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From: David Johnson <[log in to unmask]>
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Subject: 5312-Interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin by various U.S.
journalists


Johnson's Russia List
#5312
20 June 2001
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Interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin by various U.S. journalists
on 18 June in Moscow: "Vladimir Putin: 'The Special Services Are Doing Very
Little To Neutralize Real Threats. Full Text of Russian Federation President
V.V. Putin's Conversation With Leading U.S. Media's Bureau Chiefs"
Moscow Strana.ru
National Information Service WWW
Text in Russian 19 Jun 01
[translation for personal use only]

V. Putin:  Good evening, Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen!
   The meeting in Ljubljana has only just ended quite recently, you know,
In principle both President Bush and I have provided a detailed account of
our talks.  But if there is interest in this topic and there are any
additional questions I will be pleased to answer them.  And, furthermore,
any other questions, if you have any.
   To begin with I must say that we did, of course, count on a positive
result from this meeting.  And from the very outset we planned this meeting
to ensure that the result was achieved.  I must say to you that from the
first moment of our meeting I had the impression that President Bush was of
the same mind.
   We also planned the walk down the alleyways that you saw there.  It was
planned that it would take far longer, it was also planned that the talks on
a broader format would take longer.  But our conversation on our own
progressed in such a way that I personally was sorry to waste time on
protocol.  I told the President fairly rapidly that I was delighted that we
were being given an opportunity (by "we" I mean the Russian side) to start
our relationship "with a clean slate," as it were, needless to say,
retaining now and in the future all the positive elements that we have built
up in the past.
   I was told that the President cannot listen for long, that he prefers
talking himself, and within five minutes he gets irritable, and waits for
the person with whom he is talking to finish.  But it all turned out
differently in actual fact.  The President proved to be a very attentive and
very interested listener.  He reacts fairly dynamically to everything that
he is told.  He listens  with a critical ear and voices his own standpoint
in very frank terms.  A very trusting relationship developed immediately.
   I must say that I think from the very outset that I had a definite plan
for our conversation just as he did.  I suggested starting a discussion on
specific issues, on those issues that provoke the greatest concern in the
world, in relations between the two sides, and give rise to a certain
atmosphere, to be specific, problems of antimissile defense.  He listened
carefully and then said:  "Listen, let us talk on the whole about how
relations have developed between the two countries over the past few years,
the state that we are in now, and where we are now, and let us look to the
future."
   This was what I meant when I said at the news conference that the
President, as a historian, suggested talking about a wide range of issues
and taking a broad look at the problems of Russian-U.S. relations.
   I must say that in this respect he definitely took the initiative and
changed the nature of the conversation but I was very pleased with this
formulation of the question.  I think that we did not utter just formalities
at the news conference.  A situation has indeed arisen that can be
characterized by a fairly high level of trust.
   I must say on the whole that the President is pleasant to talk to, a
pleasant man.  We are aware of the debates that took place in the course of
the U.S. election campaign and how tricky this all was to resolve  Let us
hope that this will develop positively.
   I am ready to answer your questions.

   Jill Dougherty (CNN):  On behalf of our correspondents let me thank you
very much for the opportunity to speak to you.
   Here is my first question.  Before the summit, Vladimir Vladimirovich,
you said that you wanted to find out as much as possible about Mr. Bush's
new antimissile system.  You succeeded in doing so.  Do you have a good idea
of the essence and scale of this program?  Is this sufficient for Russia to
decide to review its stance on antimissile defense, say?

   V. Putin:  The President's point of departure is bound to provoke a
positive reaction.  The President says that Russia and the United States are
not enemies today, what is more, they could become allies, as he said in
Warsaw.  It is from this angle that we must look at the whole package of
past accords.  We have nothing against that.
   Our partners in the States have said and are continuing to say now that
we must think about the threats that we are all facing and that will arise
in the future in connection with the development of missile technologies.
   People in our country also take different views of this idea but I
personally share this view.  We need to think about this.  And I think that
the President is right here:  We need to think about how arms are developing
in a particularly dangerous area -- the area of missiles.  And, needless to
say, we must look at what happens in this sphere in 10, 15, or 20 years
time.
   Is there anything new in our relationship on this matter following my
meeting with President Bush?  I think that there is.  We agreed that our
specialists would single out and speak specifically about matters of a
purely technical nature:  What we mean by the term "threat" and what is
preventing us jointly or individually, if that is our partners' wish,
countering these threats?  What specifically, which elements of the ABM
Treaty prevent us overcoming the threats that we still need jointly to
identify?  It is on this point that we do not as yet espouse the same
position.
   When we talk about the 1972 ABM Treaty and its possible modification or,
as you heard earlier, the United States' unilateral withdrawal from this
treaty, it is in any case a question of combating missile threats.  But that
is not the only threat.
   To use the language of the professionals, what is the aim?  The aim is
not to dispatch a missile, the aim is to deliver a weapon of mass
destruction.  In this case -- nuclear weapons -- to the territory of a
potential enemy.  But this can be done with other things besides missiles,
in any case not only using ballistic missiles, which are the subject of the
1972 treaty.
   Then suppose we understand the idea of the threat posed by the so-called
"rogue states."  You know what the so-called "rogues" have in their arsenal.
This is not our terminology, this is American terminology.  If anyone does
not know, let me tell you:  It is Soviet Scud missiles.  What are Soviet
Scud missiles?  Strictly speaking, they are modernized German V-1's and
V-2's; these are the missiles with which Germany bombarded London during
World War II.  North Korea has made the most progress in modernizing these
missiles.  But there is a limit to this modernization and it has already
been reached.  You can increase the [fuel] tanks and the number of tanks
but, let me reiterate, the limit of the modernization has been reached.
   Developing missiles of a different generation is a completely different
story.  It is possible to steal a component but developing a serious modern
missile-attack system is a task of a completely different order.  It
requires new, absolutely new, materials.  It requires completely new fuel,
new-generation fuel.  It requires a developed, very costly system of test
sites.  It requires a very large range of components for the whole program.
To summarize all this it can be said to require a completely different
economy and a completely different level of scientific and technical
development in the country that is aspiring to develop these technologies.
It requires that the rate of economic growth be guaranteed.  That will take
decades.
   Now let us look at the situation with which we are currently familiar in
the sphere of antimissile defense.  According to preliminary estimates, the
program itself will require $50-60 billion.  What is that?  What must we
achieve?
   Do you know what speed a ballistic missile flies at?  Some 7-7.5 km per
second.  In order to down it an antimissile has to fly at the same speed,
that is 15 km per second combined speed.  It is the same as a bullet hitting
a bullet.  Is this possible today or not?  The specialists say that it is
not possible today.  Practical tests show that is true:  It is impossible.
But what if it is not just a single bullet?  What if there are 10, 20, or
1,000 of them?  Or 2,000 or 3,000-5,000?  That is the potential of Russian
and U.S. nuclear arms.  Then we have to ponder what we need to do to prevent
threats.  Let me repeat that it is still necessary to define what the
threats consist of.
   Then we are told that "rogue states" pose the main threat.  But we know
that this February, for instance, the new U.S. Globus-2 tracking station
began operating on an island in northern Norway.  The Globus-1 station,
which records missile launches was situated there; now there is another
station there that records not only the launch but also tracks the
trajectory.  What do "rogues" have to do with this?
   On the whole these are all matters that require further attentive study
by experts and a very high degree of trust.  I think that we are developing
the last component, the component of trust.  And I think that this is the
most important thing that we have achieved as a result of the meeting with
President Bush.
   Is that enough on the first question?

   D. Lewis (NBC):  Condoleezza Rice said on Sunday [17 June] that the
antimissile defense system does not prevent war and that with or without
Russia the United States will deploy its own system.  Do you not consider
this to be a hardening of position compared with what you discussed with
President Bush?

   V. Putin:  I spoke to President Bush and not to Condoleezza Rice although
she was present at the time.  We agreed that our specialists at all levels
would work in contact with one another.  Mr. Rushaylo, Russia's Security
Council secretary, is Mrs. Rice's contact.  I think that they may create the
conditions for positive dialogue with one another.
   If she said that the treaty does not prevent war, I do not know which of
them -- Rushaylo or Rice -- is planning a war or when it is scheduled to
start.  Strictly speaking we need to talk about this matter separately
somehow.  It is necessary to find out what is going on.
   But we have also noticed other statements by leading administration
officials.  The secretary of state, for instance, said the following.  As
you know, he is a military man and can be said to be an expert.  He said:
"The United States is not aiming to wreck the 1972 ABM Treaty, however, it
does firmly intend to pursue the policy of creating an effective but at  the
same time limited antimissile defense system,."  We have drawn attention to
this statement of Powell's.  I think that it is a very serious statement.
The United States is not aiming to wreck the ABM Treaty.  That is a very
important signal for us.
   We also believe that antimissile defense must be effective.  Mr. Powell
said:  "at the same time limited."  It is necessary to grasp what this
means.  This is a subject for discussion and talks.  This is a serious
statement.  Are you satisfied?

   D. Lewis.  Yes, thank you.

   E. Palmer (CBS):  During your meeting in Ljubljana President Bush said
that he intended to send ranking representatives of his administration to
Moscow to discuss concrete matters.  In your opinion, what are the most
important subjects on which you would like to achieve the most coordination
and the most progress in your relations in the very near future?

   V. Putin:  Strictly speaking, I have already spoken about this.  There is
nothing for me to add.  When we spoke about this, when I spoke to the
president about this, I think that he was referring to the discussion of
problems associated with strategic stability and the ABM Treaty.
   We agreed (this was my suggestion) that our specialists should look not
only at where threats exist but also at what specifically in the 1972 Treaty
is stopping us preventing these threats today.
   There are quite specific matters that specialists need to determine.  It
is a question of the speed of these missiles, this gives rise to the concept
of a "strategic" or "tactical antimissile defense system," and so on and so
forth.
   The 1972 ABM Treaty itself enshrines a mechanism for its modification.
And it has already been modified but we must realize what specifically it is
a question of today.  Then we spoke about this repeatedly, and I said this
at the news conference in Ljubljana:  Other accords, including [those
relating to] problems of nonproliferation, are coupled to this treaty.
There is no direct linkage in the Treaty but nonproliferation accords are
nonetheless connected with the 1972 ABM Treaty.  And if we abandon it
entirely, it is far easier for the threshold states to declare themselves to
be nuclear powers.  Will the world be safer as a result?  I doubt it.  We
need to look at the problem from this angle.
   That is why we say that we share the concerns of our American partners
but we believe that these concerns should be resolved by joint efforts
otherwise some third force may creep in amidst our conflicts and then we
will not know what to do about it.
   When we hear (and I am coming back to your question) that some programs
will be implemented with or without us, we cannot oppose that.  Please do go
ahead without us.  We cannot force you to cooperate with us -- and we are
not setting ourselves that task.  We are proposing to cooperate, we are
proposing joint work.  But if it is not necessary, by all means we are
prepared to act independently.  But what will be the result?  Since the
treaties on strategic offensive arms reduction -- START-I and START-II --
are linked with this treaty, for instance,  and they enshrine the mechanism
for verification and monitoring in the nuclear missile sphere.
   Suppose we are talking about reductions in strategic offensive arms, for
instance.  Imagine our abandoning or dumping the 1972 ABM Treaty.  This
means that we are automatically dropping START-I and START-II from
international relations.
   If that is true, we will be unable to monitor one another and see how
many missiles we have decommissioned.  And, when we have unscrewed a
warhead, see whether we have placed it nearby or destroyed it.  This
so-called "breakout potential" for Russia and the United States may be so
great that issues of nuclear arms control will cease to exist.  There will
be no control,  What we unscrew today, we can install tomorrow.  Who can
monitor this if we omit this element of control, if we ditch the START-I and
START-II Treaties?  And this will be inevitable if we abandon the 1972 ABM
Treaty.  This is all bound up together with this problem and this treaty.
   We are not forcing our way in, we are not trying to intimidate or
blackmail anyone.  We are offering cooperation.  If that is acceptable, we
will do this with pleasure.  If not, then we will act independently.  I do
not think that the States and Russia or all mankind will gain as a result.
I think not.
   But it seemed to me that President Bush was in the mood for this
cooperation, that he wanted dialogue, and that this was what he was striving
for.  I would like to confirm this once again and say it once again:  For me
personally, for the whole Russian delegation this was very important.  And I
think that this is the most important thing.

   P. Tyler (New York Times):  Mr. President, you spoke about threats and
said that you are prepared to examine these threats together and combat them
together.  If that happens, will it not also be the case that China, which
objects to the creation of any type of missile defense system, will feel in
greater danger and will show its displeasure?  That is the first question.
That is, do you not think Russia's relations with China will change in a
negative direction?
   And a second question, with your permission:  I would like to turn to
Iran.  You are carrying out joint projects with Iran and helping Iran to
build a nuclear power station.  Sergey Ivanov said at one time that the
United States is also supplying nuclear reactors to North Korea.  But I
would like to point out that the United States stipulates that North Korea
is renouncing its military nuclear program.
   Could you not make your cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere
conditional on approximately similar terms?

   Rejoinder [speaker not identified]:  Could you answer in English?

   V. Putin:  No.  I still find it rather difficult.  I tried to talk with
the President in English a bit, I said a few words.  He pretended to
understand me.  I am very grateful to him.  But in order to be more
precisely understood I will still give my answer in my native tongue.
   As for China's attitude to these problems:  That question should be
addressed to Jiang Zemin.  The way you formulated the question was that
China takes a negative view of any missile defense system at all.  I do not
know about that.  But the 1972 ABM Treaty already makes provision for a
defined missile defense system.  Missile defense of two regions, it
stipulates.  The United States chose the region where its ground-based
missile launchers are stationed, Russia chose Moscow.
   As far as I know China does not object to what is prescribed in that
Treaty, so it cannot be said that it is opposed to any missile defense at
all.  As far as I understand our Chinese colleagues, they are opposed to the
dismantling of that Treaty.
   I should say that I talked with Chairman Jiang Zemin on the telephone
today.  I told him I had passed on the signal that he sent to President Bush
via me, and I should say that the President reacted very positively to my
statement that China believes that the aircraft incident should be
considered over.  The President also reacted fairly positively and calmly
and said it should be forgotten.  And today, talking with me, Chairman Jiang
Zemin said that he is expecting the President in Shanghai this fall and is
very pleased that he has agreed to discuss problems of US-Chinese relations
separately within the framework of the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation] summit, and China is preparing for that.
   But what I notice about your question, and I think it is, in fact,
formulated very much along the right lines [sentence as published].  Of
course we must measure all our actions in this sphere and watch to see how
the other nuclear powers will react.  In this sense the transparency of our
actions is very important, so that none of the nuclear powers feels
slighted, so that they do not feel some kind of collusion is taking place
behind their backs, or else the result could be the opposite of
expectations.  We will not improve international security, we will only make
the world more vulnerable.
   Do you know how many ballistic missiles China has?

   P. Tyler:  Eighteen.

   V. Putin:  Are you also familiar with its economic potential?  So here it
is necessary to act very cautiously.  I repeat, nobody must feel slighted.
Here we must act according to the principle "do no harm."
   Our American friends are talking about future threats, about averting
future threats.  So, we all admit that today a certain balance exists and as
a minimum we must not violate it today, must not provoke anyone into an arms
race.  And of course all our actions should be within certain bounds.
Therefore the "nuclear club" and each state in the "nuclear club" should, of
course, be au fait with the current events and with the talks with our
American partners.  But at the same time all countries naturally think about
their own security.

   P. Tyler:  Is it Russia's intention to form a united position with China
on this question?

   V. Putin:  It is our intention to preserve this balance of security that
has now been created in the world as a whole, and in this sense China is a
significant component.  But not only China, the other nuclear states too.
We all know about France's position, for instance.  I do not think we hare
the right to disregard France's opinion on this matter.  The other nuclear
states are also very carefully watching what is happening in this sphere.
   I repeat, I have nothing to add here:  Our actions must not generate
fears that someone will be left out, that someone will be deceived, must not
create a situation that will prompt an arms race.  That is very dangerous.
That is why we say that a balance has been created.  Suppose there are some
threats that we should think about together -- let us think about them
together.  Because while preserving this balance we should improve the
quality of security.  We should all be together, not violate that balance.
It is in this context that our contacts with China should be viewed.
   As for Iran:  Our relations with Iran are complex.  It is our neighbor,
our history of interstate relations dates back many centuries.  Iran is in
my view undergoing a process of renewal and gradual entry into the world
community and the results of the recent elections confirm that.  I met with
President Khatami here in Moscow.  He is a very modern person, a very strong
and very worthy partner.  I think he intends to develop the country in the
direction of Iran's entry into the international community.  We understand
the US concern and Israeli concern.  We take account of this in our
relations with Iran.
   When they tell us that we are apparently working toward the rearming of
Iran, here it is necessary to clarify the terms.  We believe that the
political theses that are sometimes used to squeeze Russia out of arms
markets, including the Iranian arms market, are simply an instrument of
unscrupulous competition.  Therefore we have cooperated with Iran, we have
certain commitments in the military-technical cooperation sphere, and we
will fulfill them.
   But there is a sphere that causes particular concern to the United States
and the President told me about it at the Ljubljana meeting.  It is, of
course, weapons of mass destruction:  nuclear weapons and missile
technologies.
   I should tell you -- and I told the President this -- in the plans for
Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran there are no such programs
and none are planned.  And Russia's position on this is known to the Iranian
leadership.  Russia has taken on certain commitments on nonproliferation and
will fulfill those commitments.  Furthermore this is in accordance with our
national interests.  If you check with the experts what missile weapons Iran
has and what their range is, you will realize that I am not exaggerating
here.
   As for defensive arms, that is a separate topic and I do not think it
should cause anyone any concern.
   As for the other aspects, I can tell you it is, in fact, no secret that
European countries are actively developing their relations with Iran.
Germany supplied credit via Hermes -- 2 billion marks.  US business circles
are in contact with Iranian officials.  If that is a secret to anyone, it is
not a secret from us.  We know who is meeting, where, and when.  I mentioned
the names to President Bush.

   P. Tyler:  So you mean Americans are doing business with Iran?

   V. Putin:  They are preparing to.  They are preparing to start broad
cooperation, and they are right to do so.  But as to why we should be left
behind, that is a mystery.
   You mentioned the US construction of a nuclear power station in North
Korea.  You were right to mention that.  That is precisely the kind of
nuclear power station that we are helping to build in Iran.  Nothing special
is happening here.  The experts will tell you that this has absolutely
nothing to do with the potential for the production of nuclear weapons.  You
say that the United States made the construction of the nuclear power
station in North Korea conditional on the nonproduction of nuclear weapons
in that country.  That means you consider that effective.  So why is North
Korea presented to us as a "rogue state" that constitutes a danger?
   I am telling you that even for considerations of our own security we do
not intend to sell nuclear technologies to other countries, including Iran.
Of course we can imagine that somebody -- by underground means, in
circumvention of our laws and the official state policy -- some people may
try to sell something in order to make money.  We will do everything to stop
this.  But that applies not only to Russia, it applies to any other country.
   You are familiar with the legislation that exists in the United States
about training specialists and students.  A student arrives from Iran,
enrolls on one program at some college or university, and then nobody has
the right to ban him from switching to a different study program.  Look at
those teams of specialists themselves, look at what is happening in that
sphere, and you will find you have concerns over the training of specialists
for Iran within the United States.  Look into it!
   I think in this regard we should stop engaging in useless accusations
against each other, we should work together in order effectively to counter
the proliferation of nuclear arms and missile technologies.  For the
staffers of our special services, they have a complex system of
confrontation between Russia and the United States, and it is easier for
them to go on like that, because that does not require internal changes
which involve certain efforts, it is easier to accuse each other than to
pool their efforts to counter the real threats.  That applies both to our
special service people and to yours.

   P. Tyler:  So you are proposing cooperation between the Russian and US
intelligence services so that it is possible to share information about
these problems concerning Iran and other countries?

V. Putin:  I am proposing that the efforts of the Russian and US special
services be pooled to combat the threat of proliferation of nuclear and
missile technologies irrespective of the identity of the country to which
those technologies may leak.
   In fact I know what I am talking about, I myself worked in that field
[the special services] for quite a long time.  For decades one country was
working against the other.  And now certain positions have become
established, the people, the specialists have been chosen, all this has been
set up over decades.  It is much easier to continue to use all this in the
old way than to recognize what is happening in the world today, to
understand where the threats are, to restructure some things.  That requires
both understanding and certain efforts.  It is more difficult.
   We are talking about new threats.  One of them is ethnic terrorism,
ethnic intolerance, religious extremism.  I think this is a very good field
for joint work by the special services.  Especially since US citizens really
do suffer from these threats:  Terrorist acts occur, your servicemen and
civilians are killed.  This is a real threat, for the States too, a real
threat!  People are being killed!  And the same thing is happening to us.
   Unfortunately, I am now going to say some words to you that might be
taken in different ways, but I consider it my duty to speak about this
honestly.  I sometimes get the impression that either our special services
or yours, I think more often yours, are trying to exploit certain elements
in the continuing struggle between the special services and are thereby
damaging the national interests of both the States and Russia.  I think this
comes from an incorrect understanding of the prospects for the development
of international relations and from an incorrect understanding of today's
threats.
   If we permit ourselves today to exploit certain extremists in the
struggle for our own national interests to the detriment of others, tomorrow
these extremists could turn their weapons against us.  This is an extremely
dangerous way of achieving a goal.  In effect, it will almost certainly
prove counterproductive.
   In this connection, by way of illustration, we should define our position
on the Taleban.  What do we want to achieve there ultimately?  They have
destroyed thousand-year-old works of art, famous statues.  This somehow
slipped unnoticed through the mass media and everyone forgot about it.  But
it's terrible!  It's a disaster!  Surely we have all realized whom we are
dealing with.  But no; complete silence.
   The fact that there are bases there for training terrorists who operate
not only against us but against you too, that is known, it is a fact.  We
know all about this.  And there are many other matters where we could pool
our efforts with you.

   P. Quinn-Judge (Time):  Then we can in fact consider this a continuation
of the theme.  You exchanged clear words, you had a very intimate
conversation with the President, but all the same, what now causes you most
anxiety and concern in the behavior and policy of the US Administration?
   If possible:  You referred to this struggle between the special services.
Tell me, in what sphere do the Western special services' actions
particularly worry you?

   V. Putin:  On the first part of your question I can say this.  It is not
exactly concern, but we regard with a certain degree of alarm the
possibility of unilateral actions of some kind.  Although we are prepared
for them.
    I am confident that for the next 25 years at least this will not do
substantial damage to Russia's national security.  Any actions, including
unilateral ones.  Moreover if we encounter unilateral actions and the
dismantling of the START I and START II Treaties I think our nuclear
potential will be strengthened.  That will require practically no financial
injections.
   If you look at the START II Treaty you will understand what I am talking
about.  I am talking about the fact that new warheads can be put on existing
missiles.  Indeed, the money is negligible, it will cost almost nothing.  So
Russia's nuclear potential will increase many times over.  Many times over.
   But something else concerns us.  The fact that this could lead, so to
speak, to the unbalancing of the existing balance.  Some kind of
uncontrolled arming of other countries will begin, and many of them are
somewhere near us.  And that is what concerns us.  Although the United
States talks more about that concern.  But it concerns us, in fact, much
more.  Because the missiles that the "threshold countries" now possess will
not reach US territory for a very long time yet.  So in this sense I am
absolutely sincere when I assert that we have a common platform with the
President in discussing this topic.
   And the second part of your question?

   P. Quinn-Judge:  Continuing what you said about the special services,
particularly the way they are used...

   V. Putin:  [You mean,] what is worrying about their activity?

   P. Quinn-Judge:  Where in particular does this happen?

   V. Putin:  There is nothing worrying, because both of them [the Russian
and US special services] do a poor job.  They do not do anything
interesting.  They only get in the way.
   In principle their main work is information support for the political
level of leadership.  But I think they do very little to neutralize the real
threats that our states encounter.  Although there are individual examples
of positive work.  You know, for instance, about a number of joint
operations by the American and Russian special services in closing drug
supply channels to North America.  If there was a greater degree of trust it
would be possible to cooperate much more effectively in the sphere of
preventing acts of terrorism.  And in the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and missile technology -- that is also very much a sphere where
efforts could be pooled.
   On the whole, I would repeat, I see no great threat in this area.  The
Western special services have the concept of people who "stir up trouble."
We have plenty of these people too.  But, on the whole, there are
nonetheless a lot of people who are pretty professional over there as well.
I very much hope that they will be able to safeguard the national interests
of both the United States and Russia alike.  And that they will be able
jointly, I would repeat, to pool their efforts to avert the threats that
both states encounter.

   S. Glasser (Washington Post):  In developing what has been said
specifically about one country -- Iran -- I would like to recall what were
stated by President Bush after your meeting Saturday as being specific areas
where there were differences in the course of your discussions.  He referred
to issues such as those relating to Chechnya, such as issues relating to and
associated with your specific activities in the Caucasus and Georgia -- he
mentioned that country.
   And the third specific issue he mentioned was the situation with the mass
media, with their freedom.  Admittedly, he voiced those issues in somewhat
general terms, in the abstract, he did not flesh them out.
   I would like to know, if I may, just what specifically was said about
this and how you responded in your dialogue with President Bush to the
specific concerns he raised.  Because it seemed as though he subsequently
sidestepped the issues with a few generalities.

   V. Putin:  You know, we talked about these subjects.  The President is,
after all, an absolutely normal person with a realistic perception of
things.  I realize that you can prepare everything you like as much as you
like and submit as many materials as you like, but if you want to look each
other in the eye, to listen to each other, and to hear what is being said,
certain things have to be assessed objectively.
   So when we talk about Chechnya, I am simply tired of repeating certain
things.  It seems to me that it is no longer possible to fail to understand
this.  Although I sometimes find myself thinking that people who are not
involved with this every day do indeed need to have certain things repeated
especially for them.  The President, of course, is acquainted with all of
these problems, but now, answering your question, I am forced to recall
certain things yet again.  And I am prepared to speak even in a certain
amount of detail about what specifically I said to the President on this
issue.
   You and I are very well aware of what has happened in the Caucasus over
the past decade.  In 1995 Russia did not legally recognize but effectively
agreed to Chechen independence and left the area entirely.  It dismantled
all of its organs of power and administration there, withdrew the Army, the
police, the Prosecutor's Office, and the courts.  Absolutely everything was
dismantled.  I have to tell you that this looked like a national
humiliation, but Russia did it in order to achieve reconciliation.  Russia
had encountered other problems.
   To all intents and purposes we had encountered the physical annihilation
of the Russian-speaking population in Chechnya, but Russia did not respond
even to this -- it was in roughly the same condition as America had been in
after the Vietnam War.  It was essentially in shock after 1995.
   More serious processes began.  Because there were no borders the criminal
assimilation of the economy of Russia itself began from the territory of
Chechnya, which was absolutely out of control by any authorities.  But
Russia did not respond even to this.
   Attacks on adjoining territory -- Dagestan and other Russian oblasts --
began virtually immediately on an almost daily basis, every day.  The
populace simply began selling their homes and leaving.  There was absolutely
nobody to talk to, because there were no authorities in Chechnya.  There was
not even anyone to complain to.  And our law-enforcement organs there were
absolutely powerless -- they were even scared of crossing the border when in
hot pursuit of criminals.
   How did it end?  It ended in a major attack by several thousand armed men
on Dagestan under the slogan of separating additional territory from Russia
and creating a new state from the Black Sea to the Caspian -- creating, as
they called it, a United States of Islam.  But, listen, that is completely
over the top -- it was just direct aggression!
   What do you propose that we do?  Discuss Biblical values with them?  They
interpret even the Koran in their own way.  And they consider anyone wearing
a cross to be the enemy.
   I told the President:  "Just imagine that somebody came, armed men, and
wanted to grab half of Texas.  What would you think of that?"
   But, after all, that is precisely the issue that we were facing!  And you
know that.  I sometimes even think about what is happening in the mass
media, and I cannot believe that nobody understands this.  If some sort of
campaign is under way, I think it is simply a deliberate attempt to exploit
the situation in Chechnya to get the Russian Federation off-balance.  There
is no other possible explanation.
   And everything is forgotten -- the decapitated foreigners (British, you
will recall, and New Zealanders) -- the public executions of our own
citizens in Chechnya in public squares have been forgotten.  Nobody pays any
attention to them, as if they did not happen.  There were the public calls
for the extermination of the Jews.  The leaders of this so-called
"insurgent" movement appeared on television and publicly called for the
extermination of the Jews.  Nobody pays any attention to that.
   For us the question today of Chechnya's dependence on or independence
from Russia is of absolutely no fundamental importance.  What is of
fundamental importance to us is just one issue.  We will not allow this
territory to be used any longer as a bridgehead for an attack on Russia.  We
will not allow it!
   It was in that vein that I discussed the problem with the President.  The
international community has never recognized Chechen independence.  We
believe that it is part and parcel of the Russian Federation.  And we think
that this will continue for the present and for the immediate historical
future.  And we must, of course, bear responsibility for what is happening
there.  Regrettably, this is bound up with major problems of a humanitarian
nature.  We are ready to cooperate with international organizations in
solving those humanitarian problems.
   We proceed on the basis that whoever breaks Russian laws should be
brought to book.  This applies to our servicemen and to civilians as well.
We do not draw any distinctions, we proceed on the basis that we must ensure
the operation of the law in this territory.  That is of fundamental
importance.  We are not planning to act as if we are occupiers.  This is our
country and that style of behavior is counterproductive.  We are perfectly
well aware of this and are not planning to carry out any reprisals there.
Nobody needs that.  The result would be the opposite of what you would
expect.  We do not need to be persuaded of that.
   Are you happy with that?

   S. Glasser:  Yes.

   V. Putin:  We are all adults, serious people, you are all very
experienced people.  But can you imagine how else we, Russia, could have
behaved after what happened during the period of the attack on Dagestan?
Could anyone imagine how else we could have behaved?
   We have tried so many times and for so many years to organize a dialogue
and reach agreement on something.  It is impossible to reach an agreement.
And there is nobody to reach an agreement with.  Maskhadov was essentially
in charge of nothing over there.  Everything had splintered into separate
bits of territory.  Each bit of territory was headed by a so-called field
commander.  There was simply nobody to talk to.  But, listen, I have
responsibility for a huge country.  People are being killed every day.  I
can imagine if this were to happen in a Western country.  You would have had
an uprising a long time ago.  Our people are still patient, they have been
patient for so many years.
   Now Georgia.  We have a difficult relationship with Georgia exclusively
on issues relating to the fight against terrorism.  We previously suggested
to Shevardnadze that he allow our troops at the bases on Georgian territory
to travel to the Chechen stretch of the border between Russia and Georgia
and close that border in order to ensure that the gunmen are unable to move
about Georgian territory.  He agreed.  Yeltsin spoke to him on the
telephone, and he said:  "Yes, I agree.  OK."  Yeltsin told him:  "Defense
Minister Sergeyev will fly out to see you tomorrow."  He said:  "OK.  I'll
expect him."  He phoned Sergeyev the next morning and said:  "You know,
Yeltsin and I agreed that you'd be flying in.  I've thought about it and
changed my mind -- don't come."  You are well aware of what this led to.
   First the Georgian authorities say that there are no gunmen there, then
they atree that there are.  But the reality there is understandable.  People
are kidnapped over there, and crimes are continually being committed.  And I
assert that there are large numbers of gunmen in both the Pankisi Gorge and
in Akhmeta District.  We know all the leaders by name, and I have told
Shevardnadze that.  It's easy to find them out -- they talk on the phone the
whole time, and we listen in.  There is nothing secret about it, I will tell
you that.  The Georgian official authorities have to all intents and
purposes lost control over the area.  I think that this is now a domestic
problem for Georgia.
   That is why we were forced to introduce the visa arrangements.  Because,
understandably, it was very easy for bandits to infiltrate Russian
Federation territory from Georgian territory when there were no visa
arrangements.
   You get the impression that the official Georgian authorities have
forgotten how terrorists from Chechnya used to play soccer with the heads of
Georgians during the crisis in Abkhazia.  That, sadly, did happen.  Although
certain Georgian leaders say:  "We remember that, we know about it."  I say:
"So you know about it.  What's the use in knowing?"
   This is essentially the only problem that we have in interstate
relations.  We realize that this is a problem for Georgia.  And we realize,
I realize, why Shevardnadze, shall we say, changed his mind.  The fact is
that there are very many ethnic Chechens living in the area.  And he was
scared that if our troops were to go in, there would be some kind of unrest,
and so forth.  That was a danger.
   But are things any better now?  That is a question that requires trust
and courage and joint action.  Otherwise there will be no result.  This
could go on for a very long time.  We will be strengthening the border, we
will be increasing our presence on this border.  What will Georgia do with
the terrorists who are over there?
   We have no problems on any other issues.  We are holding talks, albeit
difficult talks, on the bases and are reaching an agreement on the bases.
You know that we are already withdrawing our armaments.  And we will be
complying with our accords on flank restrictions.
   We are providing real support to Georgia in the economic sphere.  There
is no issue on which we would turn Georgia down in the economic sphere.
They asked us to restructure the debt -- we immediately did so.  They asked
us to help out in the sphere of power generation -- we did so.  They asked
us to secure gas supplies -- we did so.  And we are supplying them at prices
lower than we supply Europe.  And lower than we supply Ukraine.  We are
helping Georgia.
   You know that around 600,000-700,000 Georgians have moved to Russia from
Georgia.  They send $150-200 a month in cash back from Russia to support
their families.  That is not a lot.  But if you work it out, it comes to
around $1 billion.  That is serious money for Georgia.  And that money is
really supporting actual people.
   We are not getting in the way of this, we are creating the conditions for
these people.  There are the jobs that people are doing here, there is the
support, I would repeat, for actual people.  We are doing everything to
preserve stability in Georgia.
   Now to the mass media.  I think this will probably be the last question.
   You know, it is 10 years since everything in Russia changed
fundamentally.  You cannot create new qualities overnight anywhere,
including in state building, in people's mentality, and in the functioning
of state institutions.  I think that this is a sphere which you may
understand better than I.
   I will tell it the way I understand it and the way I feel it.  And you
yourselves will draw the conclusion as to what is right and what does not
square with reality.
   In the first stage, when fundamental changes took place -- the Soviet
Union collapsed -- those processes of collapse did, of course, affect the
Russian Federation itself as well.  This led to certain destructive
phenomena in state institutions themselves.  They were as weak as they could
get.  The legal system, the control system -- they were all in a very sorry
state.  And it was under these conditions that the privatization process
began.  And, needless to say -- there is nothing unusual about this -- very
many people exploited this weakness on the part of the state allied to rules
governing privatization that were not sufficiently complete.  I have already
said that the rules themselves were not very complete.  But, in the context
of the weakening of state institutions, the conditions were created whereby
those rules could be broken.  And it was hard in general to work out what
had been broken and what hadn't been, because they were too complicated.
   Clans were created which acquired fortunes running into many billions
[currency unspecified], they acquired fortunes running into many billions.
I am not exaggerating.  We are talking about billions of dollars.  Whereas
there are places (the United States, say) where people spent decades
amassing their fortunes, in our country certain groups obtained fortunes
running into the billions in the course of two or three years.  It very
rapidly became clear to many of them that in order to preserve those
fortunes, to preserve their position, it was necessary to acquire levers of
influence over the authorities.  The best lever of influence over the
authorities -- I would even say that it is a lever for blackmailing the
authorities, a way to blackmail the authorities -- is, of course, the mass
media.  And many of them, the nationwide mass media, were also in effect
de-fact privatized in breach of existing legislation.  Some of them were set
up again, but using money obtained illegally.
   That is why I am profoundly convinced that society cannot be normal, it
cannot be democratic, without free mass media.  They must serve society
rather than serving the interests of specific groups, they must not be a
tool for blackmailing the authorities in the process of serving those
economic interests.  And not just serving those interests, but defending the
semicriminal state in which Russia has found itself for a long time.
   In order to ensure that the mass media are truly free, an economic base
needs to be created to that end.  It is necessary to ensure that the mass
media are an effective venture in their own right, that they are not
dependent on other economic activities, and that they are not a subordinate
part of some more major economic interest.  But this is a complicated
process, it requires effort, time, and persistent action.  I repeat that it
is necessary to create the economic base for press freedom.  And I see this
as my task.  We will be acting in this direction.

   D. Syuard [name as transliterated] (AP):  One more short question.  I am
interested in the quality of the partnership.  Do you believe that Russia
and the United States are now like family, or is there a senior partner and
a junior partner?  And a related question.  You have spoken a lot about the
need to preserve a balance, a strategic balance, in the world.  Do you see
any sense in or do you think it is necessary to restore a bipolar world?

   V. Putin.  As regards junior and senior partners.  In general we really
perfectly appreciate the position and state in which Russia is.  If anyone
has any doubts on that score, I can disillusion them.  Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union Russia has lost 40 percent of its territory and
approximately the same percentage of its economic potential.  We are aware
of that.
   But I must tell you that talk of a senior partner and a junior partner is
something we already went through in Soviet times.  I think that is the
terminology of imperialism.  In the international arena everyone is equal.
And anyone who tries to think otherwise will very soon encounter problems.
Because no one likes imperial ambitions.  No one even needs to talk anything
up here or to unite anyone here.  Everything unites naturally against a
potential imperialist.
   And anyone who understands that is in a very advantageous position.  But
understanding and acting in accordance with that understanding is a quite
complicated business.
   Take the Europeans' meeting in Nice.  In terms of its economic potential
and its influence Germany is a very major European country and it was very
successful in Nice.  I think that it was because of its understanding that
imperial ambitions are not a help but a hindrance, because Germany suggested
building Europe in such a way that its domination would not suppress the
other participants in this process.  And the overwhelming majority of
participants in the meeting turned toward Germany.  But for that it was
necessary to understand all this and to elaborate a specific strategy.
   And conversely if someone had formed the desire to throw their weight
around it all would have collapsed immediately.
   As for Russia, despite the loss of this substantial potential we can also
appreciate our positive aspects, development opportunities, and our level of
scientific development, because that is nonetheless the main level of
competition and it is in the hi-tech spheres.  Not in production, but in
those spheres.  And that instills optimism in us.  We think we will succeed
in modernizing the economy.  We think that on this basis we will be able to
achieve a specific pace of economic growth and to preserve the level of our
defense potential.  All this gives us grounds for believing that Russia will
take its fitting place.
   As for a bipolar world, I do not think that is our goal and I shall tell
you why.  Because we have already been through that.  If we are dealing with
a bipolar world then some forces or other will start to congregate around
these poles and some kind of dividing lines will start to appear again.
That is bad.  It seems to me that when we speak of a multipolar world, when
we no longer make any distinctions, when we do not erect new "Berlin walls"
between states and do not seek to form any blocs, we are nonetheless
returning mankind to a normal existence.

   A. Higgins (Wall Street Journal):  Two questions concerning energy and
gas in particular.
   You recently appointed a long-standing associate of yours to head
Gazprom.  What mission did you set him?  What must he do?  Will he change
the actual situation, the actual climate in Gazprom?  Will he investigate
and study questions connected with claims that there was corruption, that
funds were misused, that there were abuses of funds?  Will he address the
issue of finding these funds and returning them to Gazprom, to the state?
  And my next question, which also relates to energy.  Foreign gas companies
and oil companies invariably say they are prepared to invest tens of
billions of dollars in Russia but on condition that they finally get
intelligible and trustworthy terms within the framework of production
sharing agreements.  Efforts to adopt this law in an acceptable form were
made, in particular, last September but these efforts have gotten stuck
somewhere in the bureaucratic machinery.  Are there now intentions to resume
those efforts in order to see the matter through?

   V. Putin:  Let's go straight to the question to do with corruption and
the money which has gone no one knows where.  I shall begin with that.
   We know that enormous amounts of money were misspent.  Everyone is
familiar with one way in which the money was misspent:  Mr Gusinskiy
received nearly a billion and did not give it back and does not intend to
give it back.  He is running between Israel and Washington and feels fine
and he is buying groups of influence in the United States in order to
undertake activity, to launch activity against us.  Let him give back the
money.  There are many other issues of the same kind.
   But of course that is not part of Miller's mission -- the law enforcement
bodies must address this.  He should not engage in police functions.  But he
is faced with a complex task.  The first task is to safeguard the state's
interests in this company, to collect everything which by rights belongs to
the state, and to make the company's activity and primarily its financial
activity absolutely transparent to all shareholders, including minority
shareholders.  We must investigate the company's financial commitments.
   Of course we must be concerned to fulfill our commitments to our foreign
partners inside the country too.  We must understand that the gas industry
should function under normal market conditions, since this is a commodity
and it should have a realistic price.  And that price should not differ by
an order of magnitude from the foreign price.  But of course we do not have
the opportunity to do this overnight, it must all be in accordance with the
growth of the economy and the public's purchasing power.  On this basis we
must ensure the development of new deposits and access to the pipeline
system for everyone who wants to work in this sphere.
   Now about production sharing agreements.  You know that I meet regularly
with Russian business leaders.  Of course some of the Russian Government's
plans in this sphere perturb them and I think that it would be wrong not to
heed them.  And their thesis is a simple one.  They say:  "If you offer
preferential terms to foreign investors, tax breaks for instance, what is it
that makes us worse?  In that case we shall not invest as Russian corporate
bodies.  We will come in too, but as foreigners."
   What is the point for us then?  There is only one point:  developing oil
or gas deposits within a normal tax regime.  That regime should be as
favorable and liberal as possible.  And we have now outlined a whole series
of steps in that direction.  And some concessions can and should be received
by companies which should spend substantial amounts of money and make big
investments under conditions of a certain commercial risk.
   What do I mean?  For instance, we have known stocks and deposits about
which everything is clear:  What their volume is, how much must be invested,
and what the return will be.  But under those conditions, of course, we must
use a universal common standard.  But if a company comes to areas that have
not been well prospected and the investments have to be substantial yet it
is not very clear what the return will be, then they are taking a risk.
Then, of course, we should provide preferential terms.  Here, of course, we
cannot place our national market players on worse terms than foreign
players.  The terms for production sharing should be universal, they should
be accessible to Russian entrepreneurs as well.

   Is that enough?  Are you happy?

   K. Keril [name as transliterated]:  Mr president!  We have asked you a
great many very hard technical questions, perhaps this is a more personal
question.  You have said many times that you were very proud to have worked
in the USSR state security organs, have you not?  And as you know, that is
very hard for the Western public to understand.

   V. Putin:  What?

   K. Keril:  No, I believe you know that we Western journalists are always
saying:  "Mr Putin was in the KGB.  That's terrible."

   V. Putin:  When Kissinger and I were talking and I told him where I
worked, he had a think and said:  "All respectable people began in the
intelligence service.  So did I."  So I cannot really understand what makes
you so particularly interested.  Especially as I believe the 41st President
of the United States did not work in a laundry but headed the CIA.

   K. Keril:  This was not intended as censure!  What is it in that
training, in that professional training and that experience, that influences
you today and helps you lead the country under conditions of what is, let us
say, a very unstable situation?

   V. Putin:  You know, you can say a lot, you can go deep into the details,
but the main thing is that it is experience of working with people.  And
with utterly diverse people:  with journalists, scientists, politicians, and
simply with ordinary people who for one reason or another may be of interest
to a specialist.
   To be able to work effectively with people you have to know how to set up
dialogue and make contact, you have to activate all that is best in your
partner.  If you want a result you have to respect your partner.  And
respecting means recognizing that in some ways he is better than you.
   You must make a person your ally, that person must feel that there is
something common that joins you and him, that you have common goals.  And it
is perhaps that skill which is the most important and of course far from
primarily in international affairs, but as a skill in working inside the
country.
   You know what happened in our Duma during the adoption of the Land Code
at the first reading.  It reached the point of brawling and I am told that
during the brawl one deputy broke another's nose.  That is the degree of
tension was extremely high.  And that despite the fact that I had met with
the faction leaders beforehand to discuss the question and we had discussed
it at the State Council.  Overall, while approaches differed, everyone
agreed, and nonetheless this led to what I would call this serious ordeal,
to this serious clash.  It is simply that the pitch of domestic political
life in Russia is very high.
   Many people now are saying that consolidation is to be observed in our
country, and that is true.  But I want to tell you, and those recent events
in the Duma show it, that this is not being achieved simply, that this
requires great effort.  I think that is the main point.  Of course if we are
being more specific, it is area studies, it is the ability to work with a
large amount of information, it is a skill which is cultivated in the
analytical services and special organs, the skill of selecting what is most
important from a large flow of information, processing it, and knowing how
to use it.
   And in my view that is actually the main point.  Things have probably
been different at different times but when I was working in the Soviet
Union's foreign intelligence organs, as you can understand, this was already
on the threshold of perestroyka and I saw nothing there which might have
been reminiscent of any repressions, there was nothing like that.  At that
time there was already a spirit of rebellion in the air in the foreign
intelligence service because people had mainly spent their entire conscious
professional lives abroad, they had seen everything for themselves and after
returning to the country (and the procedure was to spend three, four, or
five years abroad and then go home for brainwashing in the Soviet Union and
then to go back again) they were able to compare what was happening in real
normal life abroad and what was happening in the Soviet Union.
   And now I am coming to the most important point.  Nevertheless, what was
cultivated in the security organs and in the intelligence service was the
most important -- patriotism and love for the Motherland.

   K. Keril:  Thank you.

   V. Putin:  Thank you very much.

*******
-------
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