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CRIT-GEOG-FORUM  December 2001

CRIT-GEOG-FORUM December 2001

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Subject:

War in Afghanistan | Some articles and sources

From:

David Wood <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

David Wood <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Wed, 12 Dec 2001 09:44:26 -0000

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text/plain

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Hi Critters. There's been very little discussion here recently, especially
on the 'War against Terrorism'. Perhaps we are all working on post-September
11th articles...

Here's some recent newspaper articles and source material on the US attack
on Afghanistan - of course, as the original compilers suggest, there is no
reason why the longer-term rationale (which they refer to as the
'conspiracy' - that of course being a term for politics as usual by people
who are still surprised that things work this way) cannot coexist with a
desire for revenge / justice / whatever after September 11th.

> The Daily Mirror of London:
> Mirror.co.uk  Friday, December 7, 2001
>
>
> PILGER: THIS WAR IS A FRAUD
>
> By John Pilger, Former Mirror chief foreign correspondent
>
>
> The war against terrorism is a fraud. After three weeks'
> bombing, not a
> single terrorist implicated in the attacks on America has
> been caught or
> killed in Afghanistan.
>
> Instead, one of the poorest, most stricken nations has been terrorised
> by the most powerful - to the point where American pilots have run out
> of dubious "military" targets and are now destroying mud houses, a
> hospital, Red Cross warehouses, lorries carrying refugees.
>
> Unlike the relentless pictures from New York, we are seeing almost
> nothing of this. Tony Blair has yet to tell us what the
> violent death of
> children - seven in one family - has to do with Osama bin Laden.
>
> And why are cluster bombs being used? The British public should know
> about these bombs, which the RAF also uses. They spray hundreds of
> bomblets that have only one purpose; to kill and maim people.
> Those that
> do not explode lie on the ground like landmines, waiting for people to
> step on them.
>
> If ever a weapon was designed specifically for acts of terrorism, this
> is it. I have seen the victims of American cluster weapons in other
> countries, such as the Laotian toddler who picked one up and had her
> right leg and face blown off. Be assured this is now happening in
> Afghanistan, in your name.
>
> None of those directly involved in the September 11 atrocity was
> Afghani. Most were Saudis, who apparently did their planning and
> training in Germany and the United States.
>
> The camps which the Taliban allowed bin Laden to use were
> emptied weeks
> ago. Moreover, the Taliban itself is a creation of the
> Americans and the
> British. In the 1980s, the tribal army that produced them was
> funded by
> the CIA and trained by the SAS to fight the Russians.
>
> The hypocrisy does not stop there. When the Taliban took
> Kabul in 1996,
> Washington said nothing. Why? Because Taliban leaders were
> soon on their
> way to Houston, Texas, to be entertained by executives of the oil
> company, Unocal.
>
> With secret US government approval, the company offered them
> a generous
> cut of the profits of the oil and gas pumped through a
> pipeline that the
> Americans wanted to build from Soviet central Asia through
> Afghanistan.
>
> A US diplomat said: "The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudis
> did." He explained that Afghanistan would become an American
> oil colony,
> there would be huge profits for the West, no democracy and the legal
> persecution of women. "We can live with that," he said.
>
> Although the deal fell through, it remains an urgent priority of the
> administration of George W. Bush, which is steeped in the oil
> industry.
> Bush's concealed agenda is to exploit the oil and gas reserves in the
> Caspian basin, the greatest source of untapped fossil fuel on
> earth and
> enough, according to one estimate, to meet America's voracious energy
> needs for a generation. Only if the pipeline runs through Afghanistan
> can the Americans hope to control it.
>
> So, not surprisingly, US Secretary of State Colin Powell is now
> referring to "moderate" Taliban, who will join an American-sponsored
> "loose federation" to run Afghanistan. The "war on terrorism"
> is a cover
> for this: a means of achieving American strategic aims that lie behind
> the flag-waving facade of great power.
>
> The Royal Marines, who will do the real dirty work, will be
> little more
> than mercenaries for Washington's imperial ambitions, not to
> mention the
> extraordinary pretensions of Blair himself. Having made
> Britain a target
> for terrorism with his bellicose "shoulder to shoulder" with Bush
> nonsense, he is now prepared to send troops to a battlefield where the
> goals are so uncertain that even the Chief of the Defence
> Staff says the
> conflict "could last 50 years".
>
> The irresponsibility of this is breathtaking; the pressure on Pakistan
> alone could ignite an unprecedented crisis across the Indian
> sub-continent. Having reported many wars, I am always struck by the
> absurdity of effete politicians eager to wave farewell to young
> soldiers, but who themselves would not say boo to a Taliban goose.
>
> In the days of gunboats, our imperial leaders covered their
> violence in
> the "morality" of their actions. Blair is no different. Like them, his
> selective moralising omits the most basic truth. Nothing justified the
> killing of innocent people in America on September 11, and nothing
> justifies the killing of innocent people anywhere else.
>
> By killing innocents in Afghanistan, Blair and Bush stoop to the level
> of the criminal outrage in New York. Once you cluster bomb, "mistakes"
> and "blunders" are a pretence. Murder is murder, regardless of whether
> you crash a plane into a building or order and collude with
> it from the
> Oval Office and Downing Street.
>
> If Blair was really opposed to all forms of terrorism, he would get
> Britain out of the arms trade. On the day of the twin towers
> attack, an
> "arms fair", selling weapons of terror (like cluster bombs
> and missiles)
> to assorted tyrants and human rights abusers, opened in London's
> Docklands with the full backing of the Blair government.
>
> Britain's biggest arms customer is the medieval Saudi regime, which
> beheads heretics and spawned the religious fanaticism of the Taliban.
>
> If he really wanted to demonstrate "the moral fibre of Britain", Blair
> would do everything in his power to lift the threat of
> violence in those
> parts of the world where there is great and justifiable grievance and
> anger.
>
> He would do more than make gestures; he would demand that Israel ends
> its illegal occupation of Palestine and withdraw to its
> borders prior to
> the 1967 war, as ordered by the Security Council, of which
> Britain is a
> permanent member.
>
> He would call for an end to the genocidal blockade which the UN - in
> reality, America and Britain - has imposed on the suffering people of
> Iraq for more than a decade, causing the deaths of half a million
> children under the age of five.
>
> That's more deaths of infants every month than the number
> killed in the
> World Trade Center.
>
> There are signs that Washington is about to extend its
> current "war" to
> Iraq; yet unknown to most of us, almost every day RAF and American
> aircraft already bomb Iraq. There are no headlines. There is
> nothing on
> the TV news. This terror is the longest-running Anglo-American bombing
> campaign since World War Two.
>
> The Wall Street Journal reported that the US and Britain faced a
> "dilemma" in Iraq, because "few targets remain". "We're down
> to the last
> outhouse," said a US official. That was two years ago, and
> they're still
> bombing. The cost to the British taxpayer? £800 million so far.
>
> According to an internal UN report, covering a five-month
> period, 41 per
> cent of the casualties are civilians. In northern Iraq, I met a woman
> whose husband and four children were among the deaths listed in the
> report. He was a shepherd, who was tending his sheep with his elderly
> father and his children when two planes attacked them, each making a
> sweep. It was an open valley; there were no military targets nearby.
>
> "I want to see the pilot who did this," said the widow at the
> graveside
> of her entire family. For them, there was no service in St Paul's
> Cathedral with the Queen in attendance; no rock concert with Paul
> McCartney.
>
> The tragedy of the Iraqis, and the Palestinians, and the Afghanis is a
> truth that is the very opposite of their caricatures in much of the
> Western media.
>
> Far from being the terrorists of the world, the overwhelming
> majority of
> the Islamic peoples of the Middle East and south Asia have been its
> victims - victims largely of the West's exploitation of
> precious natural
> resources in or near their countries.
>
> There is no war on terrorism. If there was, the Royal Marines and the
> SAS would be storming the beaches of Florida, where more CIA-funded
> terrorists, ex-Latin American dictators and torturers, are
> given refuge
> than anywhere on earth.
>
> There is, however, a continuing war of the powerful against the
> powerless, with new excuses, new hidden agendas, new lies. Before
> another child dies violently, or quietly from starvation, before new
> fanatics are created in both the east and the west, it is time for the
> people of Britain to make their voices heard and to stop this
> fraudulent
> war - and to demand the kind of bold, imaginative non-violent
> initiatives that require real political courage.
>
> The other day, the parents of Greg Rodriguez, a young man who died in
> the World Trade Center, said this: "We read enough of the
> news to sense
> that our government is heading in the direction of violent
> revenge, with
> the prospect of sons, daughters, parents, friends in distant lands
> dying, suffering, and nursing further grievances against us.
>
> "It is not the way to go...not in our son's name."
>
>  <http://www.johnpilger.com> www.johnpilger.com
>
>
>
> Agence France Presse
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Sunday October 7, 8:18 PM
>
>
> US gave silent blessing to Taliban rise to power: analysts
>
>
>
>
>
>
> WASHINGTON, Oct 7 (AFP) -
>
> Afghanistan's Taliban regime, now bracing for punitive US military
> strikes, was brought to power with Washington's silent blessing as it
> dallied in an abortive new "Great Game" in central Asia.
>
> Keen to see Afghanistan under strong central rule to allow a US-led
> group to build a multi-billion-dollar oil and gas pipeline, Washington
> urged key allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to back the
> militia's bid for
> power in 1996, analysts said.
>
> But it was soon forced to abandon its brief and shadowy
> flirtation with
> the Islamic purists, who US officials now say are unfit to
> rule, as the
> militia began imposing its brutal version of Islamic law, sparking a
> violent outcry from US women's groups.
>
> While the United States has denied supporting the Taliban's rise,
> experts say that at the time they seized the capital five years ago,
> Washington saw the militia as a strange but potentially stabilizing
> force.
>
> "Now, years on, the US has to cope with the damage for which it is
> partially responsible starting with its role during and after
> the Soviet
> occupation of Afghanistan," said Radha Kumar of the Council on Foreign
> Relations in New York.
>
> Ahmed Rashid, a leading author and expert on Afghan affairs,
> said it was
> "clear" Washington, which armed and trained the Afghan
> mujahedin during
> their battle against Soviet invaders in the 1980s, indirectly
> supported
> the Taliban.
>
> "The United States encouraged Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to support the
> Taliban, certainly right up to their advance on Kabul" on
> September 26,
> 1996, he said from his base in Lahore, Pakistan. "That seems
> very ironic
> now."
>
> One key reason for US interest in the Taliban was a 4.5-billion-dollar
> oil and gas pipeline that a US-led oil consortium planned to build
> across war-ravaged Afghanistan.
>
> The California-based Unocal Corp. in 1996 hatched plans to stretch the
> pipeline from the central Asian state of Turkmenistan to Pakistan and
> the United States and the oil consortium wanted most of Afghanistan to
> be under the stable control of one government to ensure the pipeline's
> security, the analysts said.
>
> In the months before the Taliban took power, former US assistant
> secretary of state for South Asia Robin Raphel waged an
> intense round of
> shuttle diplomacy between the powers with possible stakes in the
> project.
>
> "Robin Raphel was the face of the Unocal pipeline," said an
> official of
> the former Afghan government who was present at some of the meetings
> with her.
>
> The Unocal consortium also included Saudi-based Delta Oil, Pakistan's
> Crescent Group and Gazprom of Russia.
>
> The project was to start with a two-billion-dollar, 890-kilometer
> (556-mile) gas pipeline that would channel 1.9 billion cubic
> feet of gas
> to Pakistan each day.
>
> In addition to tapping new sources of energy, the move also suited a
> major US strategic aim in the region: isolating its nemesis Iran and
> stifling a frequently-mooted rival pipeline project backed by Tehran,
> experts said.
>
> "This was part of what I call a new great game between Russia, the
> United States, China, Iran and European companies for control
> of the new
> oil and gas resources that have been discovered," Rashid said. A
> dangerous game for influence in Afghanistan was played in the 19th
> century by Britain and Russia, at a strategic crossroads between South
> Asia and Czarist Russia.
>
> The Unocal consortium feared there could be no pipeline as long as
> Afghanistan, battered by war since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, was
> split among rival warlords. The Taliban, whose rise to power owed much
> to their bid to stamp out the drugs trade and install law and order,
> seemed attractive to Washington.
>
> "It thought the Taliban might be a stabilizing factor if they
> controlled
> 90 percent of the country," said the CFR's Kumar.
>
> When the Taliban rolled into Kabul, Washington appeared initially
> enthusiastic amid signs it would consider recognising the new regime.
>
> The top US diplomat in Pakistan planned a visit to Kabul just
> days after
> it was captured by the Taliban and a State Department
> official expressed
> hope that the Taliban would "move quickly to restore order and
> security."
>
> But Washington cancelled the diplomat's trip as protests against the
> Taliban's treatment of women erupted in the United States,
> news reports
> said at the time. Unocal withdrew from the pipeline
> consortium two years
> later.
>
>
>
> Department of Energy Fact Sheet.
>
>
>
>  <http://www.eia.doe.gov/>  <http://www.eia.doe.gov/> Energy
> Information
> Administration  <http://www.eia.doe.gov/>
>
>
>
> September 2001
>
> Afghanistan
>
>
> The information contained in this report is the best available as of
> September 2001 and can change.
>
> General Background
> Afghanistan's significance from an energy standpoint stems from its
> geographical position as a potential transit route for oil and natural
> gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea.  This potential
> includes the possible construction of oil and natural gas export
> pipelines through Afghanistan, which was under serious
> consideration in
> the mid-1990s.  The idea has since been undermined by Afghanistan's
> instability.  Since 1996, most of Afghanistan has been
> controlled by the
> Taliban movement, which the United States does not recognize as the
> government of Afghanistan.
>
> On December 19, 2000, the UN Security Council imposed additional
> sanctions against Afghanistan's ruling Taliban movement
> (which controls
> around 95% of the country), including an arms embargo and a ban on the
> sale of chemicals used in making heroin. These sanctions (Resolution
> 1333) are aimed at pressuring Afghanistan to turn over Osama
> bin Laden,
> suspected in various terrorist attacks, including the August 1998 US
> Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  These latest sanctions are in
> addition to sanctions (Resolution 1267) imposed on Afghanistan in
> November 1999, which included a freeze on Taliban assets and a ban on
> international flights by Afghanistan's national airline, Ariana.  The
> Taliban reacted sharply to the new sanctions, ordering a boycott of US
> and Russian goods, and pulling out of UN-mediated peace talks aimed at
> ending the country's civil war.
>
> On November 29, 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan issued
> a report on
> Afghanistan which listed the country's major problems as
> follows: civil
> war (which has caused many casualties and refugees, and which has
> devastated the country's economy), record opium production, wide-scale
> human rights violations, and food shortages caused in part by
> drought.
>
> According to the 2001
> <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html> CIA World
> Factbook, Afghanistan is an extremely poor, landlocked country, highly
> dependent on farming and livestock raising.  Afghanistan has
> experienced
> over two decades of war, including the nearly 10-year Soviet military
> occupation (which ended in 1989). During that conflict
> one-third of the
> population fled the country, with Pakistan and Iran sheltering a
> combined peak of more than 6 million refugees.  Large Afghan refugee
> populations remain in Pakistan and Iran. Gross domestic product has
> fallen substantially over the past 20 years because of the
> loss of labor
> and capital and the disruption of trade and transport.  The severe
> drought of 1998-2000 added to these problems.  The majority of the
> population continues to suffer from insufficient food, clothing,
> housing, and medical care. Inflation remains a serious problem
> throughout the country. International aid can deal with only
> a fraction
> of the humanitarian problem, let alone promote economic
> development. The
> economic situation did not improve in 1999-2000, as internal civil
> strife has continued, hampering both domestic economic policies and
> international aid efforts. Numerical data are likely to be either
> unavailable or unreliable. Afghanistan was by far the largest world
> producer of opium poppies in 2000, and narcotics trafficking
> is a major
> source of revenues.
>
> Energy Overview
> The Soviets had estimated Afghanistan's proven and probable
> natural gas
> reserves at up to 5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in the 1970s.  Afghan
> natural gas production reached 275 million cubic feet per day (Mmcf/d)
> in the mid-1970s. However, due to declining reserves from producing
> fields, output gradually fell to about 220 Mmcf/d by 1980. At
> that time,
> the Jorquduq field was brought online and was expected to boost Afghan
> natural gas output to 385 Mmcf/d by the early 1980s. However, sabotage
> of infrastructure by the anti-Soviet mujaheddin fighters limited the
> country's total production to 290 Mmcf/d, an output level
> that was held
> fairly steady until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. After the Soviet
> pullout and subsequent Afghan civil war, roughly 31 producing wells at
> Sheberghan area fields were shut in pending the restart of natural gas
> sales to the former Soviet Union.
>
> At its peak in the late 1970s, Afghanistan supplied 70%-90% of its
> natural gas output to the Soviet Union's natural gas grid via a link
> through Uzbekistan. In 1992, Afghan President Najibullah
> indicated that
> a new natural gas sales agreement with Russia was in
> progress. However,
> several former Soviet republics raised price and distribution
> issues and
> negotiations stalled. In the early 1990s, Afghanistan also discussed
> possible natural gas supply arrangements with Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
> and several Western European countries, but these talks never
> progressed
> further.  Afghan natural gas fields include Jorqaduq, Khowaja
> Gogerdak,
> and Yatimtaq, all of which are located within 20 miles of the northern
> town of Sheberghan in Jowzjan province.  Natural gas production and
> distribution is the responsibility of the Taliban-controlled
> Afghan Gas
> Enterprise.  In 1999, work resumed on the repair of a distribution
> pipeline to Mazar-i-Sharif.  Spur pipelines to a small power plant and
> fertilizer plant also were repaired and completed.  Mazar-i-Sharif is
> now receiving natural gas from the pipeline, as well as some other
> surrounding areas.  Rehabilitation of damaged natural gas
> wells has been
> undertaken at the Khowaja Gogerak field, which has increased
> natural gas
> production.
>
> In February 1998, the Taliban announced plans to revive the Afghan
> National Oil Company, which was abolished by the Soviet Union after it
> invaded Afghanistan in 1979.  Soviet estimates from the late 1970s
> placed Afghanistan's proven and probable oil and condensate
> reserves at
> 95 million barrels. Oil exploration and development work as well as
> plans to build a 10,000-bbl/d refinery were halted after the
> 1979 Soviet
> invasion.  A very small amount of crude oil is produced at the Angot
> field in the northern Sar-i-Pol province.  It is processed at a
> primitive topping plant in Sheberghan, and burned in central heating
> boilers in Sheberghan, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kabul.  Another small
> oilfield at Zomrad Sai near Sheberghan was reportedly
> undergoing repairs
> in mid-2001.
>
> Petroleum products such as diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel are
> imported,
> mainly from Pakistan and Turkmenistan.  A small storage and
> distribution
> facility exists in Jalalabad on the highway between Kabul and
> Peshawar,
> Pakistan.  Turkmenistan also has a petroleum product storage and
> distribution facility at Tagtabazar near the Afghan border, which
> supplies northwestern Afghanistan.
>
> Besides oil and natural gas, Afghanistan also is estimated to have 73
> million tons of coal reserves, most of which is located in the region
> between Herat and Badashkan in the northern part of the country.
> Although Afghanistan produced over 100,000 short tons of coal annually
> as late as the early 1990s, as of 1999, the country was producing only
> around 1,000 short tons.
>
> Afghanistan's power grid has been severely damaged by years of war.
> Currently, the ruling Taliban are concentrating on rebuilding damaged
> hydroelectric plants, power distribution lines, and
> high-voltage cables.
> Production of power by Afghanistan's hydroelectric dams was negatively
> affected by the drought of 1998-2000, resulting in blackouts in Kabul
> and other cities.  Increased rainfall in 2001 has improved power
> production.  The Kajaki Dam in Helmand province near Kandahar is
> undergoing the addition of another generating turbine with assistance
> from the Chinese Dongfeng Agricultural Machinery Company.
> This will add
> 16.5 megawatts (MW) to its generating capacity when completed.
> Transmission lines from the Kajaki Dam to Kandahar were repaired in
> early 2001, along with a substation in the city, restoring supplies of
> electricity.  The Dahla Dam in Kandahar province also has
> been restored
> to operation, along with the Breshna-Kot Dam in Nangarhar province,
> which has a generating capacity of 11.5 MW.  The 66-MW Mahipar hydro
> plant also is now operational.
>
> Turkmenistan supplies electricity to much of northwestern Afghanistan.
> In October 1999, Afghanistan announced that it had reached agreement
> with Turkmenistan for electricity imports into northwestern
> Afghanistan,
> including power to the city of Herat and the Herat cement plant.
> Another transmission line has been built from Turkmenistan to the city
> of Andkhoy, and one was under construction in 2001 to Sheberghan.
> Electricity has previously been imported from Uzbekistan for
> Mazar-i-Sharif, but supplies were cut off during the winter
> of 1999 due
> to payment arrears.
>
> Regional Pipeline Plans
> In January 1998, an agreement was signed between Pakistan,
> Turkmenistan,
> and the Taliban to arrange funding on a proposed 890-mile, $2-billion,
> 1.9-billion-cubic-feet-per-day natural gas pipeline project. The
> proposed pipeline would have transported natural gas from
> Turkmenistan's
> 45-Tcf Dauletabad natural gas field to Pakistan, and most likely would
> have run from Dauletabad south to the Afghan border and through Herat
> and Qandahar in Afghanistan, to Quetta, Pakistan. The line would then
> have linked with Pakistan's natural gas grid at Sui. Natural gas
> shipments had been projected to start at 700 Mmcf/d in 1999
> and to rise
> to 1.4 Bcf/d or higher by 2002. In March 1998, however,
> Unocal announced
> a delay in finalizing project details due to Afghanistan's continuing
> civil war. In June 1998, Gazprom announced that it was
> relinquishing its
> 10% stake in the gas pipeline project consortium (known as the Central
> Asian Gas Pipeline Ltd., or Centgas), which was formed in August 1996.
> As of June 1998, Unocal and Saudi Arabia's Delta Oil held a
> combined 85%
> stake in Centgas, while Turkmenrusgas owned 5%. Other participants in
> the proposed project besides Delta Oil included the Crescent Group of
> Pakistan, Gazprom of Russia, Hyundai Engineering &
> Construction Company
> of South Korea, Inpex and Itochu of Japan
>
> On December 8, 1998, Unocal announced that it was withdrawing from the
> Centgas consortium, citing low oil prices and turmoil in
> Afghanistan as
> making the pipeline project uneconomical and too risky. Unocal's
> announcement followed an earlier statement -- in August 1998
> -- that the
> company was suspending its role in the Afghanistan gas
> pipeline project
> in light of U.S. government military action in Afghanistan,
> and also due
> to intensified fighting between the Taliban and opposition groups.
> Unocal had previously stressed that the Centgas pipeline project would
> not proceed until an internationally recognized government
> was in place
> in Afghanistan. To date, however, only three countries --
> Saudi Arabia,
> Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates -- have recognized the Taliban
> government (note: in late September 2001, Saudi Arabia and the United
> Arab Emirates both cut ties with the Taliban).
>
> Besides the gas pipeline, Unocal also had considered building a
> 1,000-mile, 1-million barrel-per-day (bbl/d) capacity oil
> pipeline that
> would link Chardzou, Turkmenistan to Pakistan's Arabian Sea Coast via
> Afghanistan. Since the Chardzou refinery is already linked to Russia's
> Western Siberian oil fields, this line could provide a possible
> alternative export route for regional oil production from the Caspian
> Sea. The $2.5-billion pipeline is known as the Central Asian Oil
> Pipeline Project. For a variety of reasons (i.e. war and political
> instability), however, this project remains highly doubtful
> for the time
> being.
>
>  In April 1999, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and the Taliban authorities in
> Afghanistan agreed to reactivate the Turkmenistan-Pakistan
> gas pipeline
> project, and to ask the Centgas consortium, now led by Saudi Arabia's
> Delta Oil (following Unocal's withdrawal from the project),
> to proceed.
> Periodic meetings to discuss the project have continued. It remains
> unlikely, however, that this pipeline will be built.
>
> Energy Infrastructure at a Glance
>
> Oil
>
>
>
>
> Angot Oilfield
>
> Produces a small quantity of crude oil; located in Sar-i-Pol province
>
>
> Zomrad Sai Oilfield
>
> Reportedly undergoing rehabilitation; near Sheberghan
>
>
> Sheberghan Topping Plant
>
> Primitive topping plant which processes crude oil for consumption in
> heating boilers in Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Sheberghan
>
>
> Jalalabad Storage Facility
>
> Petroleum product storage and distribution facility
>
> Gas
>
>
>
>
> Sheberghan Area Gas Fields
>
> The Jorqaduk, Khowaja Gogerak, and Yatimtaq gas fields are all located
> within 20 miles of Sheberghan
>
>
> Pipeline to Mazar-i-Sharif
>
> A pipeline connects these gas fields to Mazar-i-Sharif.Gas is
> used for a
> small power plant, a fertilizer plant, and domestic use.
>
>
> Local pipelines
>
> Small local pipelines near the gas fields distribute gas in small
> quantities to nearby villages and Sheberghan
>
> Electricity
>
>
>
>
> Kajaki Dam
>
> Located in Helmand province near Kandahar; undergoing upgrade
> which will
> add a third generating turbine and increase its installed capacity by
> 16.5 MW (from its current 33 MW capacity); transmission lines to
> Kandahar repaired in early 2001.
>
>
> Mahipar Dam
>
> Installed capacity of 66 MW.Repaired and operational.
>
>
> Breshna-Kot Dam
>
> Installed capacity of 11.5 MW.Repaired and operational.In Nangarhar
> province near Jalalabad.
>
>
> Breshna-Kot Substation
>
> Reportedly undergoing repairs.
>
>
> Dahla Dam
>
> Kandahar province.Repaired and operational.
>
>
> Mazar-i-Sharif Power Plant
>
> Small gas-fired power plant near Mazar-i-Sharif, with an installed
> capacity of 35 MW.
>
>
> Transmission Lines from Turkmenistan
>
> Transmission lines from Turkmenistan supply power to several cities in
> northwestern Afghanistan, including Herat, and Andkhoy.A line
> was under
> construction in early 2001 to Sheberghan.
>
> Note: This listing of Afghanistan's energy infrastructure was compiled
> from information available in press and media sources, and should not
> necessarily be considered comprehensive.  Only facilities which have
> been reported to be functional or under repair have been included.
>
>
>
> U.S. Geological Survey - Map of Afghanistan's Natural Resources
>
>
>
>
>   _____
>
> Sources for this report include: BBC Monitoring South Asia;
> BBC Summary
> of World Broadcasts; Dow Jones; Economist Intelligence Unit Viewswire;
> Financial Times Asia Intelligence Wire; Foreign Broadcast Information
> Service(FBIS).
>
>   _____
>
>
> For more information from EIA on Afghanistan, please see:
> EIA -  <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/afghan.html> Country
> Information on Afghanistan
>
>
> Links to other U.S. government sites:
> 2001  <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html> CIA
> World Factbook - Afghanistan
> U.S. State  <http://travel.state.gov/afghanistan_warning.html>
> Department Travel Warning on Afghanistan
> U.S. State  <http://travel.state.gov/afghanistan.html> Department
> Consular Information Sheet -- Afghanistan
> U.S.  <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/maps/93019.gif>
> Geological Survey - Afghanistan Natural Resources Map
>
> The following links are provided solely as a service to our customers,
> and therefore should not be construed as advocating or reflecting any
> position of the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the United
> States Government. In addition, EIA does not guarantee the content or
> accuracy of any information presented in linked sites.
> The Islamic State  <http://www.stm.it/politic/afghanistan.htm> of
> Afghanistan
> Afghanistan Online <http://www.afghan-web.com/>
> Washington
> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/worldref/
> country/af
> ghanis.htm> Post: World Reference -- Afghanistan
> University  <http://menic.utexas.edu/menic/countries/afghan.html> of
> Texas at Austin: Afghanistan Information
> Afghanistan -  <http://www.afghana.com/Map/MapRoadsAirports.htm> Roads
> and Airports Map
> ReliefWeb
> <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/map.nsf/wByELatest/EE2A2260B1AE4CD
> E85256ACC0
> 0664300?Opendocument> - Map of Afghanistan's Provinces
> Afghanistan  <http://frankenstein.worldweb.net/afghan/> Today
> Afghan  <http://www.afghan-network.net/> Network
>
>   _____
>
> If you liked this Country Analysis Brief or any of our many other
> Country Analysis Briefs, you can be automatically notified
> via e-mail of
> updates. Simply click here
> <http://www.eia.doe.gov/listserv_signup.html>
> , select "international" and the specific list you desire, and then
> follow the instructions. You will then be notified within an
> hour of any
> updates to our Country Analysis Briefs.
>
> Return to  <file:///C|/L|/PRJ/CABSLAN/contents.html> Country Analysis
> Briefs home page
>
> File last modified: September 24, 2001
>
>  Contact:
>
> Lowell Feld
> [log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> Phone: (202) 586-9502
> Fax: (202) 586-9753
>
>
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>
> If you are having technical problems with this site, please
> contact the
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>
>  Testimony of John Maresca, Vice Pres. Unocal:
>
>
>
>
>
> TESTIMONY
>
> BY
>
> JOHN J. MARESCA
>
> VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
>
> UNOCAL CORPORATION
>
> TO
>
> HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
>
> SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
>
> FEBRUARY 12, 1998
>
> WASHINGTON, D.C.
>
> Mr. Chairman, I am John Maresca, Vice President, International
> Relations, of Unocal Corporation. Unocal is one of the world's leading
> energy resource and project development companies. Our activities are
> focused on three major regions -- Asia, Latin America and the
> U.S. Gulf
> of Mexico. In Asia and the U.S. Gulf of Mexico, we are a major oil and
> gas producer. I appreciate your invitation to speak here today. I
> believe these hearings are important and timely, and I
> congratulate you
> for focusing on Central Asia oil and gas reserves and the
> role they play
> in shaping U.S. policy.
>
> Today we would like to focus on three issues concerning this
> region, its
> resources and U.S. policy:
>
> The need for multiple pipeline routes for Central Asian oil and gas.
>
> The need for U.S. support for international and regional efforts to
> achieve balanced and lasting political settlements within
> Russia, other
> newly independent states and in Afghanistan.
>
> The need for structured assistance to encourage economic
> reforms and the
> development of appropriate investment climates in the region. In this
> regard, we specifically support repeal or removal of Section
> 907 of the
> Freedom Support Act.
>
> For more than 2,000 years, Central Asia has been a meeting ground
> between Europe and Asia, the site of ancient east-west trade routes
> collectively called the Silk Road and, at various points in history, a
> cradle of scholarship, culture and power. It is also a region of truly
> enormous natural resources, which are revitalizing cross-border trade,
> creating positive political interaction and stimulating regional
> cooperation. These resources have the potential to recharge the
> economies of neighboring countries and put entire regions on
> the road to
> prosperity.
>
> About 100 years ago, the international oil industry was born in the
> Caspian/Central Asian region with the discovery of oil. In the
> intervening years, under Soviet rule, the existence
>
> of the region's oil and gas resources was generally known, but only
> partially or poorly developed.
>
> As we near the end of the 20th century, history brings us full circle.
> With political barriers falling, Central Asia and the Caspian are once
> again attracting people from around the globe who are seeking ways to
> develop and deliver its bountiful energy resources to the
> markets of the
> world.
>
> The Caspian region contains tremendous untapped hydrocarbon reserves,
> much of them located in the Caspian Sea basin itself. Proven
> natural gas
> reserves within Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan
> equal more than 236 trillion cubic feet. The region's total
> oil reserves
> may reach more than 60 billion barrels of oil -- enough to service
> Europe's oil needs for 11 years. Some estimates are as high as 200
> billion barrels. In 1995, the region was producing only
> 870,000 barrels
> per day (44 million tons per year [Mt/y]).
>
> By 2010, Western companies could increase production to about 4.5
> million barrels a day (Mb/d) -- an increase of more than 500
> percent in
> only 15 years. If this occurs, the region would represent about five
> percent of the world's total oil production, and almost 20 percent of
> oil produced among non-OPEC countries.
>
> One major problem has yet to be resolved: how to get the region's vast
> energy resources to the markets where they are needed. There
> are few, if
> any, other areas of the world where there can be such a dramatic
> increase in the supply of oil and gas to the world market.
> The solution
> seems simple: build a "new" Silk Road. Implementing this solution,
> however, is far from simple. The risks are high, but so are
> the rewards.
>
> Finding and Building Routes to World Markets
>
> One of the main problems is that Central Asia is isolated.
> The region is
> bounded on the north by the Arctic Circle, on the east and
> west by vast
> land distances, and on the south by a series of natural obstacles --
> mountains and seas -- as well as political obstacles, such as conflict
> zones or sanctioned countries.
>
> This means that the area's natural resources are landlocked, both
> geographically and politically. Each of the countries in the Caucasus
> and Central Asia faces difficult political challenges. Some have
> unsettled wars or latent conflicts. Others have evolving systems where
> the laws -- and even the courts -- are dynamic and changing. Business
> commitments can be rescinded without warning, or they can be displaced
> by new geopolitical realities.
>
> In addition, a chief technical obstacle we face in transporting oil is
> the region's existing pipeline infrastructure. Because the region's
> pipelines were constructed during the Moscow-centered Soviet period,
> they tend to head north and west toward Russia. There are no
> connections
> to the south and east.
>
> Depending wholly on this infrastructure to export Central Asia oil is
> not practical. Russia currently is unlikely to absorb large new
> quantities of "foreign" oil, is unlikely to be a significant
> market for
> energy in the next decade, and lacks the capacity to deliver
> it to other
> markets.
>
> Certainly there is no easy way out of Central Asia. If there are to be
> other routes, in other directions, they must be built.
>
> Two major energy infrastructure projects are seeking to meet this
> challenge. One, under the aegis of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, or
> CPC, plans to build a pipeline west from the Northern Caspian to the
> Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk. From Novorossisk, oil from this
> line would be transported by tanker through the Bosphorus to the
> Mediterranean and world markets.
>
> The other project is sponsored by the Azerbaijan
> International Operating
> Company (AIOC), a consortium of 11 foreign oil companies
> including four
> American companies -- Unocal, Amoco, Exxon and Pennzoil. It
> will follow
> one or both of two routes west from Baku. One line will angle
> north and
> cross the North Caucasus to Novorossisk. The other route would cross
> Georgia and extend to a shipping terminal on the Black Sea port of
> Supsa. This second route may be extended west and south
> across Turkey to
> the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
>
> But even if both pipelines were built, they would not have
> enough total
> capacity to transport all the oil expected to flow from the region in
> the future; nor would they have the capability to move it to the right
> markets. Other export pipelines must be built.
>
> Unocal believes that the central factor in planning these pipelines
> should be the location of the future energy markets that are
> most likely
> to need these new supplies. Just as Central Asia was the
> meeting ground
> between Europe and Asia in centuries past, it is again in a unique
> position to potentially service markets in both of these regions -- if
> export routes to these markets can be built. Let's take a look at some
> of the potential markets.
>
> Western Europe
>
> Western Europe is a tough market. It is characterized by high
> prices for
> oil products, an aging population, and increasing competition from
> natural gas. Between 1995 and 2010, we estimate that demand
> for oil will
> increase from 14.1 Mb/d (705 Mt/y) to 15.0 Mb/d (750 Mt/y), an average
> growth rate of only 0.5 percent annually. Furthermore, the region is
> already amply supplied from fields in the Middle East, North Sea,
> Scandinavia and Russia. Although there is perhaps room for some of
> Central Asia's oil, the Western European market is unlikely to be able
> to absorb all of the production from the Caspian region.
>
> Central and Eastern Europe
>
> Central and Eastern Europe markets do not look any better. Although
> there is increased demand for oil in the region's transport sector,
> natural gas is gaining strength as a competitor. Between 1995
> and 2010,
> demand for oil is expected to increase by only half a million barrels
> per day, from 1.3 Mb/d (67 Mt/y) to 1.8 Mb/d (91.5 Mt/y). Like Western
> Europe, this market is also very competitive. In addition to
> supplies of
> oil from the North Sea, Africa and the Middle East, Russia
> supplies the
> majority of the oil to this region.
>
> The Domestic NIS Market
>
> The growth in demand for oil also will be weak in the Newly
> Independent
> States (NIS). We expect Russian and other NIS markets to
> increase demand
> by only 1.2 percent annually between 1997 and 2010.
>
> Asia/Pacific
>
> In stark contrast to the other three markets, the Asia/Pacific region
> has a rapidly increasing demand for oil and an expected significant
> increase in population. Prior to the recent turbulence in the various
> Asian/Pacific economies, we anticipated that this region's demand for
> oil would almost double by 2010. Although the short-term increase in
> demand will probably not meet these expectations, Unocal stands behind
> its long-term estimates.
>
> Energy demand growth will remain strong for one key reason:
> the region's
> population is expected to grow by 700 million people by 2010.
>
> It is in everyone's interests that there be adequate supplies
> for Asia's
> increasing energy requirements. If Asia's energy needs are not
> satisfied, they will simply put pressure on all world markets, driving
> prices upwards everywhere.
>
> The key question is how the energy resources of Central Asia
> can be made
> available to satisfy the energy needs of nearby Asian
> markets. There are
> two possible solutions -- with several variations.
>
> Export Routes
>
> East to China: Prohibitively Long?
>
> One option is to go east across China. But this would mean
> constructing
> a pipeline of more than 3,000 kilometers to central China --
> as well as
> a 2,000-kilometer connection to reach the main population
> centers along
> the coast. Even with these formidable challenges, China National
> Petroleum Corporation is considering building a pipeline east from
> Kazakhstan to Chinese markets.
>
> Unocal had a team in Beijing just last week for consultations with the
> Chinese. Given China's long-range outlook and its ability to
> concentrate
> resources to meet its own needs, China is almost certain to
> build such a
> line. The question is what will the costs of transporting oil through
> this pipeline be and what netback will the producers receive.
>
> South to the Indian Ocean: A Shorter Distance to Growing Markets
>
> A second option is to build a pipeline south from Central Asia to the
> Indian Ocean.
>
> One obvious potential route south would be across Iran. However, this
> option is foreclosed for American companies because of U.S. sanctions
> legislation. The only other possible route option is across
> Afghanistan,
> which has its own unique challenges.
>
> The country has been involved in bitter warfare for almost
> two decades.
> The territory across which the pipeline would extend is controlled by
> the Taliban, an Islamic movement that is not recognized as a
> government
> by most other nations. From the outset, we have made it clear that
> construction of our proposed pipeline cannot begin until a recognized
> government is in place that has the confidence of governments, lenders
> and our company.
>
> In spite of this, a route through Afghanistan appears to be the best
> option with the fewest technical obstacles. It is the
> shortest route to
> the sea and has relatively favorable terrain for a pipeline. The route
> through Afghanistan is the one that would bring Central Asian oil
> closest to Asian markets and thus would be the cheapest in terms of
> transporting the oil.
>
> Unocal envisions the creation of a Central Asian Oil Pipeline
> Consortium. The pipeline would become an integral part of a
> regional oil
> pipeline system that will utilize and gather oil from
> existing pipeline
> infrastructure in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia.
>
> The 1,040-mile-long oil pipeline would begin near the town of
> Chardzhou,
> in northern Turkmenistan, and extend southeasterly through Afghanistan
> to an export terminal that would be constructed on the
> Pakistan coast on
> the Arabian Sea. Only about 440 miles of the pipeline would be in
> Afghanistan.
>
> This 42-inch-diameter pipeline will have a shipping capacity of one
> million barrels of oil per day. Estimated cost of the project -- which
> is similar in scope to the Trans Alaska Pipeline -- is about US$2.5
> billion.
>
> There is considerable international and regional political interest in
> this pipeline. Asian crude oil importers, particularly from Japan, are
> looking to Central Asia and the Caspian as a new strategic source of
> supply to satisfy their desire for resource diversity. The pipeline
> benefits Central Asian countries because it would allow them to sell
> their oil in expanding and highly prospective hard currency
> markets. The
> pipeline would benefit Afghanistan, which would receive revenues from
> transport tariffs, and would promote stability and encourage trade and
> economic development. Although Unocal has not negotiated with any one
> group, and does not favor any group, we have had contacts with and
> briefings for all of them. We know that the different factions in
> Afghanistan understand the importance of the pipeline project
> for their
> country, and have expressed their support of it.
>
> A recent study for the World Bank states that the proposed
> pipeline from
> Central Asia across Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea would
> provide more favorable netbacks to oil producers through access to
> higher value markets than those currently being accessed through the
> traditional Baltic and Black Sea export routes.
>
> This is evidenced by the netback values producers will receive as
> determined by the World Bank study. For West Siberian crude,
> the netback
> value will increase by nearly $2.00 per barrel by going south to Asia.
> For a producer in western Kazakhstan, the netback value will
> increase by
> more than $1 per barrel by going south to Asia as compared to west to
> the Mediterranean via the Black Sea.
>
> Natural Gas Export
>
> Given the plentiful natural gas supplies of Central Asia, our
> aim is to
> link a specific natural resource with the nearest viable
> market. This is
> basic for the commercial viability of any gas project. As with all
> projects being considered in this region, the following projects face
> geo-political challenges, as well as market issues.
>
> Unocal and the Turkish company, Koc Holding A.S., are interested in
> bringing competitive gas supplies to the Turkey market. The proposed
> Eurasia Natural Gas Pipeline would transport gas from Turkmenistan
> directly across the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan and Georgia to
> Turkey. Sixty percent of this proposed gas pipeline would follow the
> same route as the oil pipeline proposed to run from Baku to Ceyhan. Of
> course, the demarcation of the Caspian remains an issue.
>
> Last October, the Central Asia Pipeline, Ltd. (CentGas) consortium, in
> which Unocal holds an interest, was formed to develop a gas pipeline
> that will link Turkmenistan's vast natural gas reserves in the
> Dauletabad Field with markets in Pakistan and possibly India. An
> independent evaluation shows that the field's resources are
> adequate for
> the project's needs, assuming production rates rising over time to 2
> billion cubic feet of gas per day for 30 years or more.
>
> In production since 1983, the Dauletabad Field's natural gas has been
> delivered north via Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Russia to
> markets in the
> Caspian and Black Sea areas. The proposed 790-mile pipeline
> will open up
> new markets for this gas, travelling from Turkmenistan through
> Afghanistan to Multan, Pakistan. A proposed extension would link with
> the existing Sui pipeline system, moving gas to near New
> Delhi, where it
> would connect with the existing HBJ pipeline. By serving these
> additional volumes, the extension would enhance the economics of the
> project, leading to overall reductions in delivered natural gas costs
> for all users and better margins. As currently planned, the CentGas
> pipeline would cost approximately $2 billion. A 400-mile
> extension into
> India could add $600 million to the overall project cost.
>
> As with the proposed Central Asia Oil Pipeline, CentGas cannot begin
> construction until an internationally recognized Afghanistan
> government
> is in place. For the project to advance, it must have international
> financing, government-to-government agreements and
> government-to-consortium agreements.
>
> Conclusion
>
> The Central Asia and Caspian region is blessed with abundant
> oil and gas
> that can enhance the lives of the region's residents and
> provide energy
> for growth for Europe and Asia.
>
> The impact of these resources on U.S. commercial interests and U.S.
> foreign policy is also significant and intertwined. Without peaceful
> settlement of conflicts within the region, cross-border oil and gas
> pipelines are not likely to be built. We urge the
> Administration and the
> Congress to give strong support to the United Nations-led
> peace process
> in Afghanistan.
>
> U.S. assistance in developing these new economies will be crucial to
> business' success. We encourage strong technical assistance programs
> throughout the region. We also urge repeal or removal of
> Section 907 of
> the Freedom Support Act. This section unfairly restricts U.S.
> government
> assistance to the government of Azerbaijan and limits U.S.
> influence in
> the region.
>
> Developing cost-effective, profitable and efficient export routes for
> Central Asia resources is a formidable, but not impossible,
> task. It has
> been accomplished before. A commercial corridor, a "new" Silk
> Road, can
> link the Central Asia supply with the demand -- once again making
> Central Asia the crossroads between Europe and Asia.
>
> Thank you.
>
>
>
> Is Oil the Real Target in Afghanistan?
> http://www.iacenter.org/nowar_oil.htm
>
> Why are the Bush Administration and the Pentagon so intent on invading
> Afghanistan?  .   If Bush has the "evidence" he claims, why not bring
> Bin Laden before the World Court?  Are they really just interested in
> bringing down the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden?  After all, it was the
> U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, along with Pakistan's intelligence
> forces who helped establish the Taliban as a base of power in
> Afghanistan in the first place  As recently as May 2001,
> George W. Bush
> sent the Taliban $43 million  allegedly to aid in the fight against
> drugs in northern Afghanistan, the  one part of the country controlled
> by opposition forces.  Now Congress is  allocating billions
> more dollars
> for "America's new war".  There's not  much new about it, however.
>
>  U.S. bombs and missiles have killed hundreds of thousands of
> civilians
> in  Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, Somalia and Afghanistan
> in the past
> two  decades alone.  More often than not the aim has been to
> secure U.S.
> control over the oil rich resources of the Middle East and southern
> Asia,  and this latest war drive, with the pretext of revenge for
> September 11,  may be no different.
>
>  Ever since the fall of the former Soviet Union ten years ago, Exxon,
> Mobil, Chevron and the other big oil monopolies have been scheming to
> get  their hands on the vast oil and gas wealth around the
> Caspian Sea,
> just  north of Afghanistan.  This region's oil reserves may reach more
> than 60  billion barrels - enough to service Europe's oil needs for 11
> years.   Some estimates are as high as 200 billion barrels.
> The Caspian
> Sea  reserves are 10 percent of the world's known supply - worth about
> $5  trillion at today's prices.
>
>  In February 1998, Unocal Corporation testified to the House Committee
> on  Internal Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific that the
> "Taliban  government in Afghanistan is an obstacle" to having an oil
> pipeline from  the Caspian region to the Indian Ocean - that
> is, through
> Afghanistan.   In 1997, Unocal even tried to woo the Taliban with
> billions of dollars to  support the proposed pipeline through their
> country. The unrecognized  Taliban government, however, was a set back
> to their plans.
>
>  Having a government in Afghanistan that is beholden to U.S.
> interests,
> along with stationing U.S. troops in the former Soviet Republics of
> Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, would secure the region and
> allow this project to proceed.  And just in time, as far as
> the U.S. oil
> companies are concerned, because there is international
> competition for
> the Caspian Sea oil resources.
>
>  Russia and German companies had been trying to establish a pipeline
> from  the Caspian Sea through Eastern Europe, but U.S. bombing of
> Yugoslavia  blocked this plan.  Russia, however, also
> brokered a treaty
> with Iran for  a pipeline route.  China also began
> negotiating to build
> oil and gas  pipelines from Kazakhstan.  In January 2001, oil industry
> journals  lamented that any chance the U.S. had of cementing alliances
> in the  region seemed doomed.  They noted, however, that the incoming
> Bush  administration, heavy in oil and related interests, would likely
> try to  reverse this trend (www.caucasuswatch.com).
>
>  The U.S. has it's own oil reserves, and does not need to rely on oil
> from  abroad.   However, Europe, Japan and Asia are dependent on oil
> from the  Middle East (oil that is controlled by U.S. and British
> companies) and  they are eager for alternative and cheaper
> sources.  The
> continuous U.S.  bombing of Iraq has kept oil prices high
> enough to make
> construction of a  U.S.-owned pipeline seem possible.  The
> profits to be
> made from  controlling the flow of oil are the issue at stake in
> "America's new  war".
>
>  Issued by Philadelphia International Action Center, 813 S. 48th St.,
> Philadelphia, PA 19143, 215-724-1618,  <mailto:[log in to unmask]>
> [log in to unmask]
>
> posted 10/14/01
>
>
>
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