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Marvellous to see discussion on epistemology. The social model is and always was an epistemology in its own right that has given rise to a variety of social theories (Mike Oliver of course makes the point about the social model not being a social theory). I think that one of the biggest epistemological challenges for disability activists, allies, theorists and researchers is how we contribute to the growing poststructuralist and phenomenological work on 'the body' (Butler, Foucault, Turner, MP). This is becoming the sexy topic within the social sciences, though often these destabilising turns threaten some social facts (postmodern cough) about the material and social origins of disablement. Instead of structures we think of 'bodies', instead of social practices we look at 'discursive positions'. My concern is that as truths are laid to rest, we are offered almost Tony Blairite 'third way' positions where anything goes - particularly a reinvestment of pseudo-biological conceptions of impairment and disabiltity. Thus while Foucault offers much about the creation of disabling psy-complexes, gaze, control, intervention in the name of benevolence, a logical conclusion is that, well, we should remember the body is always there creating disability. This is worrying. Similarly, Deb Marks' advocation of psychoanalysis is all very well (I know where Deb is coming from, in terms of a politicised position on disability), but there are some incredibly essentialist postions in this field of knowledge (see Lacan, Reich, Irigary) that could seep into disability theory. A final point I would like to open up to debate is the notion of standpoint. As a researcher working with people with the label of learning difficulties, I find myself critiquing theories in terms of what they can or cannot offer a politicisation of disability and impairment. So I feel constrained by an epistemological stance - the social model - that pushes me in particular ways to look for suitably politically sensitive theories. This I think is a good thing. As Foucault put it, where there is power there is resistance. And Fairclough (1989, p28): 'The social nature of discourse and practice always implies social conventions - any discourse or practice implies social conventional types of discourse or practice ... people are enabled through being constrained: they are able to act on condition that they act within the constraints of types of practice - or of discourse. However, this makes social practice sound more rigid than it is, ... being socially constrained does not preclude being creative'. A case for being 'epistemological constrained' maybe? Dan Goodley %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%