From: Progressive Response [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 9:46 PM
To: ProgResp List
Subject: Korea; Privatized Military Training; Social Development
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The Progressive Response 09 June 2000 Vol. 4, No. 24
Editor: Tom Barry
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The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in
Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center
and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the
opinions expressed in PR and may print them in the "Letters and
Comments" section.
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I. Updates and Out-takes
*** NORTH KOREA REACHES OUT ***
By John Feffer
*** PRIVATIZING MILITARY TRAINING: SOME PROMISE, SOME RISK ***
By Deborah D. Avant
II. Outside U.S.
*** IS GENUINE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POSSIBLE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? ***
By International South Group Network
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I. Updates and Out-takes
*** NORTH KOREA REACHES OUT ***
By John Feffer
(Editors Note: On the eve of this historic summit, the Clinton
administration has promised to lift sanctions immediately after the
summit's conclusion. This action is to be applauded, but given the
history of broken promises, observers should be wary until the
administration's commitments are actually translated into action.
Furthermore, as FPIF analyst John Feffer notes, the lifting of sanctions
is but a first step in altering U.S. policy toward the Korean
peninsula.)
In many respects, the Clinton administration has broken with cold war
traditions in its policy toward North Korea. The decision to create the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to help rebuild
the energy capacity of a declared adversary--through the Agreed
Framework--was an extraordinary act of trust building. In addition, the
administration has been generous with its foreign aid. In 1999, for
instance, the U.S. provided 53% of the $380 million in international aid
for North Korea.
Despite these generous gestures, Clinton administration policy has been
flawed and contradictory. It has employed economic carrots and military
sticks in an attempt to coax and threaten North Korea into being
cooperative. This asymmetric approach has alleviated short-term
suffering in North Korea, but it has also contributed to escalating
military tensions in the region.
Even the economic carrots have not been without blemishes. For instance,
as Clinton administration insiders admit, the decision to create KEDO
was based on an expectation that the North Korean government would
collapse before the nuclear plants come on line. And indeed, due to a
mixture of internal politics and a failure of strong leadership,
construction of the plants has been delayed by several years. Such
delays have not inspired North Korean confidence in the U.S. ability to
abide by agreements.
The more critical failure has occurred around economic sanctions. After
the successful September 1999 meetings, the Clinton administration
formulated new regulations that would permit most bilateral trade. As
part of the package, Washington agreed to remove North Korea from the
so-called terrorism list, otherwise known as the Export Control Act.
Such a move is overdue. According to the U.S. government itself, North
Korea has not initiated terrorist activities since 1987, the year before
the Export Control Act was adopted. However, the administration has
neither implemented the 1999 regulations nor removed North Korea from
the terrorism list. This is a breach of promise and a disturbing
indication that Washington responds more to North Koreas aggressive
acts than to its peaceful overtures.
Although these failures to follow through on economic promises are
disappointing, the continued use of military sticks may prove in the
long run to be the more damaging aspect of U.S. policy. For Clintons
entire tenure, the U.S. has refused to consider altering its military
posture in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. military continues to hold
costly joint exercises with its allies in the region, has concluded a
new basing arrangement with the Philippines, and has developed a new
military plan that endorses a preemptive strike against North Korea. The
administration is forging ahead on Theater Missile Defense (TMD), the
regional Star Wars, which enrages not only North Korea, but China and
Russia as well. From Pyongyangs point of view, Washington is raising
the military stakes in the region, so that even the relatively benign
tripartite coordination of policy with Japan and South Korea resembles
encirclement, not consensus building.
To justify its military presence in the region, the U.S. government
cites the threat of North Koreas weapons program, specifically its
ability or desire to build an intercontinental missile. But according to
arms control experts, this threat is exaggerated--by both North Korea
and the United States. In reality, North Koreas missile program is
technologically suspect and more useful as a bargaining chip than for
military purposes. Contrary to some congressional assertions, North
Korean missiles cannot reach the United States and cannot carry nuclear
payloads. North Koreas longest range missile, the Taepodong 2, has
never been tested.
Critics of North Korea remain skeptical of Pyongyangs current
diplomatic overtures. North Korea is viewed as simply buying time,
rather than truly engaging with the outside world. As The Economist has
editorialized, It is certainly too early to detect any strategic shift
in North Korea's thinking about the outside world, nor is there any real
sign that the poverty-stricken country is preparing to adopt real
reforms at home.
Yet, North Korea opted for a strategic shift in outlook over a decade
ago, when it established joint venture laws and a free trade zone.
Domestically, a range of real reforms have already taken place,
resulting in the decentralization of authority, greater scope for
private economic activity, and a wider range of contacts with South
Korea and other countries. Although this is not a Chinese rush to the
market, the changes all point to greater engagement with the outside
world.
Instead of encouraging these changes through the lifting of sanctions
and the lessening of military tensions, U.S. conservatives continue to
expect North Korea to collapse prior to absorption by the south. South
Korea, chastened by the costs of such a German scenario, is pursuing a
different strategy, a slow motion unification that proceeds patiently
and incrementally. If the June summit proves successful, South Korea
will provide major investments in northern plants and infrastructure,
helping to allay North Korean concerns of German-style ingestion.
According to some reports, the North Korean economy is already showing
signs of recovery. In 1999, state revenues improved by 3%, reversing a
decade-long decline.
Peaceful unification is advanced by an economically viable North Korea.
The Clinton administration has expressed concerns that South Korean
President Kim Dae Jung is proceeding unilaterally, offering economic
incentives without securing agreements on North Korean missile
production or sales. Instead of chastising its ally, Washington should
consider developing its own innovative approaches to strengthen
prospects for unification.
Both sides talk of keeping their powder dry. It is the responsibility
of the stronger party to make the first move. Washingtons offensive
posture--bases, military presence in South Korea, TMD, joint
maneuvers--does nothing to allay Pyongyangs fears of invasion. The U.S.
must consider the following steps:
** Cancel joint exercises with South Korea, and put the issue of U.S.
troop withdrawal on the negotiating table. The North Korean military
threat has been inflated, and the South Korean military can already
counter any North Korean threat without U.S. troop support. North
Koreas entire government budget of $9.4 billion is smaller than South
Koreas military budget of $13 billion.
** Cancel TMD. This system is wildly expensive ($60 billion over the
next fifteen years), technically flawed, and disruptive to U.S.
relations with numerous countries. An East Asian space race is already
pushing countries to develop satellites. Rather than encouraging this
race, the U.S. must lead the way in restraining the militarization of
space.
** Encourage regional security dialogue. U.S. military withdrawal from
the region should avoid creating a vacuum in its wake that might
encourage major arms programs in South Korea or a remilitarized Japan.
Only an effective multilateral security framework that oversees
confidence building measures and regional force reductions can ensure a
nonhegemonic peace in the region. As part of this approach, the U.S.
must reduce arms sales to the region and abandon the costly Pentagon
doctrine of maintaining the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously.
Sources for More Information
Organizations
American Friends Service Committee, Asia Desk
1501 Cherry St.
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Voice: (215) 241-7149
Fax: (215) 241-7026
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.afsc.org/
Contact: Alice Andrews
Asia Pacific Center for Peace and Justice
110 Maryland Avenue NE, Ste. 504 (Box 70)
Washington, DC 20002
Voice: (202) 543-1094
Fax: (202) 546-5103
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.apcjp.org/
Korean American Peace Institute
60 Cedar St.
Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660
Voice: (201) 440-6975
Fax: (201) 229-0072
Email: [log in to unmask]
National Council of Churches of Christ (USA)
Office of East Asia & Pacific
475 Riverside Drive, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10115-0050
Voice: (212) 870-2371
Fax: (212) 870-2064
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.ncccusa.org/
Nautilus Institute
1831 Second St.
Berkeley, CA 94710
Voice: (510) 204-9296
Fax: (510) 204-9298
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/
Contact: Timothy Savage
U.S. Department of State
The Office of Korean Affairs
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520-6310
Voice: (202) 647-7717
Fax: (202) 647-7388
Websites
Federation of American Scientists
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/
Institute of North Korean Affairs
http://www.koreascope.org/
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
http://www.kedo.org/
Korea Web Weekly
http://www.kimsoft.com/korea.htm
Stratfor.com Global Intelligence Update
http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/northkorea/
United Nations
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf
(John Feffer <[log in to unmask]> works for the American Friends Service
Committee in the East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program based in
Tokyo. He travels regularly to North and South Korea and China to
encourage dialogue on peace and justice issues.)
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*** PRIVATIZING MILITARY TRAINING: SOME PROMISE, SOME RISK ***
By Deborah D. Avant
During the post-cold war era, there has been a proliferation of private
companies providing a wide array of security services ranging from
military advice and training to operational support to security
protection, logistics support, policing, drug interdiction,
intelligence, and more. Western governments, developing countries,
international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private
companies who operate in the worlds hot spots have each purchased these
services. Military advice and training has been one of the most
significant areas of growth, particularly in the United States. It also
comes closest to the core mission of the military.
In the post-cold war period, however, the number of firms offering
military services has grown, the scale of their operations has expanded,
and their role has become more public and regarded as being more
legitimate. Revenues from the global international security market are
expected to rise from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010,
according to private industry projections. The Pittsburgh Post Gazette
(February 2000) reported that private security companies with publicly
traded stocks grew at twice the rate of the Dow Jones Industrial Average
in the 1990s. Private firms trained militaries in more than 42 countries
during the 1990s. Although the older companies such as Vinnell,
Booz-Allen, and Cubic are still active, many of the highest profile
firms (including MPRI, which boasts that its 1997 volume of business
exceeded $48 million), postdate the cold war.
As the industry has grown, private military companies (PMCs) have sought
to polish their images. They establish websites, grant interviews, and
appear at conferences. Sandlines website offers everything from British
government documents regarding Sandlines activities to opinion papers
on how the private security industry might best be regulated.
Foreign military training programs have expanded in the post-cold war
period, offering greater opportunities for private military companies.
Training foreign armies is a prime component of current U.S. engagement
strategy, according to the Office of the Presidents 1999 document A
National Security Strategy for a New Century. Military training is said
to further U.S. contact with other countries, to aid in the spread of
democracy and good civil-military relations, and to enhance specific
U.S. strategic concerns regarding such issues as counternarcotics and
counterterrorism. To achieve these objectives, U.S. Special Forces train
with over 100 countries annually.
While major threats have diminished in the post-cold war period and U.S.
forces have been downsized, ethnic conflict, humanitarian emergencies,
and the desire to prevent further problems with the U.S. engagement
strategy have boosted the number of operations involving the U.S.
military. In scrambling to meet more requirements with fewer personnel
and a more competitive labor market, policymakers have turned to private
contractors to conduct some of their foreign military training programs.
The current generalized push toward the privatization and outsourcing of
government functions only abets this trend.
Privatizing military training has long-term political and foreign policy
implications. Employing private companies may increase the flexibility
and expand the capacity of the U.S. military. Such flexibility may help
impose stability in troubled regions in the short run and may avoid
lengthy political debates over the proper number of U.S. troops required
to support the engagement policy outlined in A National Security
Strategy for a New Century. The downside of this approach, however,
could be a public increasingly disengaged from global problems; a
military ever more focused on high-tech combat operations rather than
military training, assistance, and other engagement activities; and
significant reliance on private firms for a central part of U.S.
military assistance and overseas operations.
The U.S. government and private military companies need to work toward
an international regulatory structure that will increase transparency
and accountability and will encourage military training that promotes
stability, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The British
company Sandline has already voiced its support for international
regulation. An international office, perhaps at the UN (replacing the
UNs special rapporteur on mercenaries), would be one mechanism through
which the international community could bolster the industrys fledgling
efforts at self-regulation. Such a structure could also open the way for
a dialogue regarding how and whether private military firms should be
employed by NGOs--or even the UN--to carry out certain tasks, such as
providing security or training for UN forces in complex emergencies.
Policymakers need to evaluate the economic and political implications of
privatizing military training before the U.S. proceeds further down this
path. If they decide that private firms are to play a role in training
security forces, Congress and the administration should work at both the
international and domestic level to ensure that PMC practices are
regulated to comply with international law and human rights norms.
(Deborah Avant <[log in to unmask]> is an associate professor of political
science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International
Affairs, George Washington University.)
Sources for More Information:
Organizations
Amnesty International, USA
322 8th Avenue
New York, NY 10001
Voice: (212) 633-4200
Fax: (212) 627-1451
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.amnesty-usa.org/
International Alert
1 Glyn Street
London, UK
Voice: (0207) 793-8383
Fax: (0207) 793-7975
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.international-alert.org/
Overseas Development Council
1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1012
Washington, DC 20009
Voice: (202) 234-8701
Fax: (202) 745-0067
Email: [log in to unmask]
Website: http://www.odc.org/
Websites
Doug Brooks listserv
http://www.egroups.com/group/AMPMlist/
MPRI
http://www.mpri.com/
Sandline
http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html
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II. Outside U.S.
(Editor's Note: This section of the Progressive Response includes
non-U.S. perspectives on the impact and directions of U.S. foreign
policy. They do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the editor or
Foreign Policy In Focus. Article submissions of 1,000 words should be
sent to: <[log in to unmask]>)
*** IS GENUINE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POSSIBLE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? ***
By International South Group Network
>From June 26-30, 2000 world leaders will gather in Geneva to assess the
progress made on the implementation of commitments made in the 1995
United Nations World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen. Among
the key issues to be addressed in the Geneva Summit are poverty
eradication and improvement of living conditions, employment, social
integration, access to basic social services, empowerment, etc.
This early, the inability of many governments to realize even the narrow
targets of the Copenhagen Declaration and Program of Action can be
gleaned from official documents of the Geneva Summit. There is an open
admittance that people living in poverty has increased since 1995, that
there is an increase in causal and informal employment, and that many
countries still fall short of the targets established--particularly for
the provision of basic social services. Likewise, the worsening terms of
international trade are recognized as contributing to the factors that
have undermined poverty eradication measures.
These are to be expected in an institution that sticks to the narrow
confines of the current world order, where a few rich and powerful
nations dictate the terms of socioeconomic and political relations at
the expense of people--particularly those in developing countries. It
can never address the fundamental problems that have kept nations and
peoples impoverished and powerless. In fact the Social Summit pursues
the same neo-liberal policies of liberalization, deregulation, and
privatization that have deprived many of the even the barest needs for
survival. It will be utilized by global powers in its agenda toward
further liberalizing world trade and investments.
We are aware that globalization is the biggest stumbling block for the
attainment of genuine social development. It drives poor countries
further into underdevelopment, and their people to more miserable
situations. It denies the people their means of livelihood--i.e.
peasants of their land, and workers of decent employment. The acute
mal-development of the majority of the world's population cannot be
cured by simply instituting appropriate reforms--as the Social Summit
prescribes-- to strengthen current national and international
arrangements. In the same light, structural adjustment programs cannot
be expected to effect social development, especially eradication of
poverty.
But the Social Summit in Geneva provides another avenue for social
movements from different parts of the globe to muster strength and
relentlessly pursue the struggle against globalization. Build on the
significant gains of the anti-globalization struggles in Seattle and in
Bangkok, and continue the fight in Geneva. As the question of poverty
and social development takes center stage at the Social Summit in
Geneva, there should be more than enough space to espouse the bases of
our resistance against, and alternatives to globalization.
For more information on ISGN plans for the Social Summit:
Resource Center for People's Development (RCPD)
Email: [log in to unmask] and [log in to unmask] (use both)
International South Group Network:
Website: http://www.isgnweb.org/
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