo/policy-posts
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