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The first distinction appears to me to be implicit, for example, in the _Liber de Causis_ (tr. from the Arabic by Gerard of Cremona in the 1180s). The truth of a thing, if the neo-Platonic unity applies to true things inasmuch as they are therefore also simple or one (Unum et Bonum, as Aquinas says in his commentary on the Liber §1), depends on its proximity to the first cause (God). But *that* it is true (or Good or Simple) is not at issue; it is *how* it is true which fuels both the taxonomy of the Liber and its commentary tradition. Hope this is helpful, Stephen James M. Dean wrote: > "The Questions, Accounts and Testimonys falling under the Consideration of > Magistrates, go upon that Point; *what is true?* But Posterity likes very > often, and that justly, to hear *how a Thing is true,* especially in > Matters of Religion, where the Appearance of a Thing, (which however with > Men exceeding often goes for the *verum physicum & metaphysicum*) > infinitely differs from the *verum morale.*" > > Are these distinctions rooted in medieval philosophy (perhaps scholastic > philosophy/theology)? I should add that a similar distinction, but without > the "physicum" can be found in Locke; but my colleague believes the > distinction is older than Locke. Any light a List member can shed will be > much appreciated. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%