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>The *last* thing that we need is for "colloquials" to go round setting >the standards for what passes as the rules of language (which is to say: >of thought). The statement above implies that language and thought are related in such a way as when language is limited, thought is limited. I have noticed, for instance, in scholarship that is sensitive to the concerns of post-modernism (such as Jordan's _The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology_) that language, in this case the artificially bounded category 'sodomy', is said to be constitutive of thought. My question to the list is whether or not the kind of sentiment about language, expressed above and in Jordan's book, etc., can be articulated without falling prey to the linguistic fallacies exposed by James Barr and embodied in every linguist's favorite fallacious example: Bo(w?)man's _Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek_. Or, does the sentiment above reject Barr's arguments completely? An answer to this question would be helpful -- my exegetical (including linguistic and semiotic) training seems to be conflicting with some of the historiography I've been encountering in my historical theological training and I'm trying to find a way to relate the two or determine that they are in disagreement. Thanks in advance, Jonathan Barlow Ph.D. student, Historical Theology St. Louis University ----------------------------------------- BARLOWnet.com 8547 Gulf Drive St. Louis, MO 63130 (314) 429-0133 (During CST Office Hours) (800) 252-5930 (Toll-Free, USA) (305) 402-8336 (Fax) (314) 429-6648 (After CST Office Hours) %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%