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A couple of responses to Lorin's thought-provoking post:


>There is one certain thing which possesses intrinsic value--ourselves.
>That is, we value ourselves, our own life, intrinsically (we cannot value
>ourselves instrumentally without stating a tautology (i.e. we value our
>life for the purposes of our life)).  We value other humans intrinsically
>by logical analogy to ourselves.  In other words, if we recognize that we
>have intrinsic value to ourselves, we cannot without contradiction deny
>that other systems that matter to themselves have intrinsic value.

I think I'm with you at this point, but confess I don't know what to make
of the jump (if it is a jump) from our self-conscious valuation of
ourselves, which strikes me as a form of moral/axiological deliberation, to
the idea of other "systems" that "matter to themselves."

>Ultimately, all those entities which, if they had agency, could matter to
>themselves have intrinsic value.

Do you actually mean "agency" here, or a term more akin to either
"rationality" or "self-consciousness"?  I think (higher) animals may have
more self-consciousness than either agency or rationality--but perhaps it
would be best if you elaborate a bit further.

Here I am using a notion of "hypothetical
>agency" to determine if an organism matters to itself.  It is not the case
>that an organism has to have agency to have moral status, only that its
>moral status needs to be comprehensible from the (hypothetical) position of
>a *rational* agent.

To me, this sounds like you're saying moral status needs to be
comprehensible to a "knowing" outsider--i.e. to a human who can make sense
of an idea that another organism *could* matter to itself.  OK.  But this
seems very different from suggesting that other organisms do in fact matter
to themselves.  Or it could be that I'm just thick. . . .


I believe, using Warwick Fox's notion of autopoiesis
>(self-renewal), that all organisms / systems which renew or regenerate
>themselves, matter to themselves.  Thus, if we identify the condition of
>autopoiesis, we are obligated to recognize intrinsic value.  Trees, having
>a internal principle of continued existence and the ability of
>self-renewal, matter to themselves and have intrinsic value.  Stones do
>not: they continue in existence, to be sure, but do not exhibit any
>potential for self-renewal.  From this it follows that the biosphere has
>value because it clearly has the ability for self-renewal.

Somewhere around here is where I sense I've got to get off the train.  <s>
For the benefit of the list I hope you don't mind if I quote the earlier
point I made to you in email:

>In the paper by Watson I cited on the list,  Watson objects to theories
>like the autopoietic thesis, although it may be that he conflates living
>and mechanical systems--   He traces such ideas in environmental ethics
>back to Kenneth Goodpaster's "On Being Morally Considerable," where
>Goodpaster writes (Watson's quoting), " 'the core of moral concern lies in
>respect for self-sustaining organization and integration in the face of
>pressures toward high entropy.' "  Watson's retort  to this claim is:
>"This covers everything from crystals through all living things to storms,
>ecosystems, corporations, nation states, and every other organized entity
>in the universe."  (at 205)  Does Watson's criticism extend to Fox's
>theory, or not?  I am just curious what you think--I have not thought
>about this very much at all.

And I guess the distinction between trees on the one hand, and stones on
the other, is unclear to me.  If stones erode and eventually reform from
silt and sediment to form sedimentary rock, would this not qualify as
"self-renewal"?  I realize this may be a parody of your point, but I really
do not understand the point.

Anyhow, I'm looking forward to this continued exchange,

Jim


>I accept that.
>This does not mean, however, that every atom within the earth has
>value--morality is not reductionist. Moreover, one should be aware that
>autopoiesis is not the only principle to be considered in making moral
>decisions...if this were the case, then we would have a completely
>egalitarian morality, one which would also be completely unworkable.
>Instead, autopoiesis provides a base level of moral considerability upon
>which other considerations, positive and negative, are stacked (i.e.
>instrumental value, aesthetic value).  Moral decisions are complex.
>
>PS. I'm kinda making this up as I go, so I accept that there may be great
>gaping holes in my argument, or that it may simply be a restatement of
>positions put forth by others.
>
>
>Lorin
>
>Note to Jim: this is a different vein from the one I mentioned to you
>earlier--the one from Kent Baldner using Kant's transcendental idealism.
>I'm just weighing in my mind if Baldner's position is actually workable as
>an argument against pure subjectivism.