JiscMail Logo
Email discussion lists for the UK Education and Research communities

Help for CAPITAL-AND-CLASS Archives


CAPITAL-AND-CLASS Archives

CAPITAL-AND-CLASS Archives


CAPITAL-AND-CLASS@JISCMAIL.AC.UK


View:

Message:

[

First

|

Previous

|

Next

|

Last

]

By Topic:

[

First

|

Previous

|

Next

|

Last

]

By Author:

[

First

|

Previous

|

Next

|

Last

]

Font:

Proportional Font

LISTSERV Archives

LISTSERV Archives

CAPITAL-AND-CLASS Home

CAPITAL-AND-CLASS Home

CAPITAL-AND-CLASS  2003

CAPITAL-AND-CLASS 2003

Options

Subscribe or Unsubscribe

Subscribe or Unsubscribe

Log In

Log In

Get Password

Get Password

Subject:

WAR ON IRAQ, RESISTANCE, AND THE SHIFT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

From:

Christopher Ford <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

[log in to unmask]

Date:

Sun, 23 Mar 2003 10:29:48 EST

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (410 lines)

Statement by News and Letters Committees on the U.S. invasion of Iraq

March 22, 2003

WAR ON IRAQ, RESISTANCE, AND THE SHIFT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

by Peter Hudis

Bush's insistence on launching a full-scale war against Iraq, replete 
with over 250,000 troops, hundreds of tanks, and thousands of bombs 
and missiles, threatens to wreak enormous destruction upon the people 
of Iraq while producing a major shift in world politics which we will 
all feel for years to come.

In response to the refusal of France and Germany, as well as Russia 
and China, to support his war drive, Bush decided to go to war 
without even asking for a vote at the UN Security Council-a move that 
is inflaming resentment around the world at U.S. unilateralism. The 
failure of Turkey's parliament to agree to allow 60,000 U.S. troops 
to invade Iraq from its borders led Bush to pour more arms and 
soldiers into Iraq from the south, even though this risks greater 
U.S. combatants and Iraqi civilian casualities. And the anti-war 
sentiment that exists in every country has led Bush to write off 
democratic world opinion, which is leading to increased resentment at 
the U.S.'s drive for permanent military intervention overseas.

The more this administration tries to negate all limits to its drive 
for war, the more it manages to establish other limits which become 
real barriers to the exercise of total U.S. dominance.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER?

The massive U.S. assault on Iraq notwithstanding, it is already clear 
that the war will not lead to any genuine self-determination or 
democracy for the Iraqi people.

The administration plans to install a U.S.-run military regime for at 
least several years after a war. It also plans to keep many officials 
of Hussein's repressive Ba'ath Party in power. Worried about a 
fracturing of Iraq along ethnic and religious lines, the U.S. sees 
folding Ba'ath Party officials (many of whom are guilty of human 
rights abuses) into its occupation as a way to ensure "stability." In 
doing so the U.S. is also responding to pleas from regimes like Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf states, which fear the advent of any real 
democracy in the region.

U.S. officials have also been courting Adnan Pachachi, a former Iraqi 
foreign minister, as a possible puppet to later run Iraq. One Iraqi 
dissident commented that the courting of authoritarian figures like 
Pachachi means that "the U.S. is mainly interested in perpetrated the 
status quo in post-Saddam Iraq, and not in promoting democracy."

While the U.S. claims to be fighting in the interests of Kurds, 
Shi'ites, and other oppressed groups in Iraq, it has made sure not to 
arm them-unlike its approach to the reactionary Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan, which it flooded with weapons. Though the U.S. has given 
military training to 1,000 Iraqi exiles at a NATO base in Hungary, it 
has banned Kurds from participating.

We are seeing a repeat of what happened after the end of the first 
Gulf War in 1991, when the U.S. allowed Hussein to remain in power 
rather than allow the Kurds, Shi'ites and others to take destiny into 
their own hands. Though this time the U.S. aims to depose Hussein, 
the Kurds, who have been betrayed by Western powers before 
(especially in 1974 and 1991), are about to be betrayed again.

Kanan Makiya of the Iraqi National Congress, a group funded by the 
U.S., stated in mid-February that U.S. plans for a post-Hussein Iraq 
are "guaranteed to turn the [Iraqi] opposition into an opponent of 
the U.S. on the streets of Baghdad the day after liberation....The 
government of the United States is about to betray, as it has done so 
many times in the past, those core human values of self-determination 
and individual liberty" ("Our Hopes Betrayed," The Observer [London], 
Feb. 16, 2003).

Meanwhile, as the U.S. scurries around to find surrogates to do its 
bidding after a war, the threat of a full-fledged humanitarian 
disaster looms large. Over 60% of Iraqis depend on UN aid for food. 
The World Health Organization estimates that a decade of U.S.-imposed 
sanctions and Hussein's policies have forced the vast majority of 
Iraqis to live on a semi-starvation diet for years. These conditions 
are bound to worsen as Iraq's infrastructure is destroyed by a U.S. 
air and ground invasion, placing the livelihood of millions of Iraqis 
in jeopardy.

RIFTS IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE

Despite the Bush administration's fruitless four-month effort to get 
the UN Security Council to sanction a war against Iraq, Bush clearly 
long ago decided to go to war against Hussein, with or without 
international approval. Stunned by the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, and emboldened by its rapid "victory" over the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, the administration sees war against Iraq as a way to 
further its drive for permanent military intervention by taking down 
the only regime in the critically important Middle East that has 
expressed open opposition to U.S. policies. Yet Bush's arrogant 
over-reach has led to a pulling apart of the U.S.-led global alliance 
that seemed so unified after September 11, 2001.

France and Germany, among the most powerful components of NATO and 
the European Union (EU), have repeatedly opposed U.S. plans to invade 
Iraq. However most of the other 15 nations of the EU have expressed 
support for the war. So have the 10 nations (mainly from the former 
Warsaw Pact) that are expected to join the EU in coming years.

More is at issue in this divide within Europe than widespread 
anti-war sentiment. Public opposition to war is almost as high in 
Britain, Spain and Italy-whose rulers support Bush-as in France and 
Germany. At issue are broader political developments.

French President Chirac's decision to veto any UN Security Council 
resolution authorizing war against Iraq doesn't result from a sudden 
disdain on his part for military intervention overseas. He has shown 
little reticence to engage in such undertakings when it suits his 
purposes, as can be seen from France's many military interventions in 
Africa. A few months ago Chirac sent 3,000 French troops to Ivory 
Coast.

Chirac's refusal to support Bush on Iraq has more to do with France's 
declining power in Europe due to EU and NATO expansion. The more the 
EU expands into Central and East Europe, the more decentralized it 
becomes and less subject to French and German control. Chirac sees an 
independent stance vis-a-vis the U.S. on Iraq as a way to reassert 
French power in Europe at a moment when many newer EU members feel 
beholden to the U.S.

France's position also reflects a contest with the U.S. over 
influence in the Third World. On Feb. 20 leaders of 52 African 
nations attending a French-African summit in Paris endorsed the 
French position opposing war on Iraq.

  While this is not the first time France has taken a position that 
conflicts with the U.S., what is new today is that it has the support 
of Germany. With the absence of any external military threat, 
Germany's rulers are less willing to go against the massive 
opposition to war among the German masses.

The positions of Chirac and German Chancellor Schroeder, however, 
have so far not had the effect of bolstering French and German 
influence in the EU as much as bringing to the surface long-simmering 
rivalries within it. The governments of Spain and Italy don't mind 
seeing their role in the EU augmented at French and German expense, 
given the increasing importance of their economies. They have 
supported Bush, despite mass opposition to war at home. Blair's 
Britain, meanwhile, always wary about Franco-German domination of the 
continent, has become Bush's most trusted and energetic ally.

The rulers of the 10 nations in Central and East Europe that were 
approved for EU membership in December 2002 have also rallied in 
support of Bush. They view total support for U.S. dictates as a way 
to counterbalance French and German power (France's economy is larger 
than that of Spain, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic combined, and Germany's is 50 per cent larger than 
France's). Romania and Bulgaria are a long way from reaching the EU's 
conditions for membership; its rulers view total support for U.S. 
acts as a way to jump-start their way into "new Europe" via NATO.

Bush's actions have brought to the surface the fault-lines of 
European enlargement, which long preceded his drive to war against 
Iraq. The result is rising tension between the U.S. and France and 
Germany on a scale not seen in 50 years.

Bush cronies like Richard Perle of the Defense Policy Board have 
declared that the U.S. should abandon "romantic, nostalgic notions of 
the U.S. and members of the EU as allies working to achieve a common 
policy." And Secretary of State Colin Powell recently stated: "The 
[Atlantic] alliance is breaking itself up because it will not meet 
its responsibilities."

This has made it easier for Russia-which has nothing to gain and much 
to lose from a U.S. war against Iraq in the way of oil contracts and 
a $20 billion debt owed to it by Hussein-to threaten to veto a war 
against Iraq in the UN Security Council.

These intra-capitalist rivalries pose a huge challenge for the 
anti-war movements, because nothing would do more to channel them 
into a reformist, non-revolutionary direction than for the movements 
to follow the latest incarnations of neo-Gaullism. The more anti-war 
movements tailend existing state powers, be it France, Germany, or 
any other power in the UN, the less likely they are to ever pose any 
real challenge to world capitalism.

IMPACT ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Bush's rush to war has also led to increased conflict with Turkey. 
The Turkish parliament's March 1 failure to approve positioning 
60,000 U.S. troops there for an invasion, even after being offered 
$30 billion in economic inducements, was a stunning setback for the 
administration.

U.S. relations with Turkey have been severely strained since Turkey 
will not even allow U.S. jets to take off from bases in the country, 
permitting only flights over its airspace. Over 95 per cent of its 
populace opposes war on Iraq, and the U.S. pressure-it would not be 
wrong to call it bribery-to get it to agree to its mandates earned it 
few friends, even from within Turkey's political establishment. Murat 
Mercan, a member of parliament, said of U.S.-Turkish relations: "The 
relationship is spoiled. The Americans dictated to us. It became a 
business negotiation, not something between friends. It disgusted me."

The U.S. setback on Turkey is especially striking since the U.S. 
burned up a lot of political capital to secure its cooperation, as 
seen in its promise to allow the Turkish army to occupy northern Iraq 
to keep the Kurds in line. The U.S. also promised Turkey that it 
would make sure that the Kurds don't get control of the Mosul and 
Kirkuk oil fields. Kurdish groups were furious over this.

As bad a deal as the Kurds will get from the war, the Palestinians 
are destined to make out worse. Today is not like 1991, when the U.S. 
had support from many European and Arab regimes in the first Gulf 
War. Because of this Bush Sr. had to pay at least lip service to 
Palestinian desires for self-determination after the war.

The situation is different now, when the U.S. and Britain are taking 
on Iraq virtually alone. Bush's entire approach indicates that he 
will give a green light to Israel's Sharon to do as he pleases in his 
continuous war against the Palestinians. This despite the "road map" 
plan, which calls for forming a Palestinian state in three years. 
This will not amount to much. First, because the divisions between 
the U.S. and some of its allies means that the so-called quartet-the 
U.S., UN, EU, and Russia-will find it hard to put collective pressure 
on Israel. Second, because Bush insists that before any negotiations 
begin all violent acts against Israel must cease-the same demand 
Sharon has been making for two years to prevent any meaningful 
discussion from taking place with the Palestinians.

The peril facing the Palestinians is further underlined by Sharon's 
new government, which includes the National Union Party. It favors 
annexation of the West Bank and expulsion of the Palestinians from 
the occupied territories.

Israel's rulers hope that U.S. war against Iraq will allow it to 
reshape the Middle East in its image. Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz 
said that after the U.S. takes care of Iraq it should go after Iran, 
a greater threat to Israel: "We have great interest in shaping the 
Middle East the day after a war." Members of the Bush administration 
have begun to openly talk of the war against Iraq as a "pilot 
project" for future U.S. wars of intervention, possibly against Iran.

WAR IN EAST ASIA?

Bush's actions are also raising the risk of war with North Korea, 
which is also placing strain on the U.S.'s global alliances.

Sensing that it may be next on Bush's hit-list, North Korea's 
decrepit Stalinist regime has upped the ante by restarting its 
nuclear reactor at Yongbyon and openly challenging U.S. spy aircraft. 
Bush, who refuses to engage in direct talks with North Korea, 
responded on March 4 by sending 24 B-52 and B-1 bombers to Guam, in 
striking distance of North Korea. Though he says the U.S. will not 
"invade" North Korea, he has not ruled out a preemptive air strike on 
its nuclear facilities.

These moves are causing consternation in South Korea. Over 21 million 
South Koreans live in the "kill box"-the Seoul metropolitan area, in 
reach of North Korea's 13,000 artillery pieces. Another Korean war 
could kill over a million people-and that's without counting the use 
of nuclear weapons.

This is creating serious tensions between the U.S.  and South Korea, 
which wants to form a Common Market with North Korea. South Korea's 
President Roh Moo Hyun recently said in a speech to the Korean 
Federation of Trade Unions, "Koreans should stand together, although 
things will get difficult when the U.S. bosses us around." An advisor 
to Roh added, "If the American policy is simply to wait for North 
Korea to make a huge mistake, there is no future for the alliance and 
no future for the American position in East Asia" (See The New York 
Times, Feb. 25).

On Feb. 24, China, Australia and South Korea urged the U.S. to enter 
into one-to-one talks with North Korea. Bush refuses. Relations with 
China are becoming strained. Japan has moved closer to the U.S. 
position, worried about China's growing power in East Asia. Whether 
we look at West Europe or East Asia, the U.S.'s drive for war 
threatens to unravel the whole structure of global politics.

A CHANGED WORLD

The U.S. war against Iraq is rooted in the U.S. drive for single 
world mastery. It's been with us ever since the end of World War II, 
when the U.S. contended with Russia for world domination. By 1991 the 
collapse of the Soviet Union forced one side to drop out of this 
drive for world domination. Yet the U.S. continued its drive, 
unencumbered by competition from another superpower.

At the time some thought the U.S. would create new global 
institutions to deal with this changed world. However, it didn't 
happen. Though there was a lot of talk after 1991 that NATO had lost 
is purpose, the collapse of the post-World War II world didn't lead 
U.S. rulers to create any new imperial architecture. The same 
institutions that served it during the Cold War, like NATO, were 
preserved, only now expanded into Central and East Europe.

Today, however, institutions like NATO and the UN are coming under 
severe strain. Whereas in 1991 U.S. rulers chose to stick with the 
old international institutions despite the new reality, by now those 
institutions are crumbling under the weight of the U.S.'s incessant 
drive for single world mastery.

What underpins such changes is U.S. military power. But does the 
U.S.'s unprecedented military power really translate into global 
dominance? Does not the U.S.'s effort to negate all limits to its 
drive for war end up creating other limits which become real barriers 
to achieving U.S. global dominance?

In this sense Michael Ignatiev is right that it is a fatal mistake to 
confuse global power with global dominance. The U.S. clearly has 
global power, but its very power tends to undermine U.S. global 
dominance as it leads more nations and peoples to resist U.S. 
dictates. (See "The Burden," New York Times Magazine, Jan. 5, 2003)

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

Few issues have received less discussion than the economic 
ramifications of a war. A study by William D. Nordhaus says that the 
cost of military action, occupation, and reconstruction in a war with 
little Iraqi resistance would be $120 billion, while if things get 
complicated the cost could be $1.6 trillion.

This is speculative, since no one knows how the war and post-war 
occupation will pan out. However, it's clear that the economy is 
facing serious problems.

From 1997 to 2000 (the height of the "boom") the rate of profit in 
the non-financial sector in the U.S. fell by 20 per cent. Since then 
profit rates have fallen further. If profit rates are falling, what 
keeps the economy afloat? The answer in part is that the Federal 
Reserve has pushed interest rates so low that there's been a frenzy 
of household borrowing that has so far kept the economy going.

However, another key factor is the influx of foreign capital. In the 
mid-1990s the U.S. decided to push up the value of the dollar. To 
reduce the value of their currencies relative to the dollar, foreign 
capitalists bought up U.S. assets in treasury bonds and equities. A 
flood of foreign capital poured into the U.S., prompting a rise in 
the stock market. Even as profit rates fell, the value of stocks 
soared. It led to a huge wave of financial speculation.

Yet when the disconnect between overvalued stocks and falling profit 
rates recently became evident (which corporations tried to cover up 
via fake accounting) the bubble began to burst.

This indicates that U.S. capitalism has still not extricated itself 
from the problem which confronted it with the 1974-75 global 
recession-a sharp decline in its rate of profit. Profit rates remain 
at historic lows; in the past five years the rate of profit in the 
manufacturing sector has fallen by 42 per cent. Though that has been 
papered over in part by an infusion of monetary capital from 
overseas, there's no assurance that this will continue in perpetuity.

What is Bush's response to this? l) Return to massive budget 
deficits, á la Reagan, which creates pressure to cut spending on 
social programs, and 2) cut the taxes of the rich á la Reagan, like 
the tax on corporate dividends. Both are intended to redirect social 
wealth away from workers and into the hands of the rich so that they 
can invest more funds in the stock market and reinflate the 
speculative bubble.

Here may lie the basis of the U.S.'s arrogance that it can do 
whatever it wants regardless of world opinion. U.S. rulers think that 
if the bubble is reinflated through tax cuts and budget deficits, and 
if the value of the dollar remains strong, foreign capital will have 
little choice but to continue to invest in the U.S. no matter what 
anyone thinks about U.S. policy in Iraq.

The U.S.'s unprecedented military dominance has economic 
consequences, as it tends to lead foreign capitalists to view the 
U.S. as the safest haven for their investments. The U.S. is today 
more dependent on capital investments from overseas than at any time 
in the last 50 years. Many U.S. rulers imagine that by projecting 
total military power the U.S. can forever dominate the world economy, 
even though that "dominance" is itself dependent on investments from 
capitalists overseas.

Some have argued that one reason for Europe's decision to adopt a 
single currency, the euro, is that it hopes one day that the euro 
will replace the dollar as the world's currency, allowing Europe to 
reap the economic benefits that now accrue to U.S. capitalists. Is it 
any accident that the European country that's been most averse to 
accepting the euro-Britain-is most closely allied with the U.S., 
while those who have pushed hardest for the euro, France and Germany, 
are most critical of the U.S.? However, before one rushes to conclude 
that world capital is about to break up into contending continental 
blocs, keep in mind that euro or no euro, Europe is not a single, 
unified entity. Many European countries are willing to follow U.S. 
dictates at any price, though they are a far smaller part of Europe's 
economy than Germany or France.

In a word, there is no national capitalist solution to the U.S.'s 
drive for war. The only solution can come from below, from masses of 
people who refuse to accept war and the cutbacks in health care, 
education, social services, and living conditions that is sure to 
accompany Bush's war in Iraq.

Such continuous anti-war resistance has never been more critical. If 
the war is drawn out, it will be essential for the movement not to 
die off. If the war is brief, it will be even more important for it 
to continue to develop since a short and "successful" war will 
embolden Bush to later go after other regimes with even more 
disastrous consequences. Never has it become more urgent to make sure 
that the voice of the "second America" is heard!

Pointing out the second world in each country as the only real source 
of resistance to Bush's drive for war is not where our work ends. It 
is only where it begins. For history shows that unless such 
resistance become wedded to a positive vision of a new society to 
replace capitalism, the movements will not truly succeed. There is no 
more important task than developing a collective dialogue within the 
movements on how to work this out for today.

Top of Message | Previous Page | Permalink

JiscMail Tools


RSS Feeds and Sharing


Advanced Options


Archives

April 2024
March 2024
February 2024
January 2024
December 2023
November 2023
October 2023
September 2023
August 2023
July 2023
June 2023
May 2023
April 2023
March 2023
February 2023
January 2023
December 2022
November 2022
October 2022
September 2022
August 2022
July 2022
June 2022
May 2022
April 2022
March 2022
February 2022
January 2022
December 2021
November 2021
October 2021
September 2021
August 2021
July 2021
June 2021
May 2021
April 2021
March 2021
February 2021
January 2021
December 2020
November 2020
October 2020
September 2020
August 2020
July 2020
June 2020
May 2020
April 2020
March 2020
February 2020
January 2020
December 2019
November 2019
October 2019
September 2019
July 2019
June 2019
May 2019
April 2019
March 2019
February 2019
January 2019
December 2018
November 2018
October 2018
September 2018
August 2018
July 2018
June 2018
May 2018
April 2018
March 2018
February 2018
January 2018
December 2017
November 2017
October 2017
September 2017
August 2017
July 2017
June 2017
May 2017
April 2017
March 2017
February 2017
January 2017
December 2016
November 2016
October 2016
September 2016
August 2016
July 2016
June 2016
May 2016
April 2016
March 2016
February 2016
January 2016
December 2015
November 2015
October 2015
September 2015
August 2015
July 2015
June 2015
May 2015
April 2015
March 2015
February 2015
January 2015
December 2014
November 2014
October 2014
September 2014
August 2014
July 2014
June 2014
May 2014
April 2014
March 2014
February 2014
January 2014
December 2013
November 2013
October 2013
September 2013
August 2013
July 2013
June 2013
May 2013
April 2013
March 2013
February 2013
January 2013
December 2012
November 2012
October 2012
September 2012
August 2012
July 2012
June 2012
May 2012
April 2012
March 2012
February 2012
January 2012
December 2011
November 2011
October 2011
September 2011
August 2011
July 2011
June 2011
May 2011
April 2011
March 2011
February 2011
January 2011
December 2010
November 2010
October 2010
September 2010
August 2010
July 2010
June 2010
May 2010
April 2010
March 2010
February 2010
January 2010
December 2009
November 2009
October 2009
September 2009
August 2009
July 2009
June 2009
May 2009
April 2009
March 2009
February 2009
January 2009
December 2008
November 2008
October 2008
September 2008
August 2008
July 2008
June 2008
May 2008
April 2008
March 2008
February 2008
January 2008
December 2007
November 2007
October 2007
September 2007
August 2007
July 2007
June 2007
May 2007
April 2007
March 2007
February 2007
January 2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998


JiscMail is a Jisc service.

View our service policies at https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/policyandsecurity/ and Jisc's privacy policy at https://www.jisc.ac.uk/website/privacy-notice

For help and support help@jisc.ac.uk

Secured by F-Secure Anti-Virus CataList Email List Search Powered by the LISTSERV Email List Manager