It's good to hear from you again Lynne, and I concur that this debate is
very fruitful. I agree with much of what you are saying, but am perhaps
coming at the problem from a slightly different, maybe epistemological, view
point.
>From a Foucaultian perspective discourse is not a linguistic term, though it
is often presented in this way. When looking for histories of knowledge,
'Foucault is not looking for what men and women have thought nor for
histories of ideas, influences or opinions.'
"They represent an attempt to produce {..} an archaeology of the material
conditions of thought/knowledges, conditions which are not reducible to the
idea of 'consciousness' or the idea of the mind.'
This is a concept that I am only myself coming to grips with as we speak,
but let me try to explain; in this way you will see why I have moved away
from representation or cultural studies.
Fragmenting thinking: No inside to discourse
First of all we have to understand that there is no thinking process prior
to the use of words and symbols in order to make their use possible.
Wittgenstein demonstrates this with a simple algebraic formula:
y = 2x + 5; if x = 2, then the series runs 9, 23, 51, etc.
I'm no good at mathematics but this simply means 2 x 2 + 5 = 9; 2 x 9 + 5 =
23 etc.
What does it mean to think of the next number when expanding the series? It
of course simply means to perform the calculation. This discursive operation
has nothing to do with my expressing my thought of the next number, because
to do this it would have to be possible to think of the next number without
performing the calculation. We don't think of the number prior to being
equipped. So knowledge goes on without us and we need to uncover the
conditions of possibility.
Thought therefore is very simple and nothing special at all and not the
product of some higher order called thinking. For Foucault thought is ' the
name given to the material surfaces of appearances' which result from the
operation of a dispersed collection of public historical apparatuses''. We
cannot go deeper as the calculation demonstrates, the surface is all there
is.
There is also no outside to discourse, which I won't go into now. But to put
it perhaps too simply, discourse is both the sayable and the visible. For
example the discourse of the prison is the building and statements such as
penology. They are both linked, discourse is not simply a linguistic term
and it is not reducible to thought in people's heads it is a apparatus or
practice. It is not linguistic.
This does not mean that everything is discourse. Bodies are non-discursive
in their materiality but they do not exist in a non-discursive vacuum.
What I've attempted to illustrate is just one aspect of the profoundly
complex concept of discourse, but I think it illustrates why I have moved
away from idea of trying to study what people are thinking.
By the way I once read an interview with Foucault where he said he didn't
have much regard for philosophy, though much of his work was grounded in
philosophical texts going back as far as Ancient Greece. Foucault's work
could be described as a history of the present. All his work is based on the
idea of a problem, if something is intolerable in the present he uses
history to diagnose the present rather than seeing how it emerged from the
past. The present is just as strange as the past and he wants to highlight
the often contingent nature of what we take for granted.
If you want to get into Foucaultian studies I recommend one book in
particular. 'Using Foucault's Methods' by Gavin Kendall and Gary Wickham. It
is both complex and clear and dismisses many myths and misconceptions and is
the best introduction I've seen. I just wish I'd had a copy a couple of
years ago. What I've written above is explained there in much more depth
plus all his other concepts. In fact I only got my copy Saturday and have
hardly taken my head out of it. As I told Shelley, one chapter is called:
'My head is spinning . . .' and this has been literally true for me. It's
destroyed many of my misconceptions about his concepts.
I hope we can continue our debate as I'm enjoying it very much. It's good to
share views, insights and ideas.
Regards,
Adam
----- Original Message -----
From: Lynne Roper {PG} <[log in to unmask]>
To: 'Adam Greenow' <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Monday, June 12, 2000 11:54 AM
Subject: RE: conference on body
> In reply to Adam et al,
> I too am finding this discussion invaluable - thanks! What I'm trying to
get
> away from is the idea that images (i.e. 'representations') are in some way
> separate from the political/social/cultural practices which they
represent.
> Here, again, Richard Dyer is excellent. Representation (whether visually,
or
> through discourse, or both) is inextricable from the whole issue. It is a
> part of it, it feeds from it, and it also reflects back into it (for
example
> images of any grouping in society partly reflect not only how other people
> see that grouping, also how members of that grouping see themselves). This
> is not a simple concept, and there are a whole host of variables which
> affect the way a media text is read by an individual. However, I would
argue
> that this representation (or as Dyer calls it 're-presentation') is
central
> to any political debate. Language is obviously a part of this, but I
accord
> images at least equal status. I'm not a philosopher, but after reading
> Shelley's, yours and Marian's arguments, I think I'd better go an get
> Foucault out of the library.
> Lynne
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