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Robin you wrote,
1) I've seen some discussion of the difference between the reach of CMO configurations on the one hand and mid-range theory on the other on the list - but I'm not sure if there are espistemological/ philosophical distinctions between these two and if so what they are.
The concept of ‘Middle-Range Theory’ pre-dates CMO configuration. So MRT has been used extensively outside the parameters of realist evaluation. Despite how the concepts have emerged, they are quite compatible. Take the example I gave in the previous email on deterrence theory – it is widely observed and accepted that punishment to crime has an impact on crime. That is a very general description of the theory of deterrence. The CMO configuration can be used to explore how this theory plays out in contexts, given specific types of punishment in relation to types of crimes and the range of responses by people who would commit crimes. So in that sense, the CMO configuration is a heuristic to refute or refine the MRT using whatever empirical means available. The origins of middle-range theory is that of piecemeal understanding of society, culture and human behavior. The nature of society is such that we cannot arrive at universal explanatory claims, but rather need to have many interconnected middle-range theories to provide a view of society as a whole. The CMO configuration can support that agenda, but has more been used in the assessment of programmes, policies etc.
2) The other thing which I would like to hear discussion of is the classic formultion of realist vs traditional evaluative perspectives. This is framed as the difference between asking 'what works, how, in which conditions and for whom' as opposed to asking 'whether an intervention works or not'
What are the epistemological underpinnings of this difference? In particular I'm keen to unpick and examine the basis of the realist assertion that there ARE in fact underlying mechanisms which work in a positive direction in a given context, as opposed to the more neutrally based classic evaluative question of whether something works or not. What is the philospohical basis for the realist contention that there are indeed mechanisms which work? What are the other assumptions about the way the world works that go along with this belief? Is there a philosphical optimism underpinning the realist view of the world or is this merely a discursive difference?
This is a fantastic question. Let’s see if anyone else picks this up!!
Justin
Hope these make sense,
Robin
Robin Sen
Lecturer in Social Work
Department of Sociological Studies
University of Sheffield
Elmfield
Northumberland RoadSheffield S10 2TU
On 22 September 2017 at 09:04, Jagosh, Justin <[log in to unmask]
> wrote: Dear Colleagues,
I will be hosting a one-day intensive on the Philosophical Foundations of Realist Evaluation on October 11th 2017 with a follow-up on-line webinar on November 16th. In the workshop participants will expand their thinking on key concepts related to Realist Philosophy and Realist Evaluation, for the purpose of expanding capacity to conduct complex realist analyses and to theorize programmes using ‘retroduction.’ The workshop will include practical exercises to help participants understand such concepts as “retroduction/abduction”, “mechanisms”, “context + mechanism”, “demi-regularities”, “emergence”, “theory falsifiability”, and “middle-range theory.” If you are interested in attending the workshop, space is available, and registration will remain open until Thursday, October 5th.
Even if you are not able to attend the workshop, but are still interested discussing concepts in the philosophy of realist evaluation, we can share ideas on this forum! Here is a statement about these concepts to stir up dormant questions and productive disputation. If you have any thoughts on the ideas presented or want to pose further questions, please do so as it will contribute to a rich and needed discussion online:
Considering the concepts: “CMO configuration”, “demi-regularity”, and “middle-range theory” – they impart a strikingly common message, not immediately apparent. To reveal this common theme it is first necessary to understand the realist treatment of ontology (i.e., what we accept “reality” to be). One of the key facets of realist ontology is that reality is stratified in layers, and at some level of depth lies dormant or latent mechanisms. In an un-activated form, such dormant mechanisms are like un-manifested, or theoretical ‘universal laws’. Looking through a realist lens it can be argued that although universal laws do “exist”, they exist in theory - in other words they are latent, or dormant until they are activated. It is only when they are activated that they can be empirically researched. Here lies the greatest paradox of research: The manifestation of such universal laws means that, in their actualization (or triggering), they “interface” or are modified by context, thus creating context-specific outcomes. The universal law of gravity for example, means that universally, any mass has the power to attract other masses to it. That law is universal, (literally applicable to the universe). However in manifested reality, gravitational pull differs based on differences in the mass of objects in question. In the absence of a realist basis to science, we may conflate the specific gravitational pull of the earth with the universal truth of gravitational mass attraction. The physical and social sciences are vulnerable to this conflation. The quest to uncover ‘universal laws’ or ‘universal truths’ through research presents an ultimate paradox, which is that there is no universal truth in manifested reality that isn’t modified by the context of its manifestation. How then, can research distinguish between the intrinsic working of things and the conditional modifications that are always present in manifestation? The CMO configuration is brilliant in its attempt to address this.
“CMO configuration”, “demi-regularity” and “middle-range theory” are all concepts that implicitly acknowledge the contextual modifications of universal truths in their manifested form. Upon manifestation, such laws are always a product of the context-mechanism interaction. A demi-regularity is exactly this: (universal) regularity in principle, demi-regularity in practice. Similarly, a middle-range theory is not a totalizing, universal account – but an account that may contain a slice of universal truth with receptivity to the particulars of context. Example: “punishment for committing a crime deters criminal activity” is a theory of the middle-range because it says something universal about human nature, but leaves the door open to explanatory variations in how this may play out, in different context, for different people, with different forms of punishment, and different crimes. The falsifiability of this theory sets up the conditions for exposing contextual variation. The irony is that despite a natural quest to find universal laws, truths and generalizable facts through research, it is the discovery of the conditionality of such laws and developing insight into the significance of the context-mechanism interaction that will create emancipatory knowledge.
Justin
Justin Jagosh, Ph.D
Director, Centre for Advancement in Realist Evaluation and Synthesis (CARES)
www.realistmethodology-cares.
org &
Honorary Research Associate
Institute for Psychology, Health and Society
University of Liverpool, UK