Johnson's Russia List
#5551
17 November 2001
A CDI Project
www.cdi.org

[Note from David Johnson:
  1. The Russia Journal: 'It's too early to say Russia has turned corner.'
Analyst Clifford Gaddy outlines hurdles ahead for the economy. (interview)
  2. Luba Schwartzman: ORT Review.
  3. The Economist (UK): Arms and the men.
  4. Obshchaya Gazeta: Andrey Piontkovskiy about Putin's break with
the policy of the political elite toward the US: "A Stolz in the Kremlin."
  5. Vremya MN: Leonid Radzikhovskiy, Test of Strength. (Political Crisis
Sure To Follow Economic Slump)
  6. Reuters: Russia's economic focus switches to US from OPEC.
  7. The Times (UK): Michael Evans, Blair plans wider role for Russia with
Nato.
  8. The Russia Journal: Dmitry Pinsker, Kremlin tames civil society.
  9. Reuters: Russia rules out peacekeepers for Afghanistan.
  10. UPI: Nicholas Horrock, The True Russian Nature]

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#1
The Russia Journal
November 16-22, 2001
'It's too early to say Russia has turned corner'
Analyst Clifford Gaddy outlines hurdles ahead for the economy
By MICHAEL HEATH

Clifford Gaddy is a fellow in Economic and Foreign Policy studies at the
Brookings Institution and one of the most respected analysts of the Russia
economy in the world today.

His groundbreaking article, "Russia's Virtual Economy," co-authored by
Barry Ickes, exposed the myths of the reform effort in Russia through the
1990s, and has since become a cornerstone of analysis of the country.

The Russia Journal asked Gaddy about the Russian economy's recent past, its
status today and its prospects for the future.

THE RUSSIA JOURNAL: A lot of people are talking up the Russian economy
today, pointing to the record trade surpluses and the revival of domestic
industry after the crisis. Has Russia really turned the corner after a
decade of decline?

CLIFFORD GADDY: I think it's too early to say that Russia has turned the
corner. Of course there are a number of positive signs, aggregate indices
like GDP growth or industrial growth look good, inflation looks good and
the trade balance is extremely positive.

But I think when you disaggregate that and look at the micro-level there
are some more worrisome signs. Perhaps not really disturbing signs as yet,
but they certainly should give us pause, and cause us to ask what exactly
is going on with the Russian economy and what are its longer-term prospects.

RJ: Let's look at those long-term prospects. To what extent has the reform
implemented prepared Russia for long-term growth?

CG: What one has to be aware of when posing the question, "How have the
reforms undertaken during the Putin administration affected Russia's
longer-term prospects for growth?", I think we have to keep in mind that
there are really two distinct categories of economic reforms that affect
the Russian economy.

The first are the kinds of reforms that are consistent with the development
of a market economy but are not undertaken primarily for the purpose of
making Russia a market economy. They are undertaken primarily with the
objective of strengthening the state.

And again they may be consistent - that is they don't contradict the goal
of developing a market economy - but they're not undertaken primarily for
that purpose. A good example is tax reform: The primary purpose of tax
reform is to bring in more money, more resources especially to the central
government. At the same time clearly a simplification and a streamlining of
the tax system is a worthy goal and consistent with market reform.

There is, however, another type of economic reform that is absolutely
essential for the development of Russia as a competitive market economy and
yet is threatening to the stability and therefore to the strength of the
Russian state.

Those kinds of reforms I am referring to are the ones that would affect
especially Russia's core enterprise sector, its manufacturing industries,
most of which - or at least close to half of which - are simply not
competitive, and not even potentially competitive under normal
considerations of the amount of investment that would be needed to bring
them to a competitive level, it would simply require too much money, it
wouldn't be worth it.

And that means that certain reforms would threaten the survival of those
enterprises and bring with it a degree of social and political instability
that is unacceptable in Russia today. It requires too much dislocation, too
much hardship for too many people, too many regions, too many cities in
Russia to be a practicable alternative right now.

So, Russia has during these past three years since the crisis of 1998
undertaken reforms of the first type - those that are designed to
strengthen the stability and power of the state - but has consciously
refrained from undertaking the second type of reforms, which would threaten
the stability of the state.

And yet the dilemma for Russia is that the second type of reform is
absolutely essential if Russia is going to be competitive as an economy in
the longer term. And again, I think that's the real dilemma facing the
current administration: There are a number of things the Putin
administration has done and will continue to do to extract resources for a
kind of growth, from what is there in the economy right now. And the most
fundamental of those is to try to stop some of the looting and leakage of
value, if you like, from the Russian economy; to try to rein in the
oligarchs and their pure looting of the economy.

But you know there's a limit to how much you can achieve with that
approach. Beyond that you need to have new sources to generate new wealth
in the economy, and that requires developing whole new businesses,
reallocating the resources you have, the people you have, so that they're
producing new products, new services, in probably new places - new physical
geographical locations in Russia than some of the activity is right now.
And that is a huge process that in my opinion would be more revolutionary,
more disruptive than everything that's happened so far since 1991, and that
means it's quite a big process, it is not something that would be easily
undertaken.

RJ: Are we talking here of the military-industrial complex, and what else?

CG: You can begin with the heaviest of Russia's heavy industry. And now
there are some metallurgical plants that are profitable. But when you get
into processing and fabrication, that's where the problem is concentrated,
and certainly the former defense-industry sector is the biggest part of
that problem, but it extends beyond just defense plants. It includes many
plants that produce civilian products. It also includes a number of
facilities that comprise the light-industry sector - that is textiles and
clothing and things like that that are just simply not going to be
profitable.

RJ: It's a bleak picture you paint. Is there any chance that you can grow
the newer aspects of the economy in tandem with the gradual phasing out of
the older? Or does there have to be a fundamental break - despite the fact
that it's politically and socially impossible?

CG: My sense is that as much as you would like to try to find the gradual
alternative, to gradually phase out the old as you grow in the new - I
simply don't think that that's possible because of the relative proportions
between the two in Russia. The non-viable sector is simply too large. It's
going to suck resources from the new parts of the economy as they grow.

The solution, at least one possible solution, and it's very difficult as
well, is basically making the choice of following the idea of letting some
parts of the economy survive on their own. It means surviving at a low
level, kind of a subsistence level, while you try to concentrate your
efforts and your resources, your best resources, in certain selected parts
of the economy.

And I think in Russia it needs to be combined with a regional approach.
It's not simply choosing certain enterprises or certain sectors, but for
Russia's long-term viability, one of the worst legacies it brought forward
from the Soviet period was the physical location of so much of its industry
in the coldest areas of the country: I'm not only talking about Siberia,
not just Eastern Siberia and the Far East; but also even Western Siberia
and the Urals. These places are very, very cold relative to the rest of the
world. They are also cold relative to where Russian industry was located
before the Soviet industrialization campaign.

In effect, what I'm saying is that for long-term viability I think Russia
is going to have to be moving back to the European heartland, and
concentrate the development of its new viable industries there. And
actually encourage the movement of people back away from Siberia and the
Urals, where they ended up through the Soviet collectivization and
industrialization programs.

RJ: There tends to be a love-hate relationship toward Russia in the West,
and we seem to be entering the former again. Do you sense the beginning of
a situation akin to 1996-97 where people are getting enthusiastic and again
forgetting to look at the realities of the economy?

CG: Yes, there is a tendency to go to extremes with Russia. This does bear
some resemblance to the 96-97 euphoria. But, quite honestly, I feel that
there is more moderation in it, for precisely the reason that people,
though memories are short, they're not quite that short, and there is still
this notion of caution: "Remember what happened last time." And the
euphoria is not as strong and as universal as it was then. So this is the
good news, that there is somewhat more moderation.

I do think that people even now are not looking at the fundamentals, even
the official statistics should be enough for some caution, as we see that
the extremely high rates of growth, industrial growth, GDP growth, of a
year ago, are quite considerably lower now.

I have a sense that when you look at the Russian economy today, this is
something like what we're going to have for the next few years, so let's
talk in those terms. The oil price certainly remains a critical element.
But it's not as if the entire economy is going to rapidly go up and down in
tandem with the oil-price increases and decreases.

There is a stability that has been achieved in Russia that is good because
it's stable - it's bad because it's not dynamism. This is not a dynamic
economy, it's not an economy that is bursting out at the seams - one that
is growing, developing new things.

You know, one of those facts or statistics that you can cite to remind you
as a cautionary note of what's really in people's behavior, and the Russian
economy, is the statistic about how much of the food is being grown on the
private plots. If indeed, the Russian economy had taken some radical steps
toward a real market economy in the past three to four years, we would see,
I think, and hope to see, a decline in the amount of time and effort people
are spending growing their own food - they would begin to rely on the
market. And this has not happened at all in the last three years.

Over 90 percent of the potatoes are still grown on people's dacha plots. So
people, ordinary Russian citizens, are quite understandably, quite
rationally, pretty cautious about this. They may be optimistic, they may be
hopeful, but it's an attitude of "I'll believe it when I see it." And until
then, I'll make sure that my family and I have the resources to survive.

Enterprises do exactly the same thing. They would love, I am sure many of
them would, to see a more open, transparent, market - banking, financial
services, etc. But until they see that and understand that it's stable and
permanent, they're going to spend a lot of time protecting themselves. And
that, from an economic standpoint, is very inefficient. It's a waste of
resources compared to "normal market economies." From the individual
standpoint, it's completely understandable and rational, it's the smart
thing to do. So we're still in this trap right now in Russia. It will
require a longer period of stability before you begin to see people shift
away from these self-protecting modes of behavior.

RJ: Can you just give some indication and explanation of the scale of the
trade surplus Russia saw last year and what that meant?

CG: The absolutely remarkable fact about the Russian economy is that
despite apparent prosperity in certain statistical areas, we're dealing
with something that is quite unusual internationally, and perhaps
unprecedented, for the simple reason that in the year 2000 the current
account surplus was $46 billion, or 18.5 percent, if we translate Russian
GDP at the market exchange rate into dollars.

This is a staggering amount, and has to be understood relative to certain
other countries. In the 1980s Japan ran what was considered to be a huge
current account surplus, so large that it was occupying the minds of
economists and policy-makers internationally. How big was it? It was about
4 percent of Japan's GDP. Russia's was 18.5 percent.

Today there is no ordinary, normal-sized economy that has anywhere close to
Russia's current account surplus relative to GDP. So it's like an order of
magnitude bigger than other countries. And to think that a country that
runs a current account surplus that large is toying with the idea of asking
of asking for debt relief, that debt payments are a problem, says something
very stark about the Russian economy. It is very, very unusual.

RJ: Does that say something about the government or the economy?

CG: Well, I think it has to do with the Russian economy. The government is
suffering from the constraints of having to maintain an economy, such a
large part of which is not creating wealth. It is not even neutral in this
regard, but it is actually consuming or devouring wealth, rather than
producing new wealth. And this is not the fault of the current Russian
government, this is the legacy of 60-70 years of Soviet rule, but it is
clearly something the current government has to deal with and won't escape
from for not just years but decades to come.

RJ: What's your prediction then in terms of Russian growth.? Can it be
sustained at 4-5 percent, or will it taper off?

CG: The numbers are difficult to interpret. Even of the last two years, we
need to ask, what is the quality of this growth? And some of what is being
recorded as GDP growth is in fact the revival of non-competitive products
being produced by industrial enterprises. This is a fact. I know this. And
most enterprise directors who are honest can tell you they're simply
reviving some of the things that a market would not qualify as truly
marketable.

So there's the question of the quality, which also affects the level of
growth - what's the meaning of 2 percent versus 5 percent then?

I do think that given there has been so much looting - just pure looting -
taking wealth that has been produced by the economy, because the Russian
economy does produce wealth, most of it in its natural resources sector,
but it is in huge amounts. If some of that can stay and be reinvested, be
used within Russia, then you can get substantial benefits from that. So
there's a lot to be achieved just by doing that alone.

The second way to achieve growth without creating new sources of production
of wealth is by more efficient use of what you have. For instance, just
being able to have enterprise managers concentrate on their businesses as
opposed to concentrating on protecting themselves from organized crime or
corrupt bureaucrats in the government, this pays off in terms of wealth
that is actually usable for the standards of living of the population.

And given that Russia was in such abysmal shape, had reached such an
abysmally low point by the end of the 1990s, there's a good deal to be
gained in that area as well.

And so it's difficult to say how long, perhaps as many as four to five
years, perhaps even more, you can continue to be more efficient in using
what you have. But at some point you run out. These opportunities exhaust
themselves and you have to be creating new wealth. That's where Russia's
real dilemma is, that's where Russia's real challenge is, to find new
sources of wealth creation, through new industries, new products, new
businesses, new services, and reallocating what you have to create new wealth.

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